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 Abstract 
This thesis explores the application of quality risk management (QRM) in 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies and its effectiveness at managing 
risk to the patient.  The objective of the research described in this thesis was to 
characterize a maturity state of QRM implementation in which the patient is adequately 
protected from the risks associated with medicinal products of inadequate quality.  The 
research was conducted over three phases: first, to determine whether patients are better 
protected since the publication of ICH Q9, a commonly employed guidance on the 
application of QRM; second, to characterize the industry with regard to QRM maturity, 
including the effectiveness of QRM application, the behaviors, attitudes, and 
motivations of the people working with and within QRM, and the governance and 
oversight of QRM efforts; and third, to construct a mature QRM program and 
associated maturity measurement tool to accelerate improvements in QRM and better 
protect the patient.  The research employed a mixed methods approach, including the 
research methods of literature review, philosophical dialogues, benchmarking survey, 
semi-structured interview, and pilot case studies.  The research concluded that the 
patient is no better protected since the inception of QRM and the level of QRM maturity 
throughout the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries remains rather low.  
However, the research also indicated that progression towards the more mature QRM 
model proposed in thesis may help firms perform QRM in a more effective manner, 
resulting in improved management of risk to the patient. 
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1 Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This thesis outlines the objectives and progress of the research study into quality risk 
management maturity within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, 
based upon the International Council on Harmonisation (ICH) Guidelines Q8 
Pharmaceutical Development, Q9 Quality Risk Management, and Q10 Pharmaceutical 
Quality System.  The research study commenced in July 2014 for the explicit purpose 
of inquiring as to the value that Quality Risk Management (QRM) brings to the patient, 
and how best to define, measure, and accelerate risk maturity in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries.  For the purposes of this thesis, the term “risk maturity” 
is used interchangeably with “quality risk management maturity” and is defined as the 
level of effectiveness of a QRM program to bring value to the patient. 
This thesis consists of four sections and twelve chapters in total, as shown in Table 1-1.  
This chapter serves as a general introduction to the industrial and regulatory climate in 
which the research is being conducted, as well as the focus of the research and problem 
it addresses. 
Section One, inclusive of Chapters Two and Three, describes the foundations of the 
research.  
Chapter Two provides an overview of the literature review conducted, including a 
critical analysis of the ICH guidelines that serve as a primary input into the research. 
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Table 1-1: General Structure of the Thesis 
Section Chapter 
Section One: A Brief 
History of Risk and 
Research 
Chapter Two: Initial Literature Review 
Chapter Three: The Research Approach 
Section Two: 
Characterizing the 
Current State 
Chapter Four: Have Patients Realized the Benefits of 
QRM? 
Chapter Five: How Mature is Industry in its QRM 
Application?  
Chapter Six: Learning from Risk Management Practices 
in Other Industries 
Section Three: 
Recoding QRM to 
Better Protect the 
Patient 
Chapter Seven: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - 
People 
Chapter Eight: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - 
Process 
Chapter Nine: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - 
Governance 
Chapter Ten: Measuring QRM Maturity 
Section Four: 
Implications of the 
Research 
Chapter Eleven: Focus Areas for Future Research 
Chapter Twelve: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Chapter Three explores the ontological underpinning of the research, the research 
question, the methods and methodology, and reviews the progression of the research 
throughout its tenure. 
Section Two includes Chapters Four, Five, and Six, targeted at characterizing the 
current state of quality risk management in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries. 
Chapter Four explores the extent to which the patient has realized the benefits of QRM 
through improved quality of medicines. 
Chapter Five details the current state of industry with regard to QRM practices and 
perceptions. 
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Chapter Six explores the application of risk management in other industries, including 
medical devices, aerospace, and nuclear power, and explains key learnings that were 
applied in later stages of the research. 
Section Three of this thesis, composed of Chapters Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten, defines 
the ideal state with regard to QRM and provides a comprehensive tool kit to assist 
industry with progressing towards this ideal state. 
Chapter Seven focuses on the people working within the ideal QRM program, including 
the knowledge and culture necessary to enable risk maturity. 
Chapter Eight re-envisions the QRM process to strengthen the link between QRM 
activities and patient protection. 
Chapter Nine outlines the purpose of governance within a mature QRM program and 
defines critical elements and structure necessary to achieve excellence. 
Chapter Ten completes Section Three by describing a measurement tool to gauge the 
level of risk maturity at a given company and facilitate progression towards the ideal 
state. 
Section Four, the final section of the thesis, summarizes the research effort and suggests 
areas for continued evolution of QRM. 
Chapter Eleven provides suggested focus areas for future research into QRM. 
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Chapter Twelve concludes the research effort and offers recommendations to industry 
and regulators to better manage risk to patients 
 
The research study described in this thesis focuses on quality risk management (QRM), 
a relatively recent concept that involves the application of risk management principles 
and practices to the control and enhancement of drug product quality.  The goals of 
QRM are myriad, but in the researcher’s view may be summarized as follows: 
Quality risk management aims to protect the patient through the understanding and 
management of product quality risks. 
The sections that follow will briefly introduce the climate in which pharmaceutical 
and biopharmaceutical companies operate, the concepts of risk and risk management, 
and the types of risks the research explores.  Finally, the problem the research seeks to 
address is presented. 
1.1 Research context 
Looking over the roughly 6,000 years of societal history, several scientific advances 
stand out as truly transformational—advances that changed the world.  The most 
revolutionary of these was the dawn of modern medicine.  Borne of necessity (and some 
creativity), modern medicine has enabled a consistent, scientific approach to the 
diagnosis and treatment of human disease, increasing the human lifespan and enhancing 
the quality of the lives lived within it.  The lion’s share of the credit for these 
achievements goes to the advent of medicinal products.  These products tackle the 
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causes of human disease, alleviate debilitating symptoms, and empower our species to 
focus beyond mere survival towards other endeavors; as a result, medicinal products 
have enabled human progress.  The pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries 
(collectively termed “industry” throughout this thesis) are two of the bodies that 
discover, develop, and manufacture these products for human use.  The contribution of 
these industries to human health is immeasurable; these industries are the engines 
behind modern medicine.   
Medicinal products are defined as “any substance or combination of substances 
presenting as having properties for treating or preventing disease in human beings.” (1)  
There are generally considered to be two types of medicinal products: pharmaceuticals 
and biopharmaceuticals.1  Both pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products are 
intended to affect the structure or function of human physiology in order to diagnose, 
cure, mitigate, treat, or prevent disease. (2)  Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
products differ primarily in their manufacturing process, either through traditional 
chemical isolation or synthesis or through a biological process involving natural 
(biological) sources. The term “drug” is synonymous with “medicinal product” and is 
used to describe both pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals. 
Over time, the extent to which the world relies on drugs to protect and advance human 
health has steadily increased.  Worldwide revenue of the global pharmaceutical market 
grew from US$390.2 billion in 2001 to $1.1 trillion in 2014, with global drug spending 
                                                 
1 Technology is increasingly blurring the lines between the typology of medicinal products.  For example, 
many newer products incorporate both a medical device and a medicinal product, or a biological product 
with a pharmaceutical product, creating a new class called “combination products.”  So as to not 
unnecessarily complicate the concepts, this research paper will focus on pharmaceuticals and 
biopharmaceuticals, irrespective of any associated sub-classifications. 
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expected to reach $1.4 trillion by 2020. (3)  Biopharmaceuticals are expected to capture 
a larger proportion of spending in the near term, with expected revenues of $445 billion 
by 2019. (4)  These monetary figures are rough (and perhaps imprecise) surrogates for 
the true measure of the breadth and strength of the drug industry—the number of 
patients served.  Regardless of debates around drug pricing, costs associated with 
production and distribution, and access strategies in developed and emerging markets, 
the number of patients with access to medicines continues to increase. 
The success associated with treatment rates is undermined, however, by several very 
real and very grave facts.  Despite consistent progress in this area, not all patients who 
need drugs have access to them.  Of those patients who do, this access can be threatened 
by myriad issues, including quality problems.  Consider, for example, Roche’s 
antiretroviral medicine Viracept (nelfinavir).  This product treats HIV-infected patients 
of all ages, and was hailed as a medical breakthrough throughout the world for its 
effectiveness in alleviating the symptoms and disease progression of HIV.  The 
relatively low cost of the drug allowed for a relatively broad level of global access to 
this product, particularly in historically underserved regions such as Africa-- that is, 
until a manufacturing quality problem resulted in a temporary but significant market 
withdrawal in 2007.  A simple manufacturing issue (improper cleaning of a tank) had 
resulted in the creation of a genotoxic impurity known as ethyl mesylate.  A large-scale 
recall of the drug was initiated in response, leading to a lack of treatment for large 
patient populations with deadly consequences. (5) (6) 
Another example of quality problems hindering access to life-saving medicines 
occurred in 2009, due to a viral contamination event at the Genzyme plant that 
manufactured the biopharmaceutical drugs Cerezyme and Fabrazyme.  Cerezyme and 
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Fabrazyme treat rare genetic diseases known as Gaucher’s and Fabry’s, respectively.  
Both Gaucher’s and Fabry’s disease are lysosomal storage disorders—diseases in 
which the body lacks certain enzymes necessary to break down fatty acids, resulting in 
the buildup of these chemicals in the body. (7) (8)  Left untreated, most patients 
succumb to their disease. (9) (10)  When a viral contamination event at Genzyme left 
the company unable to continue to supply product to market, many patients had no 
choice but to reduce their dosing schemes or forgo treatment altogether, ultimately 
leading to several deaths. (11) (12)  The impact of these drug shortages echo to the 
present day—while the Fabrazyme shortage was resolved in July 2016, Cerezyme 
remains on critical medicines shortage lists—a full seven years after the contamination 
event. (13) 
These incidents, among others, eroded the trust between industry and the public; after 
all, these events were ultimately predictable and avoidable.  One technique with a 
proven history of success has been used in many industries (such as finance, nuclear 
energy, and aerospace) to predict and avoid such crises. This technique, risk 
management, is at the core of this research effort. 
1.2 Overview of risk management principles and practices 
“Risk” has become a ubiquitous term in contemporary society, but is used in such a 
wide variety of contexts that its meaning has been blurred.  The International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on 
objectives.” (14)  Indeed, the world is riddled with uncertainty—a necessary byproduct 
of our inability to foretell the future.  In the event the future could be precisely predicted, 
it could be controlled, rendering all types of endeavors successful.  Unfortunately, this 
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is not the world we live in, nor the world in which businesses operate.  As such, “all 
activities of an organization involve risk.” (15)   
The mere existence of risk does not imply a foregone conclusion of failure, of course; 
risk can be both defined and calculated, allowing the exercise of some influence in the 
form of knowledge.2  The magnitude of risk is calculated as the combination of the 
probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm, exhibited in a simple 
equation: (16) 
Likelihood x Severity = Risk 
This calculation captures the main concerns associated with risk—the chances that 
some undesirable event will occur, and how bad it might be if it does.  The level of 
concern rises as egregious outcomes become increasingly likely, and subsides when 
consequences are less severe or rarer.  In this way, the concept and calculation of risk 
reflects the general amount of apprehension with which we approach various activities. 
It follows that the management of risks is necessary to increase the probability that an 
identified goal will be achieved.  For example, a thrill-seeking sky diver does not 
blindly launch him or herself out of an airplane; rather, specific safety controls are 
employed to ensure the jump will be successful.  In the context of business, risk 
management is defined both as “coordinated activities to direct and control an 
organization with regard to risk” and the “systematic application of management 
                                                 
2 Because the term “risk” is both a concept and an equation, the term “hazard” has been introduced to 
make a more clear distinction.  Hazards are defined as “potential sources of harm,” (16) and serve to 
replace the concept (noun) form of the term “risk.” However, because this distinction may confuse those 
who do not specialize in risk management, in most cases throughout this report the terms “risk” and 
“hazard” are used interchangeably. 
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policies, procedures and practices to the activities of communicating, consulting, 
establishing the context, and identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring 
and reviewing risk.” (14)  Using the latter definition, risk management is universally 
acknowledged as a process consisting of the identification of risks, the analysis of risks 
to determine their criticality (using, for example, the risk equation listed above), and 
the disposition of risks based on organizational objectives.  The risk management 
process is then repeated as the internal or external business climate evolves. (15) 
The goals of risk management vary based upon the intent of application.  For example, 
risk management may be employed to: 
• increase the likelihood of achieving objectives 
• encourage proactive management 
• increase awareness of the need to identify and treat risk throughout the 
organization 
• improve the identification of opportunities and threats 
• comply with relevant legal and regulatory requirements and international 
norms 
• improve mandatory and voluntary reporting 
• improve governance 
• improve stakeholder confidence and trust 
• establish a reliable basis for decision making and planning 
• improve controls 
• effectively allocate and use resources for risk treatment 
• improve operational effectiveness and efficiency; 
• enhance health and safety performance, as well as environmental protection 
• improve loss prevention and incident management 
• minimize losses 
• improve organizational learning, and 
• improve organizational resilience (15) 
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Regardless of the individual goal for which risk management is invoked, it is always 
used to help ensure business objectives are met.  With regard to medicinal products, 
therefore, risk management assures the safety of the patient and the effectiveness of the 
drug.  The application of risk management is vital to ensure the primary business 
objective of these industries is met: to serve the patient. 
1.3 The general focus of the research 
Within the realm of medicinal products, one can identify two general categories of risk 
to the patient: intrinsic risk and extrinsic risk.  Table 1-2 delineates the various 
characteristics of, and differences between, these two categories of risk.3 
Intrinsic risks are those inherent to a given drug, given the nature of certain biochemical 
reactions within the body when exposed to a drug or its constituent parts.  Intrinsic risks 
generally surface during research and development and in the clinic, and are weighed 
against the overall medical benefits of the product when determining whether the drug 
is suitable for commercial sale.  For example, while the risk of suicidal thoughts or 
feelings might be considered acceptable in the context of an antidepressant medication 
where such underlying urges may already be present, that same risk would be 
unacceptable if it were to accompany a mild pain-reliever such as ibuprofen.  The 
acceptability of intrinsic risks is therefore relative, based on the therapeutic benefits a 
drug delivers.   
                                                 
3 While some sources allude to these different types of risks, few make a clear distinction between 
intrinsic and extrinsic risk (excepting the FDA Risk Management Task Force (40)). As such, and because 
this distinction is crucial to understand the scope and focus of the research, most of the ideas in this 
section are the researcher’s alone. 
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Table 1-2: Intrinsic vs. extrinsic risk 
 Intrinsic risks Extrinsic risks 
Originate from The medicinal product itself External events or circumstances 
Types 
• Adverse reactions 
• Risks communicated 
via warnings / 
precautions 
• Contraindications 
• Dosing or medication 
errors 
• Counterfeiting or 
tampering 
• Shortages 
• Quality risks (the focus 
of this research) 
Communicated to 
patients 
• Labeling 
• Medication guides 
• Specific risk 
management plans 
• Special notices 
(reactively identified 
events) 
• Almost never 
(proactively identified 
circumstances) 
Identified through 
• Clinical studies 
• Post-market 
pharmacovigilance 
• Complaints 
• Deviations 
• Proactive quality risk 
management 
Managed through 
Market authorization holder 
(MAH) to patient 
communication and risk 
management plans 
• Corrective and 
preventive action 
(CAPA) 
• Risk 
reduction/mitigation 
Potential 
consequences to 
patient 
Range from negligible to 
life-threatening 
Range from negligible to life-
threatening 
 
Generally, intrinsic risks are communicated to patients and their healthcare providers 
through product labeling.  Labeling allows for the sharing of intrinsic risk information 
so that patients, in consultation with their medical teams, can make informed decisions 
regarding the course of their care.  While requirements for drug product labeling vary 
by region, in most instances the communication of intrinsic risks can be subdivided into 
a number of categories, including adverse reactions, warnings and precautions, and 
contraindications.  Adverse reactions (known in some regions as side effects or 
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undesirable effects) are conditions that the patient might reasonably expect to occur 
during use of the medicinal product that are undesirable in nature. (17)  Adverse 
reactions are numerous and variable, and may include (but are certainly not limited to) 
dry mouth, drowsiness, stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea.  Side effects are 
often discovered over the course of clinical trials, and may be further refined through 
data from adverse event reporting, complaints, and pharmacovigilance activities that 
occur in the commercial phase of the product lifecycle. 
Warnings and precautions are extensions of adverse reactions that might threaten the 
patient’s health and well-being, either because the adverse reaction is severe enough to 
impact decisions regarding a patient’s care or because the adverse reaction might 
require more specific precautions to be communicated to the patient. (18)  For example, 
the common analgesic and fever reducer paracetamol (called acetaminophen in the US) 
comes with a warning regarding liver failure in doses in excess of recommendations. 
(19) (20)  Intrinsic risks grouped within warnings and precautions are often discovered 
during drug development but may also be included to highlight logical consequences 
of known side effects (as is the case, for example, when drugs that cite drowsiness as 
an adverse reaction also include a precaution against driving and operating heavy 
machinery).  Warnings and precautions, therefore, are derived from risk assessments in 
which the gravity of the risk (likelihood of harm, severity of the harm, or a combination 
thereof) or consequences of drug administration might pose a threat to the patient in an 
unintended way. 
Contraindications are an additional class of intrinsic risk in which a causal relationship 
between the drug and some other physiological condition (a disease condition or cohort 
of the patient population) exists and may result in an adverse reaction. (18)  For 
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example, certain drugs may be contraindicated for use in children, pregnant or lactating 
women, or the elderly, while others may be ill-advised for administration when the 
patient is immunocompromised due to a co-existing condition.  In addition, certain 
drugs may interact with other drugs, resulting in serious consequences that jeopardize 
the patient’s overall health, as is the case when two classes of antidepressant drugs 
(monoamine oxidase inhibitors, or MAOIs, and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, 
or SSRIs) are used simultaneously. (21)  
Regulatory authorities around the world base product approval decisions on a variety 
of factors, the most important of which is the benefit-risk profile.4  This evaluation 
weighs the intrinsic risks of the product (such as the nature of adverse reactions that 
may occur, the relative severity of the reactions, and their estimated or confirmed rate 
of occurrence in the target patient population) against the medical benefits of the 
product.  In most cases, the benefits of the product must clearly outweigh the risks in 
order to be considered appropriate for commercial use; panels of experts are often used 
to guide the final decision, though quantitative risk assessment models may be 
employed to calibrate the scientific judgment of decision-makers. (22)  In some cases, 
however, the data may reveal that the benefits outweigh the risks only in certain 
circumstances, or certain risks are severe enough to warrant additional management to 
ensure the benefit-risk profile remains favorable.  In these instances, a regulatory 
authority may call for the proposal and enactment of a risk management plan (RMP) to 
manage these risks in a commercial setting. 
                                                 
4 In some regions, such as the US, and with some products, such as medical devices, the term “risk-
benefit” is used to denote this concept. 
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Risk management plans (referred to as Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies, or 
REMS, in the US), are plans to manage intrinsic risk through the application of targeted 
controls.  The nature of the controls varies based on the risk, and are intended to assure 
that the medical benefits of the drug product continue to outweigh the risks. (23)  For 
example, the medication isotretinoin (originally marketed under the brand name 
Accutane) offers significant relief to patients with severe acne, a painful condition that 
can negatively impact patients’ self-confidence.  Isotretinoin is incredibly effective in 
the treatment of acne, in most cases eliminating the condition altogether; however, it 
can also cause severe birth defects. (24)  Despite the fact that the drug’s labeling 
documents a contraindication for pregnant women, a risk management plan was 
deemed necessary in order to ensure that women would not become pregnant while 
using the product.  The REMS for isotretinoin, called iPledge, includes a medication 
guide, a certification program for prescribing physicians and dispensing pharmacies, 
and mandatory enrollment of patients in the iPledge program. Risk controls associated 
with the iPledge program include limited prescribing allowances (no more than 30 days 
of medication with no refills at any time), contraception counseling between the 
healthcare provider and patient, two pregnancy tests performed prior to drug 
administration with monthly follow up tests thereafter, certification from the patient 
that she will use two forms of contraception throughout the treatment period, and other 
similar controls. (25)   These additional risk controls are intended to ensure that the 
benefits of isotretinoin (the treatment and potential elimination of severe acne) 
outweigh the risks (severe birth defects) by preventing fetal exposure to the drug. 
Regulators and industry acknowledge that the data obtained during drug development 
and clinical testing may not be sufficient to reveal all intrinsic risks.  As a result, 
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ongoing pharmacovigilance is required.  Pharmacovigilance is “the science and 
activities relating to the detection, assessment, understanding and prevention of adverse 
effects or any other possible drug-related problems.” (26)  Conducted in a post-market 
environment, these programs enable the identification of signals that might indicate a 
new intrinsic risk, or provide additional data regarding the frequency and severity of 
known risks that can further inform the benefit-risk balance. (27)  New information 
gleaned from pharmacovigilance may result in the discontinuation of a product.  For 
example, the popular weight loss drug fenfluramine was discontinued in 1997 after 
pharmacovigilance activities revealed a correlation with heart valve disease and 
pulmonary hypertension, conditions not previously identified in clinical trials. (28) 
Historically, pharmacological research and drug approval regulation have focused 
primarily on these intrinsic risks; as such, intrinsic risks garnered the most industry and 
regulatory scrutiny.  Patients benefit from the broad communication of intrinsic risks 
through mechanisms that include product labeling, as described above, as well as tightly 
regulated risk management in the form of initial product approval decisions, risk 
management plans that may be required during commercialization, and ongoing 
pharmacovigilance.  However, intrinsic risks are only a portion of the total risk a patient 
may be exposed to during their use of a medicinal product.  The other category of risks, 
extrinsic risks, may have similarly grave consequences, yet have been comparatively 
neglected until recent times. 
Extrinsic risk can be defined as unintended risks to the patient arising from events or 
circumstances unrelated to the drug product itself; for example, dosing errors, 
counterfeiting or tampering, drug shortages, or risks introduced during manufacturing, 
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packaging, labeling, distribution, or storage.  A critical subset of these are quality 
risks—risks to patients that are associated with the quality of the medicinal product. 
Quality risks are a nefarious bunch.  Because quality problems often manifest as failures 
to meet specifications, and because drug specifications address chemical and 
biochemical attributes of the product, quality problems are often invisible to the patient.  
Quality problems can vary by manufacturer and batch—as such, the same drug might 
expose patients to different quality risks, depending on the brand or product lot number.  
Patients are rarely informed of the potential quality risks associated with a given 
product, limiting their ability to make informed choices about their healthcare by 
restricting their access to critical information.  Finally, quality risks may greatly affect 
the benefit-risk balance of product, since products are approved for sale based on a 
favorable benefit-risk ratio, and quality risks introduce new considerations in that 
equation.   
Patients and healthcare providers have an inherent assumption that a product’s intrinsic 
risk has been accepted through regulatory approval, and that the drug they administer 
or receive is both safe and effective.  Regulators and industry acknowledge, of course, 
that deviations from cGMP and product-specific quality attributes could threaten the 
critical link between an individual dose of a medicinal product and its marketing 
authorization, thereby rendering the drug “adulterated.”  In other words, any quality 
risk imposed in addition to the drug’s intrinsic risk upsets the benefit-risk balance, and 
should therefore be identified and controlled.  Despite the criticality of quality risks, 
they were overshadowed by the concern with intrinsic risks until recent times. 
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1.4 Problem this research addresses 
When patients take a medicine, they exercise their trust in the pharmaceutical industry.  
They trust that the product is as it is labeled, and that no external circumstance might 
put them at risk beyond that disclosed in the labeling.  They trust that drug 
manufacturers have produced the product in safe and consistent way, and that their 
health and safety is protected.  The market does not distinguish between high or low-
quality drugs, because acceptable quality is presumed to be present. (29) 
As recent events attest—this assumption is far from the truth.  While the sources of 
quality problems, consequences of poor quality drug products, and the resultant patient 
impact have been well documented, a rigorous inquiry into a methodological approach 
to the resolution of these issues is notably absent.  This research effort seeks to fill this 
gap by defining the effective use of QRM, a key solution for the “quality problem.”   
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Section One: A Brief History of Risk 
and Research 
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“Risk is like fire: If controlled it will help you; if uncontrolled it 
will rise up and destroy you.” 
- Theodore Roosevelt 
 
"The easy way out usually leads back in." 
- Peter Senge  
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2 Chapter Two: Introductory Literature Review 
 
The research commenced with a review of the extant literature.  There is a wealth of 
texts on the topic of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, from 
sources spanning regulations, regulatory guidance documents, books, industry 
whitepapers, peer-reviewed articles, presentations from regulators and industry 
practitioners, and commentary and opinion pieces.  Because the literature is rich with 
different perspectives, many of which illustrate the evolving understanding of QRM 
that is so pivotal to the research, the researcher has included, where applicable, a 
thoughtful appraisal of various conceptual breakthroughs, thought leadership, and 
shortcomings. The literature serves as a consistent element of the research design and 
is drawn upon heavily in later chapters as well.   
This chapter focuses on the literature review performed to orient the researcher in the 
topic of QRM within industry.  The chapter begins with a brief (and therefore self-
consciously incomplete) history of risk management in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries.  The applicable ICH guidelines that serve as the 
foundation of the research effort are then reviewed, followed by QRM-related books 
and technical reports issued by industry thought leaders.  The literature review as 
documented in this chapter proceeds chronologically by source, rather than by theme, 
in order to demonstrate the evolution of thinking on QRM related topics over time. 
Additional chapters of the final thesis will include topic-specific literature reviews as 
applicable to the phases of the research: 
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• Chapters Four and Five describe the conduct and outcomes of the Phase 1 and 
2 research, focused on characterization the current state of industry with 
regard to QRM implementation and benefit realization.  The literature 
discussed in these chapters support this baseline characterization, including 
potential contributing factors that may have influenced the current state. 
• Chapter Six explores the application of risk management in industries with 
longer and more mature histories of its use.  The literature discussed in 
Chapter Six will serve as the primary source for this external benchmarking. 
• Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine describe the conduct and outcomes of the 
Phase 3 research, focused on defining a mature state of QRM application to 
enable industry to perform QRM activities more effectively.  The literature 
discussed in these chapters will help define the ideal state from a variety of 
perspectives, including regulation, industry, and academia. 
Figure 2-A maps the various topics to be explored as part of the literature review 
with the applicable chapters or section in which they are discussed. 
 
Figure 2-A: Literature map 
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Rather than proceeding chronologically by source, as in this chapter, the supplemental 
literature reviews will discuss the literature by theme as the full breadth of ideas in the 
research effort are introduced. 
2.1 The emergence of quality risk management as a concept and a 
discipline for medicinal products 
2.1.1 Early pharmaceutical risk management 
Risk management has been a foundational element of the regulation of healthcare 
products since the inception of related regulatory bodies; indeed, one could argue that 
the primary reason such regulatory bodies exist is to protect the public from health and 
safety risks associated with medicinal product use.   
Some sources date early formularies, known as pharmacopeias, back to first century 
AD Greek texts (such as Pliny’s catalogue of medicinal herbs in Naturalis Historae). 
(30)  The earliest known regulation for such pharmacopeia was the Salerno Medical 
Edict issued by Frederick II of Sicily in 1240, which required apothecaries to prepare 
their medicinal remedies in the same way. (31)  Such laws, which became increasingly 
pervasive throughout the European continent during medieval times, recognized that 
consistency across drug formulations was necessary in order to assure the intended 
effects of the product, thereby minimizing risk to the patient. 
The late 19th century saw additional drug legislation come into effect.  In the US, the 
first such legislation occurred following the Mexican-American war of 1846 – 1848, 
during which American soldiers were administered various drugs for a host of maladies 
(including malaria, yellow fever, and cholera).  Many of these drugs were imported, 
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and some proved to lack the safety and efficacy needed to fully protect the troops.  The 
large number of deaths that occurred in that period can be attributed not only to the 
typical slaughter seen in wartime, but also to these faulty drugs.  The US Import Drug 
Act of 1848 was sanctioned to ensure that any such imported drug was subject to purity 
and quality testing prior to passing through the border. (32) The Import Drug Act 
established a theme for drug regulation the world over—advances in pharmaceutical 
regulation general occur as a consequence of tragedy in the public eye, seeking to 
manage risk to patient safety and health reactively. 
In the US, which represents the world’s largest population of drug consumers, the 
growth in both scope and statute of the FDA was borne of several highly publicized 
tragedies.  Figure 2-B illustrates this trend for selected early milestones in American 
drug law. (31) (32) (33) (34) 
This pattern of reactivity, where healthcare disaster is antecedent to advances in 
regulatory science, continues to the present day.  For example, the heparin scandal of 
2008 led to many dozens of deaths, followed by a surge in attention to the management 
of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) and control over the increasingly complex 
supply chain. (35) (36)  While this reactive process serves to prevent future injury and 
death, one is left with a tinge of regret at the prospect that such tragedies could have 
been anticipated and avoided with the application of right tools and the right conviction.  
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1846 – 1848:
Troops die 
due to poor 
quality of 
imported 
medicines
1905:
Upton Sinclair 
publishes The 
Jungle, an 
expose on the 
US 
meatpacking 
industry
1937:
Sulfanilamide 
liquid kills 107 
people due to 
inclusion of 
diethylene 
glycol in 
formulation
1941:
Sulfathiazole 
tablets kill or 
injure 300 
people due to 
contamination 
with 
phenobarbital
1848:
Import Drug Act 
passed
1906:
Food and Drug Act 
passed; FDA 
created
1938:
Federal Food, 
Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act 
passed; 
preapproval 
required based on 
safety data
1941:
FDA introduces 
good 
manufacturing 
practices (GMPs)
1962:
Thalidomide 
causes severe 
birth defects 
in ~10,000 
babies born in 
western 
Europe
1962:
Kafauver-Harris 
Drug Amendments 
passed; 
preapproval to 
also include 
efficacy data
 
Figure 2-B: (Select) timeline of US drug law milestones and public health tragedies 
 
2.1.2 The precautionary principle 
The precautionary principle represents one of the first proactive risk management 
mindsets to reach the public sphere.  Originally discussed in the context of 
environmental law making, the principle asserts that when faced with uncertainty 
regarding a given risk, particularly when the consequences of the risk may have serious 
and lasting effects, an abundance of caution must be used to provide the desired level 
of protection to society. 5 (37) (38)  The principle serves as a decision-making guideline 
for regulators, to be invoked in circumstances where scientific evidence regarding a 
certain risk is lacking.  In these cases, a failure to actively avoid the risk could lead to 
an incredible amount of damage, both of person and of cost; therefore, the only 
                                                 
5 While the precautionary principle was first formally implemented in 1974 in a German law on clear air 
(39), the researcher suggests that the main tenets of the principle have been engrained in human nature 
throughout our existence.  The inherent risk- (and likewise uncertainty-) aversion of the species has 
enabled survival over millennia, as otherwise our curiosity would most certainly have gotten the best of 
us. 
39 
 
appropriate response is to implement the appropriate measures (such as banning a given 
substance) to protect the public while simultaneously seeking to increase understanding 
of the risks. (37) (38) 
As a decision aid, the precautionary principle can be viewed as a rudimentary risk 
management process, as illustrated in Figure 2-C. (37) (38) (39)  
The proactive nature of the precautionary principle stems from the early identification 
of sources of uncertainty, combined with the concerted effort to avoid the associated 
risk until the uncertainty can be reduced or eliminated.  In this way, the concept of risk 
is linked with scientific knowledge, such that appropriate risk management can only be 
effectively applied where there is sufficient understanding upon which sound 
conclusions can be drawn.  The precautionary principle and the effects of uncertainty 
will be explored further in Chapter Six. 
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Potential risk
Is the risk 
highly 
uncertain?
Evaluate the 
potential 
consequences of 
the risk to 
determine harmful 
effects
Are the 
consequences 
very severe?
Evaluate costs and 
benefits of 
inaction
Will society be 
adequately 
protected in we do 
nothing?
Conduct scientific 
studies to improve 
understanding of 
the risk and its 
probability of 
harm
YES
NO
YES
NO
NO
YES
Conduct risk assessment; 
make decisions based on 
benefit-risk profile
Take action (e.g. 
withdraw or ban 
substance)
 
Figure 2-C: Decision tree illustrating the application of the precautionary principle, as 
proposed by the researcher 
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2.1.3 Modern inquiries into the role of risk management in pharmaceutical 
regulation 
Modern exploration of risk management for pharmaceuticals arose with a 1999 report 
to the FDA commissioner from the Task Force on Risk Management6.  This task force, 
established by then-commissioner Dr. Jane Henney, was tasked with determining the 
technical soundness, consistency, and validity of risk management activities ongoing 
within FDA at the time, and the construction of recommendations to improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of these activities.  The final report from the Task Force, 
entitled Managing the Risks from Medical Product Use: Creating a Risk Management 
Framework, focused on the premarket risk assessments7 performed in support of New 
Drug Applications (NDAs) for pharmaceuticals, Biological License Applications 
(BLAs) for biopharmaceuticals and biologics, and Premarket Approvals (PMAs) for 
medical devices, as well as post-market surveillance activities. (40)  The report did not 
explore quality-related risk management, explaining that “injury from product defects 
is unusual in the United States because of the great attention paid to product quality 
control and quality assurance during manufacturing.” (40)  Despite this claim, the report 
goes on to cite several case studies of injury and death that, through a contemporary 
understanding of product quality, could be traced to a lack of QRM. 
                                                 
6 Some earlier regulation and guidelines had sought to apply risk management processes from 
engineering trades to medical devices, particularly in concert with design control.  These began in 1993 
in the EU with the issuance of 93/42/EEC, commonly known as the Medical Device Directive, followed 
in the US with the issuance of “Design Control Guidance for Medical Device Manufacturers” in 1997.  
Internationally, ISO 14971 from 2000 and ISO 13485 in 2003 strengthened the link between risk 
management and product development.  The application of risk management in medical devices is 
discussed further in Chapter Six. 
7 Premarket risk assessments are primarily comprised of the benefit-risk assessments described in 
Chapter One. 
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One example describes a spate of product mix-ups that led to the administration of the 
wrong drug in a hospital setting, leading to three injuries and one death.  The distributor, 
Burroughs Wellcome, packaged the implicated product in a similar way to other 
products—including a foil overlay with a transparent window through which the 
original product labeling could be viewed.  The design of this foil overlay allowed for 
movement of the product within, allowing for the product label to slip below the 
viewing window, rendering the contents of the package difficult to determine.  Sadly, 
this was the root cause of the injuries and death, as the incorrect product was 
administered to unwitting patients. (40)  The report did not acknowledge that the 
application of QRM to the foil overlay design might have allowed for the anticipation 
and avoidance of such use errors. 
Despite the (perhaps myopic) scope of the report, several recommendations were 
proposed to improve risk communication and early intervention in the event a potential 
risk is realized. (40)  These recommendations ultimately contributed to the 
implementation of several successful programs at FDA8, serving their goal to leverage 
improved data collection and risk management to better protect public health. 
While the 1999 report from the FDA Task Force on Risk Management marked one of 
the first contemporary, explicit inquiries into the existence and effectiveness of risk 
management and risk-based decision making from regulatory authorities, the topic of 
quality risk management was not addressed. 
                                                 
8 Improved data collection and risk communication programs include the formalization of REMS (Risk 
Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy), a post-approval program intended to manage serious patient risks 
associated with new medicinal products as described in Chapter One, and Sentinel, an improved adverse 
event reporting system. 
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A fully-formed concept for proactive risk management, inclusive of the management 
of both intrinsic and extrinsic risks, emerged in August 2002 with the announcement of 
a new FDA initiative, entitled Pharmaceutical cGMPs for the 21st Century – A Risk-
Based Approach.  The objectives of this initiative were as follows: 
• “Encourage the early adoption of new technological advances by the 
pharmaceutical industry 
• Facilitate industry application of modern quality management techniques, 
including implementation of quality systems approaches, to all aspects of 
pharmaceutical production and quality assurance 
• Encourage implementation of risk-based approaches that focus both industry 
and Agency attention on critical areas 
• Ensure that regulatory review, compliance, and inspection policies are based 
on state-of-the-art pharmaceutical science 
• Enhance the consistency and coordination of FDA’s drug quality regulatory 
programs, in part, by further integrating quality systems approaches into the 
Agency’s business processes and regulatory policies concerning review and 
inspection activities” (41) 
The final report on the initiative, issued in September 2004, laid out the framework 
through which FDA intended to meet or encourage these objectives.  While only one 
of the goals explicitly listed risk management as a focus area, a careful reading of the 
final report reveals that risk principles scaffold the plan. 
The report foretold the adoption of a quality systems model for quality management 
and regulation, to be applied by both industry and FDA alike.  While the quality systems 
concept had been implemented for some time within medical device regulation (for 
example, within ISO 13485, Medical devices – quality management systems – 
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requirements for regulatory purposes, and 21CFR820, Quality System Regulation), the 
idea of such a system within pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical circles was novel.   
Several advances in regulatory science had been made under the umbrella of the 21st 
Century initiative, combining knowledge gained through state-of-the art science and 
technology with a risk-based orientation.  These include, for example: 
• Creation of a risk-based model for inspectional oversight9 
• Issuance of a new guidance on Title 21, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 11, 
Electronic Records, Electronic Signatures, to encourage the use of risk-based 
approaches in the adoption of the requirements 
• Issuance of a new guidance on aseptic processing, entitled Sterile Drug 
Products Produced by Aseptic Processing – Current Good Manufacturing 
Practice, to emphasize the need to proactively prevent contamination during 
sterile product manufacturing and to further encourage the adoption of risk 
management principles in the assurance of sterility (41) 
The 21st Century initiative marked a paradigm shift in pharmaceutical regulation; a 
transition away from rule-based compliance (in which the emphasis was on following 
statute, often at the expense of developing a deep understanding of products, processes, 
and associated risks) towards a risk-based view of quality and compliance.  In the 
context of this research, perhaps the most interesting emphasis throughout the 21st 
Century initiative final report is the repeated use of the phrase efficient risk 
management.  The implications here are, of course, that risk management, if not 
                                                 
9 The FDA employs a risk-based model to prioritize sites for inspection based on the type of products 
made, the target patient population, historical compliance history, and trends associated with recent 
quality and cGMP-related events.  The model is codified in a September 2004 document entitled Risk-
based Method for Prioritizing cGMP Inspections of Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Sites – A Pilot Risk 
Ranking Model.  The PIC/S community published their model in January 2012, entitled A Recommended 
Model for Risk-based Inspection Planning in the GMP Environment.  While some variations in the risk 
method exist, the two models are more similar than they are different, illustrating how regulatory 
authorities often have convergent ideas of risk factors, regardless of their origin. 
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performed properly, can be inefficient.  This is quite a curious prospect, given that one 
of the reasons a risk-based framework would be employed for a given problem is to 
ensure that resources are efficiently allocated towards the things that matter most.  The 
concept that risk management should be performed in an efficient and effective manner 
to yield an efficient and effective outcome for the patient, serves as a cornerstone of 
this research study. 
2.2 International Council on Harmonization (ICH) Guidelines 
2.2.1 Introduction to ICH 
The ICH is a cooperative effort comprised of regulatory authorities around the world, 
working together to create a single set of harmonized guidelines through which the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries can operate.  ICH was born of the 
need to speed much-needed therapies to patients without the burden of excessively 
divergent scientific and technical legislation around the world. (42)   
The ICH espouses its mission as “…to make recommendations towards achieving 
greater harmonization in the interpretation and application of technical guidelines and 
requirements for pharmaceutical product registration, thereby reducing or obviating 
duplication of testing carried out during the research and development of new human 
medicines.” 10  (43) The mechanism through which ICH accomplishes this mission is 
the creation of harmonized guidelines, aimed at providing industry with a clear 
                                                 
10 Note, though the ICH undertook some organizational changes and an associated rebranding in October 
2015, this mission statement appears to date to 2000, a time when ICH was focused primarily on product 
registration at the expense of later phases of product lifecycle management.  It is now clear that the scope 
of ICH has evolved beyond the early phases of research and development.  Perhaps a new mission 
statement covering the current scope of the ICH will be issued in the future. 
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framework that, if followed, addresses many of the expectations of international 
regulators.  ICH guidelines are divided into four main categories, as indicated in Table 
2-1.  
This research study focuses on the more recent ICH Quality guidelines published 
between June 2005 and May 2012 (ICH Q8(R2), Q9, Q10, and Q11), including a 
prospective guideline (ICH Q12) that has not yet been published.  Collectively, these 
guidelines outline the framework within which QRM operates; therefore an 
introduction to the general concepts is in order. 
Table 2-1: ICH guideline categories 
Prefix Guideline Type Examples and Highlights 
Q Quality 
“Harmonisation achievements in the Quality area include 
pivotal milestones such as the conduct of stability studies, 
defining relevant thresholds for impurities testing and a 
more flexible approach to pharmaceutical quality based on 
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) risk management.” 
(44) 
E Efficacy 
“The work carried out by ICH under the Efficacy heading 
is concerned with the design, conduct, safety and reporting 
of clinical trials. It also covers novel types of medicines 
derived from biotechnological processes and the use of 
pharmacogenetics/genomics techniques to produce better 
targeted medicines.” (44) 
S Safety 
“ICH has produced a comprehensive set of safety 
Guidelines to uncover potential risks like carcinogenicity, 
genotoxicity and reprotoxicity. A recent breakthrough has 
been a non-clinical testing strategy for assessing the QT 
interval prolongation liability: the single most important 
cause of drug withdrawals in recent years.” (44) 
M Multi-disciplinary 
“… cross-cutting topics which do not fit uniquely into one 
of the Quality, Safety and Efficacy categories. It includes 
the ICH medical terminology (MedDRA), the Common 
Technical Document (CTD) and the development of 
Electronic Standards for the Transfer of Regulatory 
Information (ESTRI).” (44) 
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2.2.2 Quality Risk Management: ICH Q9 
ICH Q9, Quality Risk Management, represents the first internationally recognized 
guideline specifically addressing QRM for the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries.  Published in June 2005, the guideline offers an overview of general quality 
risk management principles, an example of a risk management lifecycle, discussion 
around the activities that occur in each lifecycle phase, and a listing of risk tools and 
quality system areas to which QRM can be applied.  This section discusses ICH Q9 in 
detail, including generally accepted interpretations of the intent and application of the 
guideline. 
In the introduction to the guideline, ICH acknowledges that risk management has been 
used with much success in other industries, as well as to measure and monitor the 
intrinsic risk of pharmaceuticals, as discussed in Chapter One.  The introduction 
describes the gap the guideline seeks to fulfill—that of a risk management framework 
addressing quality risks that could ultimately impact the patient. (45)  Rightly so, ICH 
Q9 positions the patient at the heart of all QRM activities by acknowledging that, 
despite the diversity of stakeholder interests (e.g. regulators, industry, healthcare 
providers, etc.), the interests of the patient are paramount.  In practice, industry often 
uses product quality as a surrogate for the patient, since the impact of quality risks are 
easier and more scientifically and statistically valid to measure.  Provided product 
quality is defined with an appropriate link to patient, as in Quality by Design (QbD; 
discussed further in the following section), the application of such a proxy is fitting. 
ICH Q9 moves on to immediately dispel a myth that had taken hold in prior industry 
and regulatory cultures— the concept of zero risk.  In older quality paradigms, drug 
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manufacturers sought to eliminate risk from their products and processes, taking their 
cue from regulators who implied, through regulatory publications and inspections, that 
no degree of risk was acceptable.  ICH, however, acknowledges that “the manufacturing 
and use of a drug (medicinal) product, including its components, necessarily entail 
some degree of risk.” (45)  This perspective shifts the industry-regulator conversation 
from one of absolutes, where quality was a black and white concept of right and wrong, 
to one focused on balance, where the level of risk is managed to protect product quality 
and patient safety.  The challenge therefore transitions from achieving an esoteric 
concept of “perfect” quality to understanding what constitutes acceptable risk and 
striving to achieve that state—perhaps the most significant paradigm shifts to occur in 
the history of drug manufacturing and regulation. 
Some other misconceptions regarding risk management are addressed in ICH Q9.  For 
example, many associate risk management with the use of rigorous, detailed tools, such 
as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA; one of the most common tools 
employed by industry).  However, Q9 is careful to apply the principles of risk 
management to the practice of risk management itself; the use of formal or less formal 
approaches are acceptable, provided the effort is proportionate the risk of the product, 
process, or system being assessed. (45)  This enables industry to embed risk 
management in all measures of activities, without the need to undertake a formal, 
resource-intensive exercise.  In addition, Q9 is quite clear that the “appropriate use of 
quality risk management can facilitate but does not obviate industry’s obligation to 
comply with regulatory requirements and does not replace appropriate communications 
between industry and regulators.” (45)  Compliance with all applicable laws, of course, 
is mandatory; risk management may not be used to justify non-compliance or to argue 
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why a specific regulatory requirement need not be fulfilled in a specific instance.  
Rather, QRM can be used to offer perspectives on how best to comply with statute, and 
to characterize the aspects of quality that are not specifically associated with 
compliance.  This distinction is discussed in further detail in Chapter Five. 
The benefits of a QRM approach are many, ICH Q9 continues. (45)  Better assurance 
of product quality, for example, may be achieved through the proactive identification 
and avoidance or minimization of quality risks, as well as the identification of sources 
of variability in the product and manufacturing process that may be targeted for 
continuous improvement.  The decision-making process can be enhanced, as QRM 
provides a lens through which scientific data and information can be viewed to better 
weigh options and understand potential outcomes of a given decision.  Finally, QRM 
can “…beneficially affect the extent and level of direct regulatory oversight,” 
ostensibly by increasing regulator’s trust in a company’s self-awareness through 
transparency of QRM efforts. (45)  The degree to which the patient, through industry, 
has been able to realize these benefits is further explored in Chapter Four. 
Per ICH Q9, the benefits of risk management are to be achieved through the application 
of a QRM lifecycle, an example of which is depicted in Figure 2-D.  The QRM lifecycle 
is an iterative process consisting of four primary phases: risk assessment, risk control, 
risk review, and risk communication, each of which is facilitated by the application of 
risk management tools.11  While ICH Q9 acknowledges that other lifecycle models 
                                                 
11 Risk management tools and their role in the QRM process will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
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might be used, the majority of industry has adopted the exact lifecycle model described 
in the guideline.12 
Unsurprisingly, the first step in the QRM lifecycle is the initiation of the process.  ICH 
Q9 describes activities that might be performed during this initiation step, including the 
identification of resources, leadership, and timelines, specifying the problem statement 
(also referred to as the risk question), outlining expected deliverables, and gathering 
applicable data and information that will serve as inputs into the risk management 
effort. (45)  However, Q9 fails to describe when or under what circumstances the QRM 
process should be initiated; that is, what triggers might exist that should invoke this 
critical first step.  This gap will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight.  
 
Figure 2-D: Quality Risk Management lifecycle, as per ICH Q9 (45) 
                                                 
12 An optimized QRM lifecycle, using ICH Q9 and other risk management standards, is proposed and 
discussed in Chapter Eight. 
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After initiation, a risk assessment is performed.  This phase of the QRM lifecycle seeks 
to determine which risks associated with the product, process, or system under review 
are unacceptable—a determination made in three general steps.  First, hazards are 
identified as applicable to the problem statement / risk question (risk identification).  
Each hazard is then analyzed to determine its relative criticality (risk analysis), using 
the risk equation (likelihood x severity = risk) introduced in Chapter One.  Finally, the 
identified and analyzed risks are compared with pre-defined criteria to determine their 
acceptability (risk evaluation). (45)  The risk assessment phase of the QRM lifecycle 
typically draws most heavily upon the use of risk management tools, which allow for a 
methodical, structured way to identify and analyze risks. 
The next phase in the QRM lifecycle, risk control, focuses on reducing risks to an 
acceptable level.13  This phase is perhaps the most important of the QRM lifecycle, as 
it is the point in the process in which control strategies are identified, implemented, and 
continuously improved; risk control is the phase that assures adequate protection of the 
patient.  There are two general activities that occur in risk control; the first being a 
concerted reduction in risk through the application of risk mitigation techniques (risk 
reduction), and the second including a confirmation that the risk mitigation actions did 
not adversely affect the overall risk profile through the introduction of new risks or an 
increase in risk levels, the risks are adequately controlled (i.e. that the risk mitigation 
actions and other risk controls are effective), and that the resultant risks are therefore 
acceptable (risk acceptance). (45)  In the event the risk remains unacceptable following 
                                                 
13 The name of this phase, as well as the activities that occur within it, reveals an implied principle of 
QRM: risks are bad and must be controlled.  This implication is not always the case, as we can learn 
from other industries and risk management standards; some risks are positive and should be actively 
pursued rather than reduced, eliminated, or avoided. 
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risk reduction, the QRM lifecycle returns to the risk assessment phase, allowing the 
practitioner to repeat the process.   
Following risk control, there is an output.  Though included in the QRM lifecycle 
(Figure 2-D), ICH Q9 does not devote any narrative description regarding what such 
an output or result might entail.  Typically, this portion of the lifecycle is interpreted as 
a documentation point—the point where the results of the risk assessment and risk 
control outcomes are drafted into a report that describes the risk assessment outcomes 
(often formatted to align with the risk management tool employed), risk reduction 
efforts undertaken, and acceptability of the residual risk.   
Once risk control is complete and the results have been documented, the risk review 
phase of the QRM lifecycle begins.  The objective of this phase is to ensure that prior 
activities and associated deliverables remain accurate, relevant, and complete in light 
of changing conditions.  Knowledge gained over the product lifecycle, ongoing 
activities such as changes to the product, process, or system, unplanned events such as 
deviations and customer complaints, and changes in the internal and external business 
and regulatory climate have the potential to impact decisions made in the risk 
assessment and risk acceptance phases of the lifecycle. (45)  Risk review, therefore, 
entails a periodic or event-driven review of these changes to determine whether the 
original risk assessment should be updated (as might be the case when new or 
previously-unrecognized hazards emerge, or the original estimates of likelihood and 
severity have changed) and whether the acceptability of the risk may be affected as a 
result.  In this sense, ICH Q9 positions risk review as an opportunity to confirm the 
continued validity of decisions made within the QRM process; it does not address a 
mechanism to determine whether the QRM process (and encompassing program) itself 
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has been effective with respect to reducing risk to the patient.  This gap is the primary 
focus of the research effort, as detailed in Chapter Three. 
A critical and often overlooked element of the QRM lifecycle is risk communication.  
Risk communication aims to ensure all applicable stakeholders are aware of risk 
information, including such aspects as the “…existence, nature, form, probability, 
severity, acceptability, control, treatment, detectability or other aspects of risks to 
quality.” (45)  Such communication most commonly occurs at the output stage of the 
QRM lifecycle, leveraging the documentation associated with the risk assessment and 
control activities as the primary mechanism to communicate; however, risk 
communication can, and should, occur at other stages of the QRM lifecycle, based on 
the nature and criticality of the identified risks.  Risk communication can occur between 
varieties of “interested parties”, as depicted in Figure 2-E.   
 
Figure 2-E: Potential channels for risk communication 
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A significant challenge in the communication of quality risks lies in the relatively 
limited options for communication between QRM practitioners and decision makers 
and the patient.  Unlike intrinsic risks (such as known adverse reactions) which are 
typically communicated through product labeling, extrinsic risks, including quality 
risks, have no defined mechanism for communication.  This challenge will be discussed 
in further detail in Chapter Eight.  
ICH Q9 concludes with two annexes: the first describing common risk management 
tools that may be used to execute the QRM lifecycle, and the second describing 
potential areas for QRM application within the quality system and product lifecycle. 
(45)  These annexes are of pivotal importance to the effective implementation of QRM 
and will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Eight. 
Despite ICH’s insistence that the Q9 guideline “…is not intended to create any new 
expectations beyond the current regulatory requirements,” (45) regulatory bodies the 
world over embraced QRM and have since integrated it at the regional level.  Some 
examples are: 
• Inclusion of a new annex to the EU GMPs (Annex 2014), as well as revisions 
to other directives, annexes, and guidelines to incorporate the principles and 
practices of quality risk management (46) 
• Inclusion of a new annex to the PIC/S GMP guide (also Annex 20) to adopt 
ICH Q9 for all member countries (47) 
                                                 
14 Annex 20 has since been retired; the QRM requirements have been moved into Chapter 3 of the EU 
GMPs. 
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• Publication of the World Health Organization (WHO) guidelines on quality 
risk management (48) 
In addition, QRM has evolved into the foundation of drug development and cGMP 
platforms, as described in ICH Q8(R2), Q10, and Q11. 
2.2.3 Quality by Design: ICH Q8(R2) and ICH Q11  
ICH Q8, Pharmaceutical Development, (currently in its second revision) outlines the 
process for the development of new pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products, 
based on the principles of Quality by Design (QbD).15  This concept, as described in 
ICH Q8(R2), brought drug development into the modern era. 
In traditional developmental models, a candidate molecule was identified, formulated 
based on pre-existing knowledge of chemistry and pharmacology (or in the case of 
biopharmaceuticals, standard cell culture and purification processes), scaled to ensure 
manufacturing processes could serve anticipated demand, and maintained over the 
commercial life of the product.  In many cases, manufacturers, marketing authorization 
holders (MAHs), and regulators possessed little knowledge of why the product worked 
and how the associated manufacturing processes supported the clinical effects of the 
product.  As a result, change was demonized; significant efforts were made to keep the 
manufacturing process static, since the potential implications of change were largely 
unknown.  Over time, this led to antiquated products and associated manufacturing 
                                                 
15 The concept of Quality by Design (commonly described as building quality into the production of a 
product, as opposed to Quality by Testing, or relying on the testing a product after production to ensure 
compliance with specifications) was originally discussed by Joseph Juran in his 1992 book Juran on 
Quality by Design: The New Steps for Planning Quality into Goods and Services. The pharmaceutical 
industry, regulators, and patients the world over owe Juran a debt of gratitude for his ideas, many of 
which are only just starting to permeate the fabric of industry.  Juran was ahead of time in many respects, 
and earned his informal title of quality guru. 
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processes, a general reluctance to harnessing the newest available manufacturing 
technology, and stalled efforts towards continuous improvement.16 
In QbD development models, the emphasis is on understanding the linkages between 
the product and its clinical effects in the patient, the manufacturing process and the 
product it delivers, and manufacturing systems and the processes they support. (49) 
Quality risk management plays a pivotal role in a QbD development model, by helping 
to improve the breadth and depth of product and process knowledge and enabling this 
knowledge to serve as an input into manufacturing process design.  The application of 
QbD (and by extension, QRM) ensures that the manufacturing process delivers a 
product that consistently meets its specifications, that the defined specifications have 
meaning in a clinical context. 
The first step in applying QbD principles to drug development is to define the Quality 
Target Product Profile (QTPP); that is, the overarching quality characteristics of the 
product to ensure quality, safety, efficacy, and usability. (49)  A list of product attributes 
can be created from the QTPP and preliminary developmental studies.  Through the 
application of QRM principles and tools, the product attributes can be further triaged 
to identify those that are critical to the patient (Critical Quality Attributes or CQAs) and 
those that are not.  This distinction allows for the focused application of resources (for 
example, technical and toxicological studies, preclinical and clinical protocol 
development, and experimental design) to gain knowledge where it matters. 
                                                 
16 Section 2.2.5, describing ICH Q12, discusses the change-averse culture in additional detail. 
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The identified CQAs are used as the input into manufacturing process development and 
characterization.  Given the large number of variables that exist in even the simplest 
manufacturing process, the need to distinguish between those variables that are critical 
to ensure the CQAs are met and those that are not becomes clear.  Process parameters 
or variables that have a direct link to CQAs are deemed Critical Process Parameters, or 
CPPs, and are identified through the application of QRM.  (49) 
Manufacturing systems, including facilities, utilities, and equipment, are not discussed 
in detail in ICH Q8(R2).  However, these crucial components are often included in the 
overarching QbD model, driven by necessity.17  Where a manufacturer chooses to 
extend their development efforts to manufacturing systems, a similar philosophy 
applies; the equipment, utilities, and facilities are designed to ensure the CPPs of the 
associated process are sufficiently controlled. (50)  The attributes of manufacturing 
systems that are linked to CPPs are often referred to as Critical Aspects (CAs).  The 
application of QRM to these principles is discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
ICH Q11, Development and Manufacture of Drug Substances (Chemical Entities and 
Biotechnological/Biological Entities), was published in 2012 and reiterates the general 
concepts of QbD devised in ICH Q8(R2) as applied to of drug substances.18  The novel 
aspects of ICH Q11, when compared with ICH Q8(R2), surround the discussion of how 
scientific knowledge and QRM can facilitate intended results in a drug development 
                                                 
17 Given that manufacturing processes are, by definition, run on equipment, using associated utilities, 
within a specific-purpose facility, the exclusion of this topic from ICH Q8(R2) is peculiar.  Other 
regulatory guidances, such as the 2011 FDA guidance on Process Validation, have since stepped in to 
fill this gap. (148; 252) 
18 Drug substances are precursors to drug products, which combine the drug substance with other 
ingredients to create the finished medicinal product form. 
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landscape.  ICH Q11 directs attention towards a number of applications of QRM in 
product and process development, including: 
• The evaluation of options for the design of the manufacturing process 
• The identification of CQAs and CPPs 
• The identification of material attributes (e.g. starting materials, raw materials, 
reagents, etc.) that may have an impact on CQAs 
• The identification of functional relationships that link material attributes and 
process parameters to the CQAs 
• The prioritization of attributes or parameters for further study 
• The characterization of how downstream processing could affect the 
acceptability of risk in upstream unit operations (e.g. how impurities present 
early in the manufacturing process might be acceptable given the process 
capability of downstream clearance and purification activities), and 
• The definition and continuous improvement of the control strategy and 
associated monitoring program (51) 
However, based on the relatively limited descriptions of how to employ QRM in ICH 
Q11, inconsistencies and confusion may result.  For example: 
• ICH Q11 notes that “either formal or informal risk management tools… can be 
used.” (51)  This statement could violate the tenants of ICH Q9, which notes 
that the level of formality of QRM should be commensurate with the level of 
risk. (45)  Indeed, it is difficult to envision how the use of an informal risk tool 
could be sufficient to characterize the critical elements of a product and 
process and ensure their control as these are perhaps the highest risk aspects of 
the product lifecycle. 
• ICH Q11 notes that “the risk assessment can also identify CQAs for which 
there are inherent limitations in detectability in the drug substance (e.g., viral 
safety). In these cases, such CQAs should be controlled at an appropriate point 
upstream in the process,” and “when developing a control strategy, a 
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manufacturer can consider implementing controls for a specific CQA at single 
or multiple locations in the process, depending on the risk associated with the 
CQA and the ability of individual controls to detect a potential problem. “ (51)  
These quotes conflict with the very tenant they seek to explain—that quality 
cannot be tested into the product, rather it must be built into the product by 
design.  These clauses from ICH Q11 imply that preventive controls should be 
explored only in the event detection controls are insufficient. 
• Example 2 of ICH Q11 illustrates the risk ranking of process parameters, 
indicating how QRM could be used to propose that low risk parameters be 
changed without prior regulatory authorization, whereas changes to high risk 
parameters would be subject to pre-approval.  The use of risk ranking is 
curious in this context, since it is not the level of risk that would enable this 
determination but rather the severity of the impact a process parameter might 
have on a CQA—one half of the risk equation.  For example, a process 
parameter would be considered critical in the event it exhibits a strong 
statistical correlation with a given CQA—that is, if variation in the process 
parameter has been demonstrated to lead to variation in one or more CQAs.  
However, risk is not a measure of the likelihood that this correlation exists, but 
rather the likelihood that unacceptable variation will occur, given the control 
strategy.  The ideal state, of course, is that all process parameters deemed 
critical based on their functional relationship with a given CQA are well-
controlled—meaning, have a low probability of affecting a CQA in the 
context of the process and associated control strategy.  The objective is to 
ensure that all CPPs are likewise low risk.   
It is possible that ambiguities of language and imprecision of examples in the regulatory 
sphere, such as those illustrated above, could result in a reluctance to apply QRM, or 
worse, incorrect application.  The extent to which this has occurred in the past is 
explored further in Chapter Five. 
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2.2.4 QRM as an enabler: ICH Q10 
ICH Q10, Pharmaceutical Quality System, was published in June 2008 and combined 
the concepts of QbD, QRM, and GMP into an overarching quality management system 
to be employed throughout the product lifecycle.  This document was developed based 
on existing requirements and guidance, such as ICH Q7, Good Manufacturing Practice 
Guide for Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, ISO 9000, Quality Management Systems, 
and regional GMP requirements. (52)  ICH Q10 is often grouped with ICH Q8(R2) and 
ICH Q9 when describing the fundamental paradigm shift that occurred in the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries in the late 2000s.   
The objectives of ICH Q10 are to: 
• Achieve product realization, including the definition and attainment of quality 
specifications as appropriate for the product and patient 
• Establish and maintain a state of control, including the definition of what this 
state of control entails19 
• Facilitate continual improvement by enhancing the level of control and 
knowledge of the behaviors of the product and process interface (52) 
In order to facilitate these goals, ICH Q10 reintroduced industry to the product lifecycle 
and described how four primary quality system elements (process performance & 
product quality monitoring, CAPA, change management, and management review) 
should be employed over the various lifecycle stages.  A sizable emphasis is placed on 
                                                 
19 Note, the concept of a “state of control” is also detailed in ICH Q8(R2).  The concepts put forth in ICH 
Q8(R2), Q9, and Q10 are synergistic but have slightly different perspectives: ICH Q8(R2) focuses on 
product- and process-specific control, ICH Q9 focuses on control over risks to patient that might manifest 
from products and/or processes, and ICH Q10 focuses on supplementary control through management 
systems, such as change management systems and corrective/preventive action systems.  Of course, the 
totality of the control strategy should include each of these perspectives: process/product control, risk 
control, and quality system control. 
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management responsibilities, including ultimate accountability for the quality system 
and its effectiveness.  In addition, ICH Q10 squarely positioned QRM and knowledge 
management as the two enablers of the quality system.  Figure 2-F illustrates the 
product lifecycle and the elements of the quality system. 
 
Figure 2-F: The Pharmaceutical Quality System (53) 
 
The product lifecycle begins with drug development, a topic discussed in detail in ICH 
Q8(R2).  Following technology transfer, the product is manufactured at commercial 
scale for sale—products spend the majority of their lifecycle in this stage.  The final 
stage of the lifecycle is product discontinuation, which may be done for any number of 
(usually business-driven) reasons, such as the expiration of patent protection or the 
commercial availability of newer products for the target disease indication.  Quality 
risk management, knowledge management, and the four primary quality system 
elements facilitate all aspects of the product lifecycle, from development through 
discontinuation. 
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Risk management principles and practices are embedded in all aspects of the quality 
system, as illustrated in Table 2-2.  The intersection of each quality system element 
(column) and product lifecycle stage (row) identifies the benefits of applying QRM at 
that stage. 
Table 2-2: Matrix illustrating the primary functions of QRM at the intersection of quality 
system elements and product lifecycle stages 
 
Process 
performance and 
product quality 
monitoring system 
CAPA system 
Change 
management 
system 
Management 
review 
Pharmaceutical 
development 
Identify critical 
quality attributes, 
critical process 
parameters, 
preliminary control 
strategy, and 
monitoring 
program 
Identify and 
prioritize 
sources of 
variation for 
further study, 
correct known 
issues (reactive 
risk 
management), 
identify and 
prevent 
anticipated 
issues 
(proactive risk 
management) 
Identify, prioritize, 
and implement 
improvements 
Confirm 
acceptability of 
residual risk 
associated with 
product and 
process design 
Technology 
transfer 
Finalize control 
strategy and 
monitoring 
program 
Ensure success of 
transfer effort 
through the 
identification and 
minimization of the 
impact of variables 
between sending 
and receiving units 
Create technology 
transfer strategy 
Commercial 
manufacturing 
Ensure continued 
state of control, 
identify and 
implement 
opportunities for 
improvement 
Identify and 
prioritize changes 
to reduce product 
and process risk, 
ensure changes are 
implemented to 
minimize the 
introduction of new 
risk 
Identify new or 
emergent risks, 
track 
implementation of 
risk mitigation, 
ensure appropriate 
resource 
allocation, 
confirm continued 
acceptability of 
residual risk 
Product 
discontinuation 
Support ongoing 
monitoring of 
product in the field 
and evaluation of 
patient impact 
Incorporate 
learnings from late-
stage products to 
newer products 
Identify new risks 
or emergent risks 
 
As an enabler of the quality system, QRM is the “engine” that drives the quality system 
over the product lifecycle, transforming information into knowledge and facilitating the 
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identification of opportunities to improve the product and associated processes to better 
serve the patient. 
2.2.5 Lifecycle Management: ICH Q12 
In September 2014, ICH announced a new effort to expand the portfolio of Quality 
guidelines with the addition of ICH Q12, Technical and Regulatory Considerations for 
Pharmaceutical Product Lifecycle Management.  In the final concept paper for this 
guideline, ICH acknowledged that, true its original name of the International 
Conference on the Harmonisation of Technical Requirements for Registration of 
Pharmaceuticals for Human Use, the majority of deliverables had focused on pre-
market requirements.  There was a clear need, however, to extend the scope of the group 
into later stages of the product lifecycle, since “the envisioned post-approval 
‘operational flexibility’ [outlined in ICH Q8(R2) through Q11] has not been achieved.” 
(54).  In order to better facilitate this objective, the Q12 guideline will attempt to:  
“…provide a framework to facilitate the management of post-approval Chemistry, 
Manufacturing and Controls (CMC) changes in a more predictable and efficient 
manner across the product lifecycle. Adoption of this guideline will promote 
innovation and continual improvement, and strengthen quality assurance and reliable 
supply of product, including proactive planning of supply chain adjustments. It will 
allow regulators (assessors and inspectors) to better understand, and have more 
confidence and trust in a firm’s Pharmaceutical Quality System (PQS) for 
management of post-approval CMC changes.” (54) 
ICH later changed its name to the International Council on Harmonization to better 
align with the newly-envisioned scope of influence. (55) 
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The announcement of this effort was lauded by industry, as the challenges associated 
with regional differences in post-approval change management are many. (56)  Each 
country has a distinct set of requirements and expectations regarding how such changes 
may be handled, whether through a firm’s change management program within their 
quality system (with post-implementation communication to regulators), or through 
rigorous pre-implementation regulatory approval.  This poses logistical difficulties, as 
companies must juggle inventory manufactured with different variations of change, 
directing product to specific markets based on the CMC approval status of the 
applicable regulatory authority. (57)  This often requires firms to continue 
manufacturing product under an older manufacturing scheme to ensure consistent 
supply of product to patients under the jurisdiction of regulatory bodies requiring pre-
implementation approval of the change. (58)  Because of this, many have noted that the 
global complexity associated with manufacturing change has discouraged innovation 
and continual improvement. 
Among other benefits, ICH Q12 is expected to more clearly link change management 
with QRM and knowledge management, the two enablers of the quality system as 
described in ICH Q10. (59)  In addition, minimization of the regulatory hurdles 
associated with product and process lifecycle management and post-approval change 
management should spur renewed focus on improvement and innovation.  ICH Q12 is 
targeted for finalization in November 2017 and is eagerly awaited by industry and 
regulators alike. (60) 
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2.3 QRM guidance from industry, for industry 
Following the publication of ICH Q9, industry eagerly embraced the opportunity to 
share ideas and best practices related to QRM.  The cadence of publication steadily 
increased as ICH Q8(R2), ICH Q10, and ICH Q11 emerged, as thought leaders sought 
to provide practical guidance to industry on the application of QRM.  As outlined in the 
literature map for this chapter (Figure 2-A), this section will focus on selected 
publications addressing general, rather than specific, applications of QRM.  
The first book published on the topic of QRM was one by renowned quality expert 
James Vesper in June 2006, one year following the publication of ICH Q9.  Entitled 
Risk Assessment and Risk Management in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Clear and 
Simple, the book posits risk management is nothing new; people (and industry) are 
exposed to and must manage risk every day, whether they are exposed to hazards during 
a daily commute to work or through the manufacture of sterile, life-saving medicines. 
(61)  Through this simple comparison, Vesper dispels any anxiety-provoking stigma 
that might accompany the introduction of a new quality management tool and made the 
concepts of QRM more accessible to and achievable by the reader.  This pragmatic tone 
quickly became the modus operandi within industry literature, as many subsequent 
publications adopted a case study approach in lieu of rigorous philosophical discussion 
on the principles and application of QRM. 
Vesper’s book describes the objectives of and process for quality risk management, but 
devotes much of the text to a discussion of risk tools and assessment methods.  While 
this was certainly appropriate given the low level of QRM knowledge within industry 
at the time, combined with general (albeit misguided) perceptions that risk assessment 
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was synonymous with risk management, the emphasis on risk tools is now viewed as a 
very narrow scope indeed.  
In 2012, the Parenteral Drug Association (PDA) published the first (and only) industry 
whitepaper on the general principles and best practices associated with a QRM 
program, Technical Report No. 54, Implementation of Quality Risk Management for 
Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology Manufacturing Operations.20  (62)  In addition to 
expanding upon ICH Q9 to offer additional guidance on QRM implementation, this 
technical report expands the body of knowledge by introducing industry to three key 
concepts to be applied in QRM: risk maturity, the formality spectrum, and human 
heuristics.   
PDA chose to begin the technical report with an introduction of risk maturity, which 
serves as the foundation of this research effort and is discussed in detail throughout this 
thesis.  A brief review of where QRM should be applied throughout the product 
lifecycle, as described in ICH Q8(R2), Q9, and Q10, is offered, followed by a 
discussion of the different types of risk management: proactive and reactive.  This 
distinction is particularly important but had not been given much attention in the ICH 
guidelines; the inclusion of this concept in the PDA technical report sets the tone for 
future discussions within industry.  In addition, PDA proceeds to examine the role of 
                                                 
20 While other whitepapers on QRM exist from PDA and its peer, the International Society for 
Pharmaceutical Engineers (ISPE), those are focused on providing an overview, typically in case study 
format, of how QRM can be applied to a specific problem or technology platform.  For example, PDA’s 
2008 Technical Report No. 44, Quality Risk Management for Aseptic Processes reviews QRM as applied 
to product sterility; ISPE’s 2010 Baseline Guide Risk-based Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products 
addresses only cross-contamination risks only; and ISPE’s 2011 Science and Risk-based Approach for 
the Delivery of Facilities, System, and Equipment and Applied Risk Management for Commissioning and 
Qualification focus solely on QRM application within engineering and qualification efforts.  The 
specificity and narrow scope of these whitepapers rendered them inappropriate for this chapter, although 
the implications of these documents (and the targeted risk management mindset they represent) is 
addressed in Chapters Five and Eight. 
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governance in a QRM program, including organizational and managerial aspects that 
are pivotal to the success of QRM; not least of these being transparency in 
communication throughout all levels of a company. (62)  This success factor has been 
identified as an ongoing challenge, discussed further in Chapters Seven and Nine. 
The PDA technical report also explores the concept of proportionality of risk 
management, explaining the intent behind the clause in ICH Q9 that efforts in QRM 
should be commensurate with the level of risk. (45)  PDA relates proportionality to 
various risk tools and the rigor with which they should be applied.  For example, PDA 
suggests that more formal tools, such as FMEA or HACCP, should be applied to more 
critical and complex systems and leverage expert knowledge from a risk facilitator and 
curated QRM team to execute the assessment, while less formal tools such as risk 
ranking need not employ the services of QRM experts in all cases.  PDA points out that 
formality should not be considered a dichotomy (i.e. either formal or informal), but 
rather is a spectrum that allows for various combinations of rigorous methods, 
techniques, documentation options, and expertise to be employed as appropriate for the 
risk question. (62) 
The concept of human heuristics, as applicable to QRM exercises, is likewise reviewed 
in PDA’s Technical Report No. 54.  The influence of human heuristics on decision-
making processes was first identified by decision science gurus Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, whose work earned a Noble Prize in Economics in 2002.21  PDA 
borrowed both from Kahneman/Tversky and from the Pharmaceutical Regulatory 
                                                 
21 While Kahneman and Tversky considered themselves cognitive psychologists, they are credited with 
establishing a new field of study known as behavioral economics, for which the Nobel Prize was 
awarded.  Though the Prize went to Kahneman, it is broadly acknowledged that Tversky would have 
been a co-recipient had he been alive to receive it. (119) 
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Science Team’s (PRST) own Dr. Kevin O’Donnell, who made the critical linkage 
between Kahneman’s work and QRM in 2010 through the publication of a two-part 
article addressing subjectivity and uncertainty in QRM exercises. (63) (64)  Human 
heuristics are cognitive “shortcuts” that are used when judgments are made in the 
presence of uncertainty; colloquially these are referred to as “rules of thumb.”  
Heuristics have the potential to adversely affect the validity of risk analyses and risk 
acceptance decisions, as the estimation of risks and their acceptability to the patient can 
be greatly influenced by cognitive shortcuts at the expense of scientific knowledge.  
PDA called attention to this phenomenon where other sources had neglected it; the 
importance of human heuristics in QRM marks this as a breakthrough.   
PDA Technical Report No. 54 was one of the earliest documents of its kind, focused 
on the establishment of a QRM program to be integrated and applied within the product 
lifecycle.  Because of this strategic perspective and the best practices offered within the 
text, this technical report has become one of the most widely referenced treatises on the 
enabling function QRM plays in an effective quality system. 
Risk Management Applications in Pharmaceutical and Biopharmaceutical 
Manufacturing, edited by Mollah et al and published in 2013, offers a modern and much 
more sophisticated treatise on QRM, including chapters on philosophical, academic, 
and statistical topics that enabled a more comprehensive understanding of the benefits 
and concepts underpinning QRM. (65)  The book is comprised of chapters on various 
QRM topics, compiled from myriad QRM experts; this book therefore represented the 
perspectives of thought leaders on QRM at the time. 
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Mollah et al provide a succinct business case for the application of risk management 
for quality improvement before delving into how various risk management tools can 
support the overarching QRM lifecycle.  Acknowledging the difficulty of providing 
discrete “rules” around the use of particular methodologies at the expense of others, 
Walker and Busmann compare the advantages and limitations of the basic QRM toolkit 
(e.g. those summarized in Annex I of ICH Q9). (66)  A noticeable gap in the relevant 
chapter surrounds tool selection—how to select the best fit risk tool for a particular 
circumstance and risk question.  This gap will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
Long offers his expertise on regulatory expectations of QRM, including common 
misunderstandings and pitfalls associated with risk implementation, in his chapter 
“Risk Management: Regulatory Expectation, Risk Perception, and Organizational 
Integration.” (67)  Some instances of QRM misuse as described by Long include: 
• Lack of QRM usage (not assessing the risk to patient or product quality where 
warranted by an event or circumstance) 
• Improper implementation of QRM (lack of evidence supporting risk-based 
decisions, lack of sufficient product and process understanding) 
• Variable risk tolerance (deeming a given risk management “acceptable” in 
some instances but not others, with no clear explanation) 
• Use of QRM to justify an expected outcome (“reverse engineering” a risk 
assessment to justify a previously-determined decision or outcome) (67) 
Perhaps the greatest contribution of Mollah et al’s book is Long’s chapter on probability 
estimates and statistical techniques as they relate to QRM exercises. (68)  Despite the 
fact that probability is a full 50% of the risk calculus (likelihood x severity = risk), there 
are very few sources available to industry QRM practitioners that explore this topic in 
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a suitable depth.22  Long addresses this topic head on, explaining general principles of 
probability, the roles of uncertainty and heuristics in estimating probability, and the 
benefits of moving towards more quantitative, data-driven assertions to support the 
validity of QRM outcomes. (68)  Indeed, as this researcher explored in a recent paper, 
industry commonly confuses risk management tool categories (qualitative vs. 
quantitative) with the application of quantitative risk analysis efforts, using actual 
probability estimates grounded in scientific data. (69)  Long’s direct inquiry into the 
relationship between statistics and QRM makes a critical connection that is often 
overlooked by industry practitioners. 
Based on the depth of discussion to all manners of QRM topics, Risk Management 
Applications in Pharmaceutical and Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing serves as a rich 
source of knowledge that can enhance the level of expertise of its readership, 
contributing to general increases of QRM maturity within industry. 
Several key lines of inquiry were extracted from the general literature review to serve 
as focus areas throughout the research effort.  These include: 
• The need to concentrate on program effectiveness in reducing risk to the 
patient when evaluating QRM maturity 
• The need to link QRM with medicinal product development and 
characterization efforts (as in ICH Q8(R2) and Q11), as well as the 
pharmaceutical quality system (as in ICH Q10) 
                                                 
22 The lack of attention paid to statistical consideration in risk analysis is particularly disappointing in 
the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, which are grounded in sound science, the scientific 
method, and associated mathematical and statistical ways of analyzing and understanding data.  Given 
the fact that, as Kahneman noted, people are poor “intuitive statisticians,” (119) the importance of 
connecting QRM to objective and rigorous sources of knowledge is essential. 
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• The need to ensure that key concepts that influence QRM outcomes (or might 
degrade the integrity of the QRM process) are integrated within the 
overarching QRM program.  Such concepts include: 
o Risk tool selection, including the formality spectrum and 
advantages/limitations of common risk management tools 
Chapter Three of this thesis further details how these earmarked themes were 
incorporated into the overarching research effort. 
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3 Chapter Three: The Research Approach 
 
This research study investigated the concept of effectiveness in quality risk 
management in managing risk to the patient, in an effort to define a mature state of 
QRM that can be used by industry to gauge their current level of QRM implementation 
and progress on the path towards excellence.  Because effectiveness is a rather 
intangible concept, stemming from combinations of business practices (processes), 
attitudes and behaviors of those employing these processes, and the organizational 
culture within which the people and processes operate, the research is primarily 
qualitative in nature, although quantitative methods were also used. Mixed methods of 
research were employed throughout the research effort, as best suited for the particular 
aspect of the research question. 
3.1 The researcher’s context 
3.1.1 The researcher’s worldview 
It is necessary for any researcher to examine their own philosophical worldviews prior 
to commencing a research effort, as these represent the lens through which the research 
is conducted and analyzed.  While these endeavors have many labels, including 
paradigms, ontologies, and epistemologies, the researcher has selected the term 
worldviews so as to minimize any potential for reductio ad absurdum.  Many academics 
undertaking a similar effort may position this process as one of selection—implying 
that a particular worldview can be selected based on its appropriateness for the topic 
under review.  This researcher disagrees with this general approach, believing that each 
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individual inherently possesses a natural inclination towards one worldview or another.  
While worldviews may change over the course of a lifetime, they are relatively fixed 
within the finite span of a research effort.  Therefore the goal of this section is to 
disclose, rather than to describe the selection of, this researcher’s viewpoint. 
The best-fit worldview to reflect this researcher’s philosophical inclinations is 
pragmatism.  Pragmatists are not committed to any one idea of reality, be it an external 
reality or one encased within the mind; the hallmark of pragmatism is that philosophy, 
and the related concepts of reality and the nature of knowledge, is largely esoteric and 
therefore irrelevant in any tangible sense. (70)  This researcher agrees that an 
exploration of the nature of reality and what can be known is quite interesting, but of 
little consequence with respect to the conduct of academic and industry research and 
the resultant research outputs.  Pragmatists are primarily concerned with finding what 
works for a given problem, rather than aligning it with one particular ontological 
position— this researcher agrees that “truth is what works at the time.” (71)  With 
regard to academic inquiry, pragmatism acknowledges that research occurs in a given 
context, and therefore must be interpreted in light of that context. (71)  For example, if 
complete certainty regarding the future and complete knowledge of the behavior of 
process variables in a system, for a given product, could be known, the field of risk 
management need not exist.  As a pragmatist, however, the researcher asserts that these 
two conditions are not met (irrespective of whether they are theoretically plausible), 
and therefore risk management principles and practices are necessary in order to 
progress pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical operations and regulatory science in 
any meaningful sense with respect to the patient.  The context in which this research is 
conducted is one of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. 
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Mixed methods research, as discussed in section 3.4, is particularly well-suited for a 
pragmatic worldview, since this methodology allows for a large toolkit of different 
methods from which the researcher can choose to best serve the research goals. (71)  
This also enables the research process, as well as the research outputs, to have an impact 
on industry practitioners, as engaging these stakeholders in a variety of ways stimulates 
thinking and can effect change.  Similarly, a pragmatic worldview allows the research 
to focus on the development of tangible work product that can be applied and used by 
stakeholders, the primary driver behind this researcher’s efforts. (70) 
3.1.2 Insider perspective 
The researcher’s desire to deliver a positive impact to industry is driven by her insider 
perspective.  With fourteen years in industry (as of this writing), the researcher is 
equipped with a deep knowledge of industry practices and challenges, and has had 
sufficient opportunity to see quality-based fads23 rise and fall without gaining any long-
term purchase, consuming an extreme amount of resources and intellectual capital in 
their implementation only to see minimal benefits be realized as a result.  Given the 
criticality of the topic at hand and the amount of time, effort, and passion necessary to 
advance the research effort, the researcher sought to simultaneously embark on a 
rigorous academic inquiry and develop meaningful, tangible outputs to address the 
needs of industry practitioners.  As such, the researcher developed the overarching 
research design with these goals in the forefront. 
                                                 
23 While some of these efforts, such as the principles and tools derived from Lean Manufacturing and Six 
Sigma, remain in force in pockets or through faint echoes in other formats, a simple search of the 
literature provides evidence of the temporal boundaries of these quality improvement schemes.  
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The researcher’s own experiences within quality control and quality assurance have led, 
ultimately, to a fervent enthusiasm for quality risk management.  An early career in 
various quality functions, including microbiology, product release, change control, and 
deviation and CAPA management, led to a host of frustrations.  A small error in aseptic 
technique could contaminate thousands of doses that would have otherwise treated a 
similar number of patients.  A drug shortage situation could lead to deaths of many, 
while the product awaits investigation into ultimately inconsequential deviations.  
Seemingly minor changes, when implemented, could initiate a domino effect on a 
manufacturing process significant enough to render it useless.  It was only with an initial 
foray into QRM that the researcher learned that such frustrations are both predictable 
and preventable.  The only obstacle standing in industry’s way was a map to guide them 
there. 
Insider research has both advantages and disadvantages, and inevitably lends color to 
the research effort.  Advantages of the insider perspective include: 
• Knowledge: Pre-existing knowledge of the research topic can shorten the time 
needed for the researcher to orient herself, while allowing for a depth of 
interpretation that might otherwise be absent. 
• Interaction: Researchers who are familiar with cultural and linguistic norms 
in a given topic or within a given social group enable a more natural 
interaction with research subjects, which is particularly useful when 
qualitative research methods are employed. 
• Access: Researchers who are considered part of a given social group may 
enjoy easier access to thought leaders within the group for the purposes of the 
research. (72) 
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Disadvantages of insider research include: 
• Excessive subjectivity:  Insider status can serve as an impediment to 
objectivity, as data is analyzed through an existing contextual framework that 
may be too narrow. 
• Bias: “researcher bias in this context would refer to the process whereby the 
researcher’s personal beliefs, experiences, and values influence the study 
methodology, design, and/or results.”24  (72) 
The researcher acknowledges the disadvantages associated with an insider perspective, 
particularly those associated with bias.  The researcher has identified and discloses one 
such bias that is present in the research process and outputs; namely, the underlying 
assumption of the research question: QRM works.  Of course, was this assumption to 
be false, it is unlikely that the international regulatory community and industry at large 
would have channeled so much energy into encouraging its adoption.25  While this 
fundamental assumption has been retained, the researcher has taken many pains to 
minimize any potential bias in the research methods, construction of benchmarking 
surveys and questionnaires, with all involved research subjects, and in the interpretation 
of the results. 
3.2 Ethics and privacy 
The research plan received approval from the Research Ethics Committee on April 14, 
2015.  The was research conducted in accordance with DIT’s Ethical Guidelines. (73)  
                                                 
24 Of course, some sources claim that in certain circumstances, bias may be an advantage and should 
therefore not be feared, since “the insiders’ biases may be a source of insight as well as error.” (97) 
25 The researcher must likewise acknowledge that even this assumption should be challenged.  Over the 
course of the researcher, it became increasingly clear that there is currently no systematically-gathered 
evidence to support this assumption.  While personal experience and a wealth of anecdotes provide 
support, Chapter Eleven of this thesis suggests that widespread evidence be gathered to, finally, confirm 
or refute this assumption. 
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The researcher has not (and will not) have any power over any of the involved research 
subjects, each of whom agreed voluntarily to participate.  Each subject has been (and 
will continue to be) provided with an appropriate brief regarding the purpose of the 
research, expected time commitments, and anticipated outcomes, and provided consent 
in a documented format.  Where requested, each subject’s identity was/will be kept 
completely confidential, with associated data encoded to eliminate any traceability to a 
particular individual. 
A Conflict of Interest was disclosed as part of the ethics package to ensure transparency 
with regard to the researcher’s current employment in the pharmaceutical industry.26  
The researcher’s employers had no access to the research in advance of publication, so 
no competitive advantage was available. 
All raw and analyzed data is kept in an electronic format, encrypted via Symantec’s 
Endpoint Encryption software,27 and stored on a personal password-protected 
computer.  The one exception to this are hard-copy consent forms which are stored in 
a designated, locked file cabinet located in the researcher’s home.  All efforts were 
made to ensure that research subjects’ rights and privacy were maintained, and all data 
was secured. 
Ethical approval was sought and granted on April 21, 2015.   
                                                 
26 Refer to section 3.1.2 for additional information on the insider perspective. 
27 Refer to https://www.symantec.com/products/information-protection/encryption for additional 
information.  Please also note that software support is purchased through an annual subscription which 
is being sustained by the researcher through the life of the research effort, which will continue until 
achievement of the PhD award or cessation of the program, at which time all electronic and hard copy 
data will be destroyed. 
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3.3 A brief history of the research question 
The original research proposal, as included in the research application and registration 
package in June 2014 (74), cited the following primary hypothesis: 
“Industry has failed to fully embrace the principles and processes outlined in 
ICH Q9.  QRM is absent or has been misapplied in multiple areas of the quality 
system for the majority of pharmaceutical and biologics manufacturers.” 
Of course, merely confirming or refuting this hypothesis would be an incomplete 
research inquiry, with little ability to effect change within the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries.  As a result, a secondary hypothesis was proposed, as 
follows: 
“A primary contributing factor to the current state of QRM in industry is the 
lack of intra- and inter-industry benchmarking with respect to the constitution 
of an effective QRM program.  Without a successful model to emulate, firms 
struggle to implement a holistic program to enable their quality management 
system in the spirit of ICH Q9 and Q10.” 
At the time of writing the confirmation report in the fall of 2016, the researcher had 
progressed in her thinking and elected to refine the initial hypotheses into a research 
question, as follows: 
 “Has industry achieved a state of effective risk management, whereby QRM is 
conducted in an efficient manner and continually adds value to operational and 
quality processes in the manufacture of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
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products?  What does effective and efficient quality risk management look like, 
and how can it be achieved?” 
This research question more sufficiently phrased the researcher’s trajectory at that stage 
of learning, with the original intent of risk maturity preserved, yet re-envisioned as a 
function of effectiveness, efficiency, and value.   
However, as time passed, the researcher again began to rethink the true objective of the 
research.  Over the course of the three-year research effort, this researcher has been 
fully absorbed into the academic and industrial world of QRM.  Thought leaders and 
experts have spoken at length about QRM at conferences, sharing their opinions in open 
venues and in peer-reviewed journals, espousing the need to apply QRM to a 
multiplicity of topics.  Regulators, similarly, have increased focus on QRM with a litany 
of new regulation, guidance, and inspection techniques.  Despite this increased 
attention, the researcher became increasingly dissatisfied with the way the conversation 
was evolving—while there was more discussion around “doing QRM,” there was less 
around managing risk to the patient.  As discussed in the introductory literature review 
(Chapter Two), very few sources address the fundamental question of how QRM should 
be used to serve the patient.  Indeed, there are no such sources that look holistically a 
comprehensively across a QRM program, including the governance, process, and 
people-related aspects that are essential to build and sustain a state in which risks to the 
patient are effectively managed.   
And thus the third and final revision of the research question crystallized: 
“How can industry recode QRM to better manage risks to the patient?” 
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3.4 Research design, methodology, and methods 
Based on the research question discussed in the prior section, the research design 
followed a phased approach to encompass the logical progression of research topics.  
The first phase focused on characterizing the current state of the industry with regard 
to reaping the benefits of better patient protection.  The second phase sought to 
understand the ways in which QRM is being used to try to achieve that benefit.  The 
third phase focused on better defining a mature state of QRM to realize the benefit, as 
well as providing tangible solutions to help industry measure and progress on the path 
towards the ideal.   
Table 3-1: Research design, methodology, and methods 
Research 
Phase Objective Methodology Methods 
1 
Characterize the 
current state of 
industry with regard 
to patient benefit 
realization 
Quantitative 
• Literature review / data 
analysis 
2 
Characterize the 
current state of 
industry with regard 
to QRM 
implementation 
Explanatory 
sequential mixed 
methods 
• Literature review / data 
analysis  
• Structured 
benchmarking survey 
• Literature review 
• Philosophical dialogues 
3 
Define how QRM 
implementation 
might better protect 
the patient 
Exploratory 
sequential mixed 
methods 
• Literature review 
• Philosophical dialogues 
• Semi-structured 
interviews 
• Transcript analysis 
• Pilots /case studies 
 
Mixed methods research was chosen as the most suitable research methodology to 
employ within the overarching research design.  Specifically, an overarching embedded 
mixed methods approach was employed.  This methodology includes combinations of 
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quantitative, explanatory sequential mixed methods and exploratory sequential mixed 
methods research techniques in an iterative framework. (71)  Quantitative research is 
primarily focused on data analysis, and where therefore chosen for the Phase 1 research.  
Explanatory sequential mixed methods begin with quantitative research, followed by 
qualitative techniques to support interpretation (71); this methodology was chosen for 
the second phases of the research to better gauge the current level of QRM adoption.  
Exploratory sequential mixed methods progress in opposite of explanatory sequential 
mixed methods; that is, qualitative methods are employed at first, followed by a 
quantitative inquiry to facilitate interpretation. (71)  Exploratory sequential mixed 
methods were used in the final phase of the research.   
As discussed above, Phase 1 sought to characterize the extent to which industry (and 
the patient) have realized the benefit of improve product quality and patient protection 
through quantitative research approach. Figure 3-A outlines the research method 
employed during Phase 1. 
 
Figure 3-A: Quantitative approach used in the Phase 1 research 
 
Phase 2 of the research used an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach to 
characterize the current state of QRM implementation in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries.  Figure 3-B illustrates the research methods employed 
during Phase 2. 
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Figure 3-B: Explanatory sequential mixed methods used in the Phase 2 research 
 
Phase 3 of the research involved a synthesis of the learnings from the prior two research 
phases as well as some additional methods in order to define an ideal state of QRM.  
Because of the iterative nature of prior and new qualitative methods and the quantitative 
pilot/case study employed in Phase 3, an exploratory sequential mixed methods 
approach was used, as illustrated in Figure 3-C.  
 
Figure 3-C: Exploratory sequential mixed methods approach used in the Phase 3 research 
3.5 The research effort 
Prior to initiating the research, the researcher had published two peer-reviewed articles 
on QRM and presented two industry conference sessions.  While these work products 
were not specifically related to a formal research effort with a defined hypothesis, the 
 
Literature review / 
analysis 
(qualitative) 
Philosophical 
dialogues 
(qualitative) 
Semi-structured 
interviews / 
transcript analysis 
(qualitative) 
Interpretation 
Pilot / case study 
(quantitative) 
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covered topics added to the existing body of knowledge on QRM and the opportunities 
to socialize ideas within industry led to the establishment of positive professional 
relationships with QRM thought leaders.28  These publications piqued the researcher’s 
interest in pursuing a more rigorous form of inquiry, and a research abstract and 
application to DIT’s graduate program was submitted. 
3.5.1 Summary of the Phase 1 Research 
The research commenced in June 2014, immediately following approval of the research 
proposal and admission into the graduate program.  The initial focus was to develop an 
understanding of whether QRM had yielded some of the benefits listed in ICH Q9—in 
particular, higher quality products and resultant patient protection.  To determine 
whether drug product quality had improved since the inception of ICH Q9, an analysis 
of quality-related recalls and critical quality defects in the US and Ireland was 
conducted to identify any applicable trends that may cast light on the research question.  
The researcher simultaneously began work on the first stage of the Phase 2 research to 
evaluate potential improvements in compliance and QRM implementation through a 
review of warning letters (from FDA) and inspection observations (from HPRA), as 
described in section 3.5.2.  
In December 2014, the researcher was contacted by the Institute of Validation 
Technology (IVT) and invited to serve as chairperson of the institute’s first Quality 
Risk Management conference.  The researcher coordinated known industry experts to 
participate as speakers and suggested QRM-related topics that were suitable for the 
                                                 
28 These relationships have proven beneficial to the research, in line with the interaction and access 
advantages of insider research described in section 3.1.2. 
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target attendees.  The conference was held in Orlando, Florida (US) in January 2015 
with a small but meaningful enrollment of approximately eighty industry practitioners.  
The researcher provided opening remarks, followed by a presentation of the initial 
quality defect and compliance observation data analysis discussed above.  The 
researcher also presented two additional topics, on risk-based impact assessment and 
the creation of custom QRM tools.  Also in January 2015, IVT arranged for peer review 
of a paper on the quality defect and compliance observation analysis, which was 
ultimately published in the Journal of Validation Technology (one of two journals 
published by IVT). 
Chapter Four summarizes the data and analysis for the Phase 1 research. 
3.5.2 Summary of the Phase 2 Research 
Following the completion of the Phase 1 research, the researcher began inquiry into the 
current level of QRM implementation, with a research plan that included a literature 
review and data analysis, an industry benchmarking survey, a qualitative literature 
review, and philosophical dialogues.  At this time, the researcher was invited to 
participate in a PDA task force, responsible for the creation of a technical report on the 
application of quality risk management to the design, delivery, validation, and use of 
manufacturing systems, inclusive of facilities, utilities, manufacturing equipment, and 
similar support systems.29 
                                                 
29 Participation on this task force proved to be a multi-year effort.  The deliverable from the task force, 
PDA Technical Report No. 54-5, Quality Risk Management for the Design, Qualification, and Operation 
of Manufacturing Systems, was published in May 2017. 
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In July 2015, the researcher was selected for the PDA Volunteer Spotlight.  This honor 
is granted to one innovative, active participant in the group each month, who is 
highlighted in a full-page interview in that month’s issue of the PDA Letter.  The 
researcher was chosen based on her work with the PDA task force described above. 
In order to reach a larger target audience and to enhance access to industry experts for 
the Phase 2 and 3 research the researcher developed a proposal for a research 
collaboration with PDA.  The PDA was selected by the researcher for this collaboration 
effort based on a number of factors, including the PDA’s reach (as of this writing, PDA 
has over 10,000 members worldwide; (75)), members’ expertise and innovation in the 
area of QRM, and the historical relationship between the researcher and the 
organization. 
The DIT/PDA collaboration proposal outlined the research objectives, portions of the 
research plan which were intended to be included in the collaboration, anticipated 
timelines, and benefits that the collaboration would yield to industry and regulatory 
science.  The proposal clearly identified that the research and all deliverables would be 
conducted by the researcher, primarily leveraging the PDA QRM Interest Group and 
other volunteers as research subjects.  The proposal was brought to vote with the PDA’s 
Regulatory Affairs and Quality Advisory Board, and received unanimous approval in 
August 2015.  The research collaboration was socialized through a talk at the PDA/FDA 
Joint Regulatory Conference in September 2015, and in an article in the PDA Letter the 
following month. 
Having secured access to a large potential research subject pool, Phase 2 commenced 
with a preliminary draft of an industry benchmarking survey designed to elicit both 
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opinions and current practices related to QRM from volunteer respondents.  The survey 
was developed in accordance with current standards of survey research, (76) to: 
• obtain respondent consent prior to completion of the survey,  
• ensure only the target population could respond (industry practitioners who 
could represent their current experience in a particular company, rather than 
consultants, for example), 
• minimize potential ambiguity in the questions, 
• mask any potential researcher bias that may have inadvertently colored the 
question, and 
• have a clear and logical flow 
The draft survey was review by peers from the PRST prior to being coded in the 
SurveyMonkey online software application.30 
The QRM benchmarking survey opened on October 1, 2015.  An email was distributed 
by PDA to its membership list to solicit participation.  The survey was originally 
scheduled to close on December 31, 2015, however the response period was extended 
through January 31, 2016 at the request of PDA Japan, who expressed particular interest 
in understanding any potential regional differences with regard to QRM adoption.  A 
total of 230 responses were received, including (approximately) 144 complete 
responses.  Preliminary results (addressing trends and themes for industry as a whole) 
were presented at the PDA Annual Meeting in March 2016; the presentation was 
subsequently featured in The Gold Sheet, an electronic periodical highlighting current 
                                                 
30 SurveyMonkey employs the latest security technology and encrypts each respondent’s personal 
information to assure privacy.  The researcher’s SurveyMonkey account was password protected so that 
no person other than researcher had access to the survey results prior or subsequent to analysis and 
presentation. 
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topics in pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical quality and regulatory affairs and was 
recently published in the PDA Journal of Pharmaceutical Science and Technology. 
While the benchmarking survey was ongoing, the literature review commenced.  
Because the goal of Phase 2 was to characterize the current state of industry with regard 
to QRM, literature was selected based on two criteria: 
• Topic under consideration addressed QRM principles, practices, or a portion 
of the QRM lifecycle 
• Content directly related to the pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical industry 
(either through publication by a regulatory agency, industry group such as 
PDA, ISPE, or IVT), or in an industry-targeted journal or periodical) 
Peer-reviewed publications were targeted where possible, however presentation 
materials and opinion pieces were reviewed as well, provided these had the potential to 
reach the target group (industry professionals) based on the conference at which they 
were delivered or periodical in which they were published.  Literature was selected 
through a systematic review of all sources identified in Table 3-2.  An overview and 
critical analysis of the literature is summarized throughout this thesis. 
 
 
 
88 
 
Table 3-2: Sources mined for literature review (excluding books) 
Data Source Issuing Organization Data Type 
Publication 
frequency 
RSS Feeds FDA, EMA, ICH RSS Feeds Continuously 
The Pink Sheet Daily Informa Subscription service Daily 
FiercePharma FierceMarkets Subscription service Daily 
FiercePharma Manufacturing FierceMarkets Subscription service 2x week 
The Pink Sheet Informa Subscription service Weekly 
PhRMA Updates PhRMA Subscription service Ad hoc 
Quality Digest Jameson Publishing Subscription service Ad hoc 
Pharmaceutical Online Jameson Publishing Subscription service Ad hoc 
BioProcess Online Jameson Publishing Subscription service Ad hoc 
Life Science Leader Jameson Publishing Subscription service Ad hoc 
Med Device Online Jameson Publishing Subscription service Ad hoc 
GMP Trend Report GMP Trends, Inc. Subscription service 2x Month 
The Gold Sheet Informa Subscription service Monthly 
Life Science Leader Jameson Publishing Industry publication Monthly 
Pharmaceutical Technology Advanstar Industry publication Monthly 
Biopharm International Advanstar Industry publication Monthly 
Pharmaceutical Executive Advanstar Industry publication Monthly 
PDA Letter PDA Industry publication 10x year 
Pharmaceutical Engineering ISPE Industry publication Bi-monthly 
PDA Journal of 
Pharmaceutical Science & 
Technology 
PDA Peer-reviewed journal Bi-monthly 
Journal of GxP Compliance IVT Peer-reviewed journal Bi-monthly 
Journal of Validation 
Technology IVT Peer-reviewed journal Bi-monthly 
PDA Technical Reports PDA Peer-reviewed whitepapers Ad hoc 
ISPE Baseline Guides ISPE Peer-reviewed whitepapers Ad hoc 
Regulation and regulatory 
guidance documents 
FDA, EMA, 
ICH Authoritative Ad hoc 
 
In addition, the researcher commenced philosophical dialogues with industry 
practitioners and QRM experts.  These dialogues spanned a number of topics, including 
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QRM best practices, obstacles preventing a more mature application of QRM, specific 
challenges and frustrations experienced by industry, and feedback on the industry 
benchmarking survey.  The researcher leveraged all available forums to conduct these 
industry consultations, drawing heavily upon industry conferences at which large 
numbers of experts were present.  The use of active listening proved invaluable in the 
Phase 2 research, and continued through the final stage of the research. 
Within Phase 2, the researcher served as guest editor for a special double issue of the 
Journal of Validation Technology, published in December 2015.  This issue, dedicated 
to quality risk management, featured peer-reviewed articles written by industry thought 
leaders and current and former regulators and marked the ten-year anniversary of the 
publication of ICH Q9.  The key theme of the issue was how industry can improve 
current QRM practices to achieve better results.  In addition to compiling the issue and 
working with authors to position the work within the overarching theme, the researcher 
contributed two articles to stimulate industry thinking on important but neglected 
topics.  These articles, as well as those of the other contributors, became part of the 
literature review in Phase 2 and Phase 3.   
Finally, the literature review was extended to other industries in which risk management 
techniques have proven effective; namely, the medical device, aerospace, and nuclear 
power industries.  Chapter Six is fully dedicated to exploring this topic. 
3.5.3 Summary of the Phase 3 research 
Phase 3 of the research focused on defining an optimal state where QRM can be applied 
to better manage risks to the patient.  Specifically, this phase entailed the development 
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of a deep understanding of the ways in which QRM should be applied to minimize 
emphasis on the risk management activities themselves while maximizing the benefits 
to the patient.  Necessarily this involved the exploration into risk maturity and QRM 
best practices as originally envisioned in the research proposal, and involved the 
synthesis of Phase 1 and 2 learnings with a more sophisticated and precise research 
plan.   
The three qualitative research methods (literature review, philosophical dialogues, and 
expert interviews/transcript analysis) were iterative in nature, as learnings from each 
inspired further research from the others.  The design of the semi-structured interviews 
was based upon specific areas of inquiry deemed necessary by the researcher to fully 
answer the research question, as follows: 
1. In your opinion, how far has the industry comes towards achieving the 
vision and benefits of QRM as outlined in ICH Q9 and Q10? 
 
2. What are the main challenges you believe industry must overcome in order 
to more fully achieve those benefits? 
 
3. What aspects of the quality system do you think require more attention and 
improvement? 
 
4.  What best practices would you say are currently being used in QRM? 
 
5. What aspects of the quality system do you think are currently well-addressed 
through QRM programs? 
 
6. In your opinion, what would be some of the characteristics of a mature QRM 
program? 
 
7. In your opinion, what are some of the characteristics of an immature QRM 
program? 
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8. What behaviors of industry personnel do you feel must be nurtured in order 
to improve QRM implementation and effectiveness? 
 
9. In your opinion, what is the one (or most) key thing that must exist at a 
company in order for QRM to be effectively applied? 
 
10. Is there anything else you’d like to say with regard to QRM effectiveness 
and maturity? 
 
Interview candidates included a total of eleven QRM experts from industry as well as 
one regulator, from the HPRA.  Industry experts were identified via self-identification 
to the researcher following the industry benchmarking survey and through active 
solicitation by the researcher based on the experts’ reputations and industry 
contributions.  In each case, the interviewee was required to meet inclusion criteria 
consisting of the following: 
• Ten or more years working in the pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, or 
medical device industries 
• Five or more years working directly (or indirectly but intensively) in the QRM 
field 
Conformance to these criteria was confirmed by a review of each interviewee’s 
curriculum vitae. 
The interviews took place either in person or via teleconference and, with the 
interviewee’s consent were recorded and transcribed.  In some instances, due to 
scheduling and geographical challenges, interviewees provided written responses 
directly to the researcher.  The transcripts (and written responses) were then analyzed 
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using a key-word identification process31 to identify emergent themes from the 
interviewees. 
The literature review and philosophical dialogues included in the Phase 3 research 
followed the same structure, with the same inclusion criteria, as outlined in section 
3.5.2.  The learnings from the qualitative research methods were used to define QRM 
maturity, described in Chapters Seven through Nine of this thesis.   
This ideal state, and the learnings from all three phases of the research, were then 
combined into a QRM maturity measurement tool.  The tool was piloted with two 
volunteer organizations, both of whom requested to remain anonymous for this thesis.  
The measurement tool design, application, and feedback from the pilot case studies are 
discussed in Chapter Ten. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 In some cases, synonyms were identified as key words.  This was deemed necessary due to the wide 
variety of metaphor and “catch phrases” used in QRM expert circles, as each interviewee possessed his 
or her own individual “brand.”  Refer to Chapter Seven for additional discussion on QRM vernacular. 
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Section Two: Characterizing the 
Current State 
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“Go to the people. Learn from them. Live with them. Start with 
what they know.” 
- Lao Tzu 
 
“Lay a firm foundation with the bricks that others throw at you.” 
- David Brinkley 
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4 Chapter Four: Have Patients Realized the Benefits of 
QRM?  
 
This chapter describes the research outputs and findings from Phase 1 of the research.  
This phase employed an explanatory sequential mixed methods approach as described 
in Chapter 3, beginning with quantitative methods of inquiry, then moving to a 
qualitative approach prior to interpretation of the results.  The objective of Phase 1 was 
to fully characterize the current state of the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries with regard to the realization of the benefits of QRM implementation as 
described in ICH Q9.32 
ICH Q9 discloses a number of potential benefits that may arise from the implementation 
of QRM principles and practices, including: 
• Better assurance of product quality through proactive identification and 
mitigation of potential risks 
• Improved compliance by enabling an understanding of the relationship between 
regulatory requirements and the unique concerns of the product or process 
• More informed and consistent decisions relative to product quality (for 
realized/reactive risks) and quality system process design 
• Potential reduction in the level or frequency of regulatory oversight through 
improved communication and higher confidence in quality system effectiveness 
(45) 
This phase of the research focused on the patient experience—that is, whether product 
quality and the resultant level of patient protection has improved since the inception of 
                                                 
32 This research summarized in this section has been previously published in the Journal of Validation 
Technology (146) and presented at an industry conference (142). 
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ICH Q9.  Based on this espoused advantage and the availability of concrete quantitative 
data through which to measure its realization, a quantitative study was designed.   
4.1 Tangible benefits to the patient – research design and process 
The Phase 1 research sought to provide a systematic review of US and Irish product 
recalls spanning the 2006 through 2013 time period.  This timeframe was selected based 
on the potential to identify trends in product quality following the publication of ICH 
Q9 in 2005, through the most current period in which a comparable data set (i.e. a 
complete year of data) was available.  As depicted in the literature map in Figure 4-A, 
this research phase extends the initial literature review described in Chapter Two. 
 
Figure 4-A: Literature map highlighting focus for Chapter Four 
Data from the US was sourced from the weekly enforcement report database available 
through the Food and Drug Administration website. (77)  Drug recall data was reviewed 
in an effort to characterize product quality, and by extension patient safety, over time.  
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In the US, drug recalls are divided as individual events, each assigned a unique recall 
tracking number and associated classification level based on risk to patient or consumer.  
While most recalls are separated based on product presentation and dosage form, in 
certain instances (e.g. where all products manufactured by one firm in a given time 
period were subject to recall) a single tracking number was assigned to a portfolio of 
products.  The data reviewed and presented in this section retains the separation and 
classification as assigned by FDA, including subsequent corrections for previously-
reported data (e.g. expansion of recalled lots).   
Data from the EU proved more difficult to retrieve.  As a result, the research focused 
on Irish recall data ascertained through publicly-available annual reports written by the 
HPRA as well as research assistance for this project provided directly by the HPRA. 
(78) (79)  As the world’s largest drug exporter and the hub of DIT, Ireland served as an 
obvious choice for a European perspective. (80)  To enable the identification of themes, 
data was coded according to a number of categories as reflected in the findings and 
analyzed to visualize potential trends and enable comparison between countries. 
4.2 Is the patient better protected? - research findings 
As noted above, one of the potential benefits of QRM is improved product quality and 
resultant patient safety.  One indicator of patterns in this area is the number of recalls 
that may result from inadequate quality products reaching the marketplace.  
Improvements in product quality, such as the ability to meet specifications prior to drug 
product release, should therefore manifest as a reducing trend in the number of recall 
events over time.  Figure 4-B and Figure 4-C depict the number of quality-related recall 
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events initiated from 2006 through 2013 in the US and Irish markets, respectively. (77) 
(78) 
 
Figure 4-B: Total Number of Quality-Related Drug Recall Events in the US, 2006 through 
2013 
 
Figure 4-C: Total Number of Quality-Related Medicinal Product Recalls in Ireland, 2006 
through 2013 
A review of these data reveals an increasing trend.  Further analysis of US data reveals 
that in peak recall years (2009 and 2011), seemingly isolated issues resulted in multiple 
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recall events.  For example, Penicillium spp. cross-contamination at a single firm 
(Aidapak Services) led to 1,021 recall events in November 2011 while cGMP 
deviations in June and July 2009 led to 1,107 recall events from another manufacturer 
(Advantage Dose LLC).  While variables such as improved detection of quality defects 
or increases in volume of drug products on the US and Irish markets cannot be ruled 
out as contributing factors for the trends seen, the data indicated that recall events were 
increasingly common over the period in question. 
This led the researcher to examine how the application of QRM may have influenced 
these outcomes.  Table 4-1 lists the top three categories of recall events for each year 
included in the research. (77) (78) 
Annex II of ICH Q9 highlights potential applications of QRM that, when employed 
appropriately, could be used to avoid these types of recalls.  For example, OOS release 
specification events might have been prevented through the application of QRM “…to 
establish appropriate specifications, identify critical process parameters and establish 
manufacturing controls (e.g., using information from pharmaceutical development 
studies regarding the clinical significance of quality attributes and the ability to control 
them during processing)” and “to decrease variability of quality attributes [to] reduce 
product and material defects [and to] reduce manufacturing defects.” (45) 
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Table 4-1: Top Three US and Irish Recall Categories, 2006 through 2013 
  Contribution Rank 
(percentage of total quality-related recall events in noted calendar year) 
Year Country 1 2 3 
2013 
US 
Lack of sterility 
assurance / sterility 
failure (49.8%) 
Out of specification 
(OOS) release 
specification (10.9%) 
cGMP deviations33 
(9.3%) 
Ireland Lack of sterility assurance (19.8%) 
cGMP deviations 
(18.5%) 
OOS stability 
specification (17.3%) 
2012 
US 
Lack of sterility 
assurance / sterility 
failure (29.5%) 
OOS release 
specification (11.6%) 
cGMP deviations 
(10.5%) 
Ireland Contamination issue (29.2%) 
OOS stability 
specification (20.8%) 
Incorrect or 
inadequate labeling 
(15.3%) 
2011 
US Cross contamination (47.9%) 
Microbial 
contamination (non-
sterile products) 
(13.7%) 
cGMP deviations 
(10.5%) 
Ireland Cold chain failure (33.0%) 
Damaged product 
(18.7%) 
OOS release 
specification (13.8%) 
2010 
US Cold chain failure (25.8%) 
cGMP deviations 
(18.4%) 
OOS stability 
specification (12.1%) 
Ireland Packaging or labeling issue (41.0%) 
Damaged product 
(15.4%) 
Cold chain failure and 
cGMP deviations (tie; 
11.5% each) 
2009 
US cGMP deviations (84.9%) 
OOS release 
specification (6.5%) 
OOS stability 
specification (2.5%) 
Ireland Packaging or labeling issue (42.2%) 
Lack of sterility 
assurance (20.0%) 
OOS release 
specification (15.6%) 
2008 
US cGMP deviations (50.6%) 
OOS release 
specification (17.7%) 
Incorrect or 
inadequate labeling 
(8.6%) 
Ireland Packaging or labeling issue (70.6%) 
OOS release 
specification (8.8%) 
OOS stability 
specification (5.9%) 
2007 
US Incorrect or inadequate labeling (57.2%) 
OOS release 
specification (13.5%) 
OOS stability 
specification (12.6%) 
Ireland Packaging or labeling issue (27.6%) 
Cold chain failure 
(25.0%) 
Lack of sterility 
assurance (17.1%) 
2006 
US Incorrect or inadequate labeling (59.9%) 
OOS release 
specification (9.5%) 
cGMP deviations 
(8.2%) 
Ireland Packaging or labeling issue (35.9%) 
Lack of sterility 
assurance (20.5%) 
OOS release 
specification and 
Particulate or other 
contamination (tie; 
10.3% each) 
  
                                                 
33 “cGMP deviations” is a classification for recall events given by FDA.  Information regarding the impact of such 
deviations, or the specific nature of the deviation, was not readily available from the Agency. 
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Similarly, QRM could have minimized instances of cross contamination, lack of 
sterility assurance / sterility failure, and microbial contamination of non-sterile 
products if used “…to determine appropriate zones when designing buildings and 
facilities, e.g… [to] minimize contamination, prevent mix-ups, and [to determine the 
need for] dedicated or segregated facilities / equipment” (45) 
Though it is not clear whether QRM was ineffective or simply not used in the context 
of these recall events, the data demonstrated that potential patient exposure to defective 
product has not improved since the inception of ICH Q9. 
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5 Chapter Five: How Mature is Industry in its QRM 
Application? 
 
The Phase 1 research concluded that the patient has not yet benefited from QRM in the 
form of higher quality and safer medicinal products.  Phase 2 of the research, as 
captured in this chapter, sought to characterize the correlation between QRM and this 
lack of benefit realization through an evaluation of the ways in which industry is 
currently applying QRM principles and practices to drug manufacturing.  The Phase 2 
research employs a variety of research methods, described in later sections, and 
continues the literature review introduced in Chapter Two, as shown in Figure 5-A. 
 
Figure 5-A: Literature map highlighting focus for Chapter Five 
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This chapter explores the extent and effectiveness of QRM application in the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  The concept of maturity was first 
introduced into the realm of QRM through PDA Technical Report Number 54, 
Implementation of Quality Risk Management for Pharmaceutical and Biotechnology 
Manufacturing Operations, published in 2012.  This report introduced industry to a 
simple maturity model, depicted in Figure 5-B.  The PDA QRM maturity model 
includes five stages, stemming from no quality risk management at the lowest level 
through fully integrated quality risk management at the highest level.  PDA positioned 
the model as one of the progression of process maturity, thereby using the conduct of 
QRM activities as the measure of program maturity.   
In the researcher’s experience, the model reflects the general progression of a company 
as QRM becomes increasingly embedded within the quality system.  The initial stage 
is a lack of QRM, in which there is no codified QRM program and risk-based 
assessments are not employed.  This stage advances to one of informal QRM, where 
risk assessments or risk-based decisions are employed, however there is an overall lack 
of consistency associated with its implementation.  Once a formal QRM program has 
taken hold, the third level of maturity is reached, where risk activities are generally 
reactive in nature, addressing issues that have already occurred in order to understand 
the impact of the event.  As companies focus more on anticipation and avoidance of 
risks through proactive risk identification, assessment, and control, QRM programs 
evolve into a more established, prospective state.  Finally, the most mature level is 
reached, where QRM principles and practices are woven into the fabric of the quality 
system and product lifecycle and are therefore transformed into the normal operation 
of the business, as shown in Figure 5-B. (62) 
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Figure 5-B: QRM maturity model presented in PDA Technical Report No. 54 
The PDA Technical Report provides a second example of a risk maturity model, 
adapted from a model originally proposed under the umbrella of supply chain risk 
management.  This alternative model explores some of the cultural factors that support 
and act within a QRM program, as shown in Table 5-1. (62) 
Table 5-1: Alternative risk management maturity model presented in PDA Technical 
Report No. 54 
Risk Maturity 
Level Risk Processes Attitude Behavior 
Skills & 
Knowledge 
Skepticism No formal processes 
Accidents will 
happen 
Fear of blame 
culture 
Unconscious 
incompetence 
Awareness 
Ad hoc use of 
stand-alone 
processes 
Suspended 
belief 
Reactive, fire 
fighting 
Conscious 
incompetence 
Understanding 
& Application 
Tick box 
approach 
Passive 
acceptance 
Compliance, 
reliance on 
registers 
Conscious 
competence 
Embedding & 
Integration 
Risk 
management 
embedded in 
business 
Active 
engagement 
Risk-based 
decision 
making 
Unconscious 
competence 
Robust Risk 
Management 
Regular review 
& improvement Champion 
Innovation, 
confident & 
appropriate risk 
management 
Expert 
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The second model offers general concepts for each maturity level within four different 
dimensions—risk processes, attitude, behavior, and skills and knowledge.  No 
additional information, such as the distinction between concepts or how to progress 
from one level to the next, is offered.  In the absence of a fully formed QRM maturity 
model (the gap this research intends to fill), the two example risk maturity models from 
PDA Technical Report No. 54 were used as the frame of reference to measure the 
current state of industry with regard to QRM.  Though QRM maturity is likely to be a 
continuum rather than one marked by discrete tiers, for clarity of analysis the researcher 
chose to employ five levels of maturity, as shown in Figure 5-C. 
 
 
Figure 5-C: Basic QRM maturity model used for Phase 2 research 
 
5.1 Has industry improved the level of compliance since the 
publication of ICH Q9? 
5.1.1 Research design and process 
The Phase 2 research began with a systematic review of US and Irish compliance 
enforcement data spanning the 2006 through 2013 time period.  Similar to Phase 1, this 
timeframe was selected based on the potential to identify trends in cGMP compliance 
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following the publication of ICH Q9 in 2005, through the most current period in which 
a comparable data set (i.e. a complete year of data) was available.   
US data was collected from the warning letter database available through the FDA 
website. (81)  Warning letters issued by FDA for cGMP-related concerns were selected 
based on the insight they may provide into the industry’s state of compliance over time.  
FDA is charged with protecting public health and as such has several levels of 
compliance enforcement options available to facilitate this mandate. (82)  Compliance 
observations noted during inspections are summarized on a Form 483.  Unlike the 
practice in the EU, these observations are not categorized according to criticality and 
therefore may not delineate the gravity of noncompliance concerns as identified during 
inspections; in addition, access to individual Form 483s are not readily available.  
Warning letters represent the “principal means of achieving prompt voluntary 
compliance” with applicable regulations and are typically issued for significant 
violations of related statutes or, in many cases, inadequate responses or commitments 
from violative firms following the issuance of a Form 483. (83)  Warning letters are 
posted to a public access database and have the potential to offer a rich source of 
information regarding noncompliance with cGMPs.  Various cross checks (i.e. database 
searches by year, company name, warning letter category, product type, and keywords) 
were performed to assure the validity and comprehensiveness of the data collected.  
Inspectional observations in the EU are not readily available to the public; the 
researcher therefore relied on assistance provided directly by the HPRA and therefore 
focused solely on the scope of inspections from the Irish authorities. (78) (79)  To 
enable the identification of themes, data was coded according to a number of categories 
and analyzed to identify patterns. 
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5.1.2 Research findings 
Another potential benefit of QRM implementation described in ICH Q9 is reduced 
regulatory oversight, which may be achieved through demonstration of quality system 
effectiveness in the form of a robust QRM program. (45) (52)  This allows trust to be 
built between regulators and manufacturing sites, as regulators have visibility to the 
depth of product and process knowledge at a site, as well as their level of self-awareness 
over their own quality vulnerabilities.  It stands to reason that, where firms fully 
embrace the principles and practices of QRM, incidences of breaches of cGMP, product 
quality defects, and resultant risks to the patient should reduce and compliance status 
should improve over time.  This should allow manufacturers to demonstrate the 
enhanced effectiveness of their pharmaceutical quality systems through the use of 
meaningful quality metrics, such as reductions in the number of deviations, 
effectiveness of CAPAs and change requests, and a reduction in the number customer 
complaints.  
Figure 5-D illustrates the overall number of cGMP-related warning letters issued by 
FDA from 2006 through 2013. (81) The increased numbers of compliance enforcement 
actions since 2006 indicated that cGMP compliance, and therefore quality system 
effectiveness, had not improved since the inception of ICH Q9.   
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Figure 5-D: Total Number of US FDA cGMP-related Warning Letters, 2006 through 2013 
 
The researcher acknowledges that further analysis of variables, such as the total number 
of cGMP inspections conducted in each calendar year and the proportion of inspection 
observations (Form 483s) that ultimately resulted in warning letters, would allow for a 
refined interpretation of the data; however, such information is not readily available 
from FDA. 
A review of warning letters through the lens of QRM revealed an increasing trend of 
citations against the QRM programs and practices themselves, as shown in Figure 5-E.  
This would indicate that, in the opinion of the inspectors, many applications of QRM 
had not inspired confidence that the manufacturing site has appropriately interpreted 
contemporary guidance and regulations within the context of their individual 
operations. 
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Figure 5-E: US FDA cGMP-related Warning Letters with one or more QRM citations, 
2006 through 2013 
 
Again, while additional variables such as increased QRM education of inspectors or an 
evolving strategic emphasis on QRM may be at play, insight into the nature and extent 
of impact of such variables is not available.  Nonetheless, these data confirmed a gap 
between regulatory expectations and industry practice over the period reviewed.  This 
conclusion was reinforced with additional analysis into the various categories of QRM 
citations.  Figure 5-F illustrates whether each individual citation indicated either an 
absence (i.e. failure to apply QRM where warranted based on an individual event or 
circumstance) or misapplication (i.e. inappropriate use of QRM principles or faulty 
conclusions drawn based on QRM application).   For example: 
• Absent QRM:  “…we note that your response includes a commitment to 
retrain personnel, revise procedures, and use of premade agar plates to address 
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[deficiencies in aseptic processing techniques].  Your response is inadequate 
because your firm failed to conduct a comprehensive risk assessment of these 
poor aseptic process activities, and the inadequate environmental monitoring 
program, to evaluate their impact on product quality.”  (84) 
• Misapplied QRM:  “We are concerned…with your risk assessment, which 
suggests that the failure of these products to meet acceptance criteria for 
defects during the 100% inspection has no bearing on the quality of the 
released units.  Please provide detailed information regarding how you 
reached your conclusion.”  (85) 
 
 
Figure 5-F: Type of Quality Risk Management Deficiency in US FDA Warning Letters 
Issued between 2006 and 2013 
 
An absence of QRM was cited in the overwhelming majority of instances.  This was 
striking, considering that ICH Q9 had been published many years prior; it would be 
reasonable to expect that sufficient time had elapsed to allow industry to overcome 
some of the initial inertia inherent in any paradigm shift, even one of the magnitude of 
transitioning from “rule-based” to “risk-based” quality and compliance. 
81.8%
18.2%
Absent
Misapplied
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Analysis with respect to the QRM lifecycle stage that was cited in the warning letter 
was similarly informative.  Figure 5-G shows the proportion of citations for the various 
sections of the lifecycle: risk assessment, risk control, risk review, risk communication, 
or risk management as a whole.   
 
Figure 5-G: Quality Risk Management Deficiency by Lifecycle Stage in US FDA Warning 
Letters Issued between 2006 and 2013 
 
The majority of citations implicated risk assessment, the first phase of the QRM 
lifecycle.  Because QRM is an iterative process that commences with a robust and 
science-based risk assessment, citations in this area of the lifecycle were particularly 
concerning since it is unlikely that the remaining phases would prove effective if built 
upon a faulty or absent risk assessment.  The data is also revealing as to the level of risk 
maturity of implicated firms—observations related to the risk review portion of the 
QRM lifecycle were notably absent.  Perhaps this is because practitioners failed to 
successfully complete the risk assessment and risk control portions of the lifecycle; if 
3.6%
89.1%
5.5%
1.8%
Risk Management
Risk Assessment
Risk Control
Risk Communication
112 
 
so, it is likely that risk review phase was not reached.  Unfortunately, it appears that 
risk review has been neglected for some time, as a 2006 PDA survey on QRM practices 
noted that a large proportion (41%) of respondents did not periodically reassess risk 
assessments, while the majority (55%) did not evaluate the QRM program for 
effectiveness. (86) 
 These data support the hypothesis that certain firms within industry are still in the early 
phases of QRM maturity (i.e. Level 1 “no quality risk management” or Level 2 
“informal quality risk management”, based on the model depicted in Figure 5-C), with 
challenges centered on the initial risk assessment phase of the QRM lifecycle. 
Another indicator as to the expected level of QRM maturity is whether warning letter 
citations focus on reactive or prospective QRM implementation. While it is broadly 
acknowledged that risk management applied in response to a realized issue (i.e. 
reactive) can be helpful to get to true root cause and plan and to define an appropriate 
remediation strategy, most risk management practitioners will assert that the full value 
of QRM is achieved through proactive anticipation and mitigation of potential risks to 
ensure those issues do not materialize. (45) (62)  When QRM-related warning letter 
citations were classified by emphasis (i.e. prospective or reactive; Figure 5-H), it was 
evident that industry shortcomings were primarily focused on reactive QRM during the 
prior eight-year period.   
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Figure 5-H: Quality Risk Management Deficiency Emphasis in US FDA Warning Letters 
Issued between 2006 and 2013 
 
Examples of this emphasis are evident in the following excerpts: 
• “Please provide a copy of your investigation [surrounding breach of data 
integrity through the deletion of critical analytical data and backdating records], 
along with your risk assessment regarding the extent and impact of the missing 
data on the quality of all finished drug products released for distribution.” (87) 
• “…your firm failed to investigate numerous customer complaints for several 
lots of [product] concerning cracked vials… your firm's response failed to 
include a risk assessment for the product currently on the market.” (88) 
• “…your firm failed to conduct and document verification under actual 
conditions of use of [multiple] laboratory test methods… [in your response] 
please provide a risk assessment for possible impurities present in [lots of API 
released to market].” (89) 
 
In these instances FDA was calling for the application of QRM in situations where an 
impact assessment might have been used traditionally, i.e. where the full breadth and 
69.1%
30.9%
Reactive
Prospective
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gravity of a cGMP-related event or circumstance must be determined.  This trend 
implied that FDA expected industry to have mastered reactive/corrective QRM, or be 
positioned at a Level 3 on the QRM maturity continuum.  Therefore, a gap between the 
risk maturity status of industry (Level 1 or 2) and FDA expectations (Level 3) was 
apparent.   
While a comparable data set was not available from Ireland, excerpts from HPRA 
inspectional observations indicated a similar gap in QRM maturity.  For example: 
• “With regard to the usage of the flexible isolator / barrier for the dispensing of 
[material X] in [room Y], there was no formal risk assessment documented 
assessing the impact of the introduction of the flexible isolator on pre-existing 
activities in the room.” (emphasis proactive, risk assessment; (79)) 
• “Following a risk assessment exercise that had been performed in 2011 on the 
use of diaphragm pumps at the site following a diaphragm pump failure issue 
that had occurred at a sister site, appropriate actions had not been taken to 
ensure that the controls on which the risk had been deemed acceptable in 
(Site) were effective…” (emphasis proactive, risk control; (79)) 
These findings indicate that (as of 2013) the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries were still struggling with QRM.  Maturity levels in QRM application were 
low, and the benefits suggested in ICH Q9 had not yet been realized.   
5.2 How is QRM currently being applied throughout industry? 
In addition to the use of compliance enforcement data as a means to characterize the 
level of risk maturity, the researcher sought data and opinion directly from industry 
through the design, deployment, and analysis of an industry benchmarking survey. 
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5.2.1 Research design and process 
The design of the industry benchmarking survey began by outlining the knowledge to 
be gained, such that the survey questions would align with the goals of the research.  
The researcher sought to explore three pillars that compose QRM—people, process, 
and governance—that in turn support the patient, as depicted in Figure 5-I: 
 
 
Figure 5-I: Pillars of a QRM program 
 
Because programs such as QRM require the engagement and dedication of practitioners 
to work within it, people was selected as the first pillar to explore.  This line of inquiry 
focused on understanding the motivations, behaviors, and attitudes towards risk 
management of the personnel who support and execute the QRM program.  Processes 
were investigated in order to measure where and how QRM is applied, using Annex II 
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of ICH Q934 and the contents of PDA Technical Report No. 54 as guides.  Finally, 
questions related to governance, such as the support from leadership, ownership, and 
accountability, were included. 
The survey was structured to elicit feedback from respondents regarding the percent of 
time spent on a particular QRM activity, the percent of colleagues who might express 
certain opinions, and how various QRM activities had been codified within the umbrella 
quality system.  In this way, the survey served as a quantitative research method, 
enabling extensive analysis and trending of resultant data. 
The first two questions of the survey addressed inclusion criteria for the research 
subjects.  The survey began with a research brief, developed as part of the 
documentation package for the Research Ethics Committee, including contact 
information for the researcher.  The brief was followed by a mandatory question 
regarding consent—respondents who indicated that they did not consent to participation 
in the research were directed to a “thank you” page and not permitted to continue with 
the survey.  Respondents who granted consent through this initial screen were allowed 
to continue to the next mandatory question regarding their current employment status.  
Respondents who self-identified as consultants were likewise directed to the “thank 
you” page and not permitted to complete the remainder of the survey.  This ensured that 
respondents answered based on their current experience with their current employer 
(either a Marketing Authorization Holder (MAH), Contract Manufacturing 
                                                 
34 As discussed in Chapter Two, Annex II of ICH Q9 lists potential applications of QRM throughout the 
quality system.  Different quality system elements, such as product development, validation, deviation 
management, change control, and sampling are listed, along with the objectives of using QRM in each 
context.  The content of this Annex was captured in the benchmarking survey to measure where and to 
what extent integration may have occurred at a given company. 
117 
 
Organization (CMO)/Contract Research Organization (CRO), or other type of 
company), rather than based on a portfolio of companies they might support, and 
therefore assured fidelity of responses based on the targeted research objectives.   
Following these inclusion questions, general demographic information (including 
product types, company size, company location, applicable product lifecycle phases, 
respondent’s functional group, and respondent’s position within the company) were 
asked to enable subsequent analysis.  The survey continued with general questions 
regarding the existence of a QRM procedure or policy, compliance with ICH Q9, and 
inspection status and results.  The remaining questions were considered optional (to 
reduce the risk of respondent fatigue and cessation of participation) and focused more 
specifically on the elements of people, process, and governance described above. 
The survey, once drafted, was reviewed by the researcher to ensure questions were clear 
and unambiguous, and that the question design would support the research objective.  
The survey was then reviewed by third parties (other members of the PRST) to provide 
additional feedback prior to coding in the SurveyMonkey software application.  Once 
coded by the researcher, the electronic survey was piloted by PDA personnel to confirm 
the integrity of the flow associated with the inclusion criteria.  All pilot responses were 
deleted, and a link to the survey was provided via email to applicable PDA members 
and published in the PDA Letter, which also announced the research collaboration 
effort.   
The survey was opened on October 1, 2015 and remained active through December 31, 
2015.  Shortly thereafter, the leader of the QRM workstream from PDA Japan requested 
that the researcher reopen the survey to allow for additional responses from members 
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in that PDA chapter.  The researcher obliged, and the survey finally closed on January 
31, 2016. 
Responses to the survey were downloaded from SurveyMonkey, encrypted as described 
in section 3.2, and analyzed.  A general analysis of industry as a whole was conducted, 
using all responses to the survey.  In addition, three sub-analyses were performed in an 
effort to identify any new perspectives that might be revealed: analysis by region (based 
on the location of company headquarters, using the primary ICH regions of EU, US, 
and Japan), analysis by company size (based on number of employees), and analysis by 
respondent position within their company (i.e. executive management, senior 
management, middle management, supervisory level, and individual contributor level).  
Initial findings from the QRM benchmarking survey were shared at the PDA Annual 
Meeting in March 2016, followed another talk at the PDA Japan Annual Meeting in 
November 2016. 
5.2.2 Research findings 
Two hundred and thirty industry practitioners accepted the invitation to complete the 
QRM benchmarking survey, with approximately 144 of these providing complete 
responses.  Though not statistically significant in a strict sense,35 this response rate 
enabled a vigorous analysis that could provide insight into the general level of QRM 
maturity within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  The 
                                                 
35 According the 2012 US census, over 810,000 people work in biopharmaceuticals in the US alone. 
(175)  Even within this small cross-section of industry, a statistically significant sample size would 
require 384 responses, given a 95% confidence level and a +/- 5 confidence interval. 
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demographic information provided by respondents indicated a broad variety of industry 
sectors were represented.   
As shown in Figure 5-J, eighty percent of respondents were employed by MAHs, with 
eleven percent working for CMOs.  The remainder worked for companies that perform 
both functions, or fall into other categories, such as contract testing laboratories. 
 
Figure 5-J: Demographics – Respondents’ company type 
A variety of company sizes were also represented, with the greatest response rate 
representing medium- and medium/large-sized companies, as shown in Figure 5-K. 
Respondents represented companies headquartered throughout the world, the majority 
of which were based in the ICH regions of EU, US, and Japan, as shown in Figure 5-L.  
In addition, half of respondents were physically located in the US (50%), followed by 
Japan (22%) and Europe (14%). 
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Figure 5-K: Demographics – Respondents’ company size36 
 
Figure 5-L: Demographics – Headquarters location of respondents’ company 
 
                                                 
36 For the purposes of this survey, small companies were defined as those employing less than 500 people; 
small/medium companies employed between 500 and 1,000 people; medium companies had between 
1,001 and 5,000 people; medium/large companies between 5,001 and 10,000 people, large companies 
between 10,001 and 50,000 people, and very large companies employing more than 50,000 people.  
These intervals were selected to represent company size based on the potential correlation with the 
number of (human) resources available to work within a QRM program. 
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Questions surrounding the respondents’ roles at their firms revealed a nearly even split 
between those working at a site versus those working at the corporate level (54% and 
46%, respectively).  These data may reveal some limitations associated the survey, 
since, depending on the company, respondents working at the corporate level (across 
multiple sites) may have only indirect knowledge regarding the actual practices and 
attitudes towards QRM at the site level.  Some inconsistencies in the data, based on 
direct versus indirect knowledge, are therefore possible. 
Respondents also cover a broad swath of positions within the company, with middle 
management-level roles providing the largest proportion of responses (Figure 5-M).  
Furthermore, nearly two-thirds of respondents work in the quality assurance or quality 
systems fields, heavily weighting data trends towards the knowledge and perspective 
of the quality unit, at the expense of operations (Figure 5-N). 
 
Figure 5-M: Demographics – Respondents’ position 
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Figure 5-N: Demographics – Respondents’ functional role within their companies 
With regard to product type, dosage form, and product lifecycle phase, biologics and 
sterile injectables received the highest representation, as did the commercial phase of 
the product lifecycle, as shown in Figure 5-O through Figure 5-Q.  Given the primary 
source of volunteers for the survey (i.e. members of the PDA), these demographics are 
not surprising.  Indeed, the majority of the respondent pool works within what is 
commonly considered to be the most complex product types (biologics), that reach the 
most people (commercial phase of product lifecycle) as well as those that carry the most 
risk to patient (sterile injectables).  It is reasonable to expect that given the climate in 
which these respondents operate, particular attention would be paid to identifying and 
managing risk. 
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Figure 5-O: Demographics – Product type(s) manufactured by respondents’ companies 
 
 
Figure 5-P Demographics – Dosage form(s) manufactured by respondents’ companies 
 
0 20 40 60 80 100
Vaccines
Generics/biosimilars
Devices/Combination products
Small molecule
Biologics
Product Type
0 20 40 60 80
Other
Topicals
Ophthalmic products
Liquid dose
Solid dose
Sterile injectables
Dosage Form
124 
 
 
Figure 5-Q: Demographics – Lifecycle phase(s) for applicable products 
A full 90% of respondents indicated that their company has a QRM policy or procedure 
in place to document how QRM activities are performed.  Five percent of respondents 
indicated that their company does not have such a document in place—this is alarming, 
particularly since the respondents work for firms within the ICH countries of US and 
Japan, for which ICH Q9 has a decade-long tenure.  An additional 5% of respondents 
were not sure of whether their company has such a document.  Nonetheless, there has 
been significant progress in this area since 2006, when only 48% of companies had 
implemented QRM with an additional 30% citing their efforts as “in progress.” (86)  
Nearly all of the respondents who indicated negative or uncertain responses to this 
question in the benchmarking survey did not continue with the remainder of the survey. 
The majority of respondents indicated that their companies’ QRM programs had been 
inspected by regulatory authorities, as indicated in Figure 5-R.  In the experience of the 
respondents, the US FDA and European National Competent Authorities (indicated as 
“EU”) review QRM programs in more than half of their inspections.  The responses 
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suggest that Japanese PMDA and Australian TGA do not appear to review QRM as 
often.  Health Canada (included in the “Other” category) also seems to have taken an 
interest in firms’ QRM programs, although to a lesser extent than its southerly neighbor. 
 
Figure 5-R: Compliance – QRM program inspection status 
 
When asked about the outcomes of these inspections, the majority of respondents (53%) 
indicated that their QRM programs only partially meet regulatory expectations (Figure 
5-S).  This is quite curious, considering that 86% of respondents indicated that their 
firms’ QRM programs were compliant with ICH Q9.  These data provide additional 
evidence of a gap between regulators’ expectations of industry and actual industry 
practices; a gap identified by the researcher during the data analysis of quality defects 
and compliance observations discussed in section 5.1.  This discrepancy may be due to 
incomplete knowledge on behalf of the respondents, or differences between the ICH 
Q9 source documents and regulators’ understanding of how the guidance should be 
implemented within the overarching quality system. 
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Figure 5-S: Compliance – QRM program inspection outcomes 
 
People: The first pillar of QRM 
Respondents then completed a series of questions regarding attitudes and opinions—
the people element of the survey.  A statement was proposed, and respondents were 
asked to estimate the percent of their colleagues who might agree with the statements.  
Statements expressed both positive (i.e. in favor of QRM) and negative (i.e. opposed to 
QRM) opinions, which were then coded and graphed during the analysis to illustrate a 
potential risk maturity level.  This analysis was conducted such that the more people 
agree with a positive opinion and disagree with a negative opinion, the higher maturity 
level. 
The first question sought to explore the general level of QRM awareness at respondents’ 
firms through the question “[What percent of your colleagues…] have no knowledge 
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of QRM principles or practices?”  This represented a negative opinion, so the results 
were graphed to show that the fewer people lacked knowledge, the more mature that 
firm might be.  As seen in Figure 5-T, the majority of industry ranks at a Level 4 
maturity with regard to QRM awareness, with an average response of 3.4.  Some 
differences were seen when considering the data by sub-group.  For example, individual 
contributors felt that the QRM knowledge of their colleagues was closer to a Level 3 
(average of 3.2), while more senior managers estimated this at closer to a Level 4 
(average of 3.6).  Similarly, awareness of QRM principles and practices appear to be 
much stronger in companies based in EU (average of 3.9) than those in the US and 
Japan (averages of 3.3 in both regions). 
 
Figure 5-T: People: Level of QRM awareness of respondents’ colleagues 
 
Looking past mere awareness into the amount of support offered by industry personnel, 
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QRM-related activities?”  As a negative behavior, the results were graphed to show that 
the more people exhibit this tendency, the less mature the company with regard to 
QRM.  As seen in Figure 5-U, the majority of industry scored a Level 4, with an average 
response of 3.8.  Similarly, differences were seen in responses by sub-group, with small 
and smaller/medium companies indicating a higher level of support for the QRM 
program (averages of 4.0 and 4.3, respectively) than large and very large companies 
(with averages of 3.6 and 3.7).  In the ICH regions, Japan exhibited the lowest level of 
support (average of 3.6), followed by the US (3.8 on average) and the EU (4.0 on 
average). 
 
Figure 5-U: People – Level of support for QRM 
 
With respect to the people pillar of QRM, maturity began to wane with the level of 
engagement within the program.  When asked “[What percent of colleagues…] are 
eager to learn and participate in QRM-related activities?” respondents indicated that 
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industry sits at a Level 3, responding with an average of 3.2 (Figure 5-V).  This   
response was relatively consistent across sub-groups, with no significant differences in 
maturity seen based on company size, respondent position, or region. 
 
Figure 5-V: People – Level of engagement within QRM program 
 
A similar drop in maturity was seen when respondents were questioned about their 
colleagues’ advocacy for QRM, with the majority of industry seated at a Level 2 and 
an average response of 2.8 (Figure 5-W).  In addition, companies based on the EU 
appear to have stronger advocates for the program (an average of 3.2) than do Japan 
and the US (averages of 2.9 and 2.8, respectively). 
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Figure 5-W: People – Advocacy for QRM program 
 
The people elements described above (awareness, support, engagement, and advocacy) 
can be placed on the QRM maturity continuum, since each attitude and behavior is a 
precursor to those that follow.  For the purposes of gauging QRM maturity with regard 
to the people working within it, the highest level (Level 5) was defined as a state where 
QRM no longer requires deliberate advocacy, since the principles and practices have 
become such a part of daily operations that QRM is seamless with other aspects of 
manufacturing and the quality system.  Through this lens, the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries score a Level 3 (average = 3.3)—that is, a state in which 
people are aware of QRM tenants and practices at their firm, are supportive of the 
program, and are engaged in applying the program to their own work (Figure 5-X).  
Industry has not yet achieved the ranks of actively championing the program, which 
may play in role in the level of maturity seen for the other two pillars of QRM: process 
and governance. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
almost none < 25% 25 - 50% 50 - 75% nearly all
# 
re
sp
os
ne
s
Advocacy:
“[What percent of your colleagues…] actively advocate 
for the use QRM?”
131 
 
 
Figure 5-X: Industry’s current level of maturity with respect to the people interacting 
with the QRM program 
  
Process: The second pillar of QRM 
The survey then transitioned into a series of questions aimed at characterizing 
industry’s level of maturity from the perspective of the process.  The first of such 
questions sought to explore the extent to which industry has integrated QRM into other 
aspects of the quality system.  The majority of the quality system elements embedded 
within this category were taken directly from Annex II of ICH Q9; therefore this 
question provided insight into the extent of compliance and potential gaps between 
industry’s current state and regulator expectations that were identified earlier in the 
research.  For a series of quality system applications, respondents were asked whether 
QRM was applied consistently (as a procedural requirement), ad hoc (not a procedural 
requirement but applied on occasion), or not at all.  Currently, the majority of industry 
applies QRM consistently in ten of the seventeen elements: deviations, CAPA, change 
control, complaints and quality defects, product and process characterization, product 
and process development, systems lifecycle management, environmental monitoring, 
internal audit, and supplier management, as shown in Figure 5-Y.
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Figure 5-Y: Process – Level of integration of QRM principles and practices into the quality system 
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These results are disappointing, given the direction offered in ICH Q9 and the potential benefits 
available were QRM applied to the other twelve quality system elements.  That said, differences 
seen on a regional basis indicate that some companies have embraced these uses, with European-
based companies showing a much stronger level of integration than US or Japan (Table 5-2).  In 
addition, as might be expected based on the availability of resources, larger companies tended to 
have a higher level of integration than smaller companies. 
Table 5-2: Matrix of quality system elements where QRM is consistently applied by ≥50% of 
respondents, by region 
Quality System Element ICH Region 
 Europe US Japan 
Deviations X X X 
CAPA X X X 
Change control X X X 
Complaints/quality defects X X X 
Product/process characterization X X  
Product/process development X X  
Systems lifecycle X   
Supplier management X  X 
Environmental monitoring X X  
Technology transfer X   
Process validation lifecycle X   
Internal audit X X  
Cleaning X   
Storage and distribution    
Packaging and labeling X   
CMO management X   
Training    
 
The process pillar of QRM is associated not only with where in the quality system QRM is applied, 
but also how it is applied.  To that end, the next set of questions focused on characterizing the 
extent to which QRM is structured in its application.  The structure of QRM should not be confused 
with the level of formality applied to the QRM process; formality refers to the rigor associated 
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with QRM application (typically risk assessment), whereas structure refers to how well the QRM 
process is defined.  Even less-formal applications of QRM should be well-defined, to enable 
consistency of application and ensure conclusions are commensurate with the assessment 
performed; as such, more mature QRM programs should tend to be well structured in their 
application.  The responses to these questions were curious, as one might expect that QRM is 
applied in either a well-defined or loosely-defined way.  However, as shown in Figure 5-Z and 
Figure 5-AA, the majority of industry uses well-defined QRM methodology <25% of the time, 
and also uses loosely-defined QRM methods <25% of the time, with responses averaging a 3.4 in 
maturity for unstructured application and 2.9 for well-structured application.  While smaller 
companies tend to apply QRM more often in a loosely-defined way than do larger companies, the 
difference was nominal and did not extend to other sub-groups such as region or position. 
 
Figure 5-Z: Process - Percent of time QRM is applied in a well-defined way 
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Figure 5-AA: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied in a loosely-defined way 
 
The next set of questions endeavored to determine when QRM was most often applied: either 
reactively, in response to a risk that has been realized or event that has occurred, or proactively, to 
identify and manage risks before they are realized.  While it is important to strike a balance 
between the two, risk principles and practices yield the greatest advantages when applied in a 
proactive setting, to identify preventive actions that enable the anticipation and avoidance of risks 
to product quality and patient safety.  Despite the broad acknowledgement of this fact from 
regulators, experts, and practitioners alike, it appears that the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries have not yet harnessed the proactive application of QRM.  Figure 
5-BB and Figure 5-CC indicate that the majority of industry is in transition, performing risk 
management before and after events in equal measure.   
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Figure 5-BB: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied proactively 
 
Figure 5-CC: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied reactively 
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The final inquiry relative to the process pillar of QRM strove to characterize the perspective with 
which QRM is applied; specifically, whether QRM is applied in a targeted manner (e.g. looking a 
single risk such as cross-contamination across a number of products or systems) or a holistic 
manner (e.g. exploring all potential risks associated with a given process or products).  While there 
are advantages and limitations associated with each approach, it is likely that a balance of the two 
would best enable a vertically integrated risk portfolio.  Figure 5-DD and Figure 5-EE demonstrate 
that the majority of industry is focused on assessing and managing previously identified risks (such 
as the cross-contamination example used above), rather than employing a more all-inclusive 
approach to risk identification and control.  The exception appears to be companies in the EU, 
where respondents indicated that holistic risk management occurs more frequently than targeted 
applications.  While a targeted approach is beneficial to evaluate a specific harm when it emerges, 
an unbalanced emphasis on conducting discrete QRM efforts aimed at known risks can lead to a 
myopic perspective regarding the true number of risks present for a given product or process, 
thereby limiting the effectiveness of risk identification. 
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Figure 5-DD: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied using a targeted approach 
 
Figure 5-EE: Process – Percent of time QRM is applied using a holistic approach 
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From the perspective of the QRM process, responses to elements such as the level of integration, 
underlying structure, timing of application, and perspective of application indicate that industry is 
currently seated at a Level 3 (Figure 5-FF).   
 
Figure 5-FF: Industry’s current level of maturity with respect to the QRM process 
 
Governance: The third pillar of QRM 
Questions exploring the governance pillar of QRM were structured in a similar manner to those 
addressing people—that is, an opinion was posited and respondents were asked to estimate the 
percent of their colleagues who might agree.  For the purposes of the survey, governance addressed 
ownership and accountability for QRM, as well as the way in which QRM supports decision-
marking.  Since these concepts are often driven by the overall QRM policy and the behaviors of 
senior leadership at a firm, governance may be considered “the tone at the top” from which 
personnel take their cue. 
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The first question addressing the level of maturity for governance asked “[What percent of 
colleagues might say that] the application of QRM is the responsibility of the Quality 
organization?”  As shown in Figure 5-GG, the majority of industry achieved only a Level 2 on the 
maturity scale, with an average response of 2.5.  However, some distinct variations in responses 
were seen within sub-groups.  In Japan, for example, responses averaged 2.4, while companies in 
the US were closer to a Level 3 (average = 2.9).  Small companies also tended to score lower 
relative to ownership, indicating an average of 1.9, whereas large companies averaged 3.0.   
 
Figure 5-GG: Governance – Ownership of QRM 
 
When asked about accountability for QRM via the question “[What percent of your colleagues 
might say that] QRM should be performed across all levels in the organization (shop floor to senior 
management)?” the majority of industry ranked a maturity Level 2, although the number of 
responses on the higher end of the maturity scale elevated the average response to a 3.0 (Figure 
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5-HH).  As a sub-group, companies based in Europe were slightly more mature (average = 3.3) 
than those in Japan or the US (averages 3.1 and 2.9, respectively). 
 
Figure 5-HH: Governance – Accountability for QRM activities 
 
Figure 5-II shows that industry is squarely at a maturity Level 3 with regard to an understanding 
of one of the primary functions of QRM—to enable risk-based decision making.  When asked 
“[What percent of your colleagues might say that] QRM should be applied before a decision is 
made, to help inform the decision-making process?” respondents provided an average reply of 3.1.  
This was relatively consistent across sub-groups, although regional differences were seen, with 
European companies providing an average response of 3.6, Japanese companies a 3.3, and US 
companies a 2.8—the least mature of the three primary ICH regions with regards to understanding 
this principle of QRM. 
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Figure 5-II: Governance – Purpose of QRM 
 
The last survey question addressing governance asked “[What percent of your colleagues might 
say that] QRM can be used to justify current practices / a decision that has already been made?”  
This question was classified as the level of complacency within an organization, since using QRM 
to justify current practices, rather than to define the optimal path forward, reduces the firm’s ability 
to identify opportunities for improvement.  As shown in Figure 5-JJ, the majority of industry scores 
a Level 4 in this area, however the number of responses falling below this maturity model resulted 
in an average response of 3.0.  There were slight but meaningful differences across regions, with 
European companies once again being more mature than industry as a whole, with an average 
response of 3.2.  The US measured an average of 3.0, with Japan falling behind at 2.8.  Executive-
level management also indicated a less mature response, averaging 2.5, which is concerning 
considering the influence individuals at that level exert over the direction of a firm.  The responses 
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for this question is rather disturbing, as it implies that companies are biased towards the outcome 
of QRM and may be “reverse-engineering” risk assessments to support pre-determined 
conclusions.   
 
Figure 5-JJ: Governance – Use of QRM to justify complacency 
 
The elements of ownership, accountability, purpose, and complacency that compose the 
governance pillar of QRM entail similar concepts that can be combined into five maturity levels 
on the continuum.  The first of these is an immature state with no governance in place—a state 
where leadership has not established an appropriate tone for the application of QRM.  From there, 
a firm might reach a state with a loose governance structure, albeit one that lacks meaningful 
management support.  The third governance maturity level is one that is fully functioning, but 
where success can be attributed to pockets (or siloes) within the firm.  Level 4 firms would have 
progressed to state with broader engagement of functional groups; one where personnel apply 
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QRM to their own areas and are held accountable for knowledge and reduction of risks.  Finally, 
the highest maturity level would entail a fully integrated governance structure where risks are 
being managed and are visible through all layers of management.  Based on the responses received 
through the benchmarking survey, industry is currently at a Level 3; a state in which QRM has not 
fully penetrated the fabric of the firm and is siloed in its application (Figure 5-KK). 
 
Figure 5-KK: Industry’s current level of maturity for QRM governance 
 
 
Questions of value 
The survey progressed to ascertain the value that respondents felt QRM brought to their daily 
operations.  The first of such questions asked “[What percent of your colleagues might agree that] 
QRM is a box-ticking exercise with no real value?”  Respondents made a clear statement that this 
is not the case, indicating that this was a rare sentiment throughout industry (Figure 5-LL).  
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Similarly, when asked whether QRM enabled product quality improvement, quality systems 
improvement, and business objective realization, the majority of respondents felt risk management 
was either valuable or very valuable (75%, 77%, and 61%, respectively, as shown in Figure 5-MM 
through Figure 5-OO). 
 
Figure 5-LL: Value – Perception that QRM adds value to the organization 
 
Figure 5-MM: Value – Value of QRM for improving product quality 
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Figure 5-NN: Value – Value of QRM for improving quality systems effectiveness 
 
 
Figure 5-OO: Value – Value of QRM for enabling business objectives to be met 
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Based on the QRM benchmarking survey results, the current state of maturity in industry is a Level 
3 for the people and process pillars of QRM, and a slightly lower 2.5 for the governance pillar.  
While no meaningful distinctions were found based on company size or respondent perception 
based on position, there is a clear difference in maturity based on region.  Companies based in the 
EU (between Level 3 and Level 4) appear to be more mature than the US (Level 3), which in turn 
appears to be more mature than Japan (between Level 2 and Level 3).  Correlating factors for this 
phenomenon include the extent to which QRM has become embedded within regional regulation, 
and the degree to which regional regulatory authorities inspect QRM programs.   
Irrespective of region, ten years after the publication of ICH Q9, one might expect industry to be 
further along the path towards maturity; however, the majority of respondents felt their QRM 
programs were on par with other companies in industry (Figure 5-PP).  Potential obstacles 
impeding a more mature state are explored in section 5.3. 
 
Figure 5-PP: Benchmarking – Estimate of QRM program maturity when compared with other 
companies 
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The last question in the benchmarking survey sought to validate the research plan.  Respondents 
were asked whether their companies had interest in benchmarking their QRM programs with other 
companies, to better understand best practices and pitfalls. Over half of respondents (56%) 
indicated that such a need exists, with another 29% being unsure.  The remainder of the research 
effort, including the development of a QRM maturity measurement tool, aims to fill this gap for 
industry. 
5.3 What obstacles might be preventing a more mature state? 
5.3.1 Research design and process 
Following the quantitative analyses performed to evaluate whether the patient has fully realized 
the benefits of QRM and to benchmark risk maturity throughout industry, the qualitative portion 
of Phase 2 began.  This phase used literature review and philosophical dialogues to understand 
potential obstacles that have impeded industry’s path towards a more mature state.  Philosophical 
dialogues were conducted at a series of industry conferences comprised of delegates from multiple 
areas of expertise; these conversations included representatives from industry, regulatory 
authorities, and academia.  This section of the report addresses the primary themes regarding 
barriers to progress in QRM that were revealed during the philosophical dialogues, some of the 
researcher’s own experience as an “insider,” and references to the literature where applicable.   
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5.3.2 Research findings 
Misconceptions regarding quality vs. compliance, or “taking a conservative approach” 
The first theme that emerged from the philosophical dialogues was confusion between compliance 
with ICH Q9 and effectiveness of QRM implementation.  These, of course, are two very different 
concepts; compliance is often defined as “following regulation” or applying the GMPs, while 
effectiveness in QRM stems from applying the regulations in a way that has tangible benefits such 
as product quality improvement, quality systems improvement, and realization of business 
objectives.  In order to better gauge the perspectives of industry practitioners relative to this 
distinction, the researcher asked conference delegates to sketch their understanding of the 
relationship between quality and compliance using a Venn diagram format.  Venn diagrams are 
graphs of interlocking circles that are often used to demonstrate the relationship between 
categories, including the relative size or contribution of each category (as depicted by the size of 
a given circle) and the level of similarities and differences between categories (as depicted by the 
extent to which the circles overlap).  Over the course of the three years of research, the researcher 
had the opportunity to see dozens of Venn diagrams illustrating the perceived relationship between 
quality and compliance in industry; a pattern emerged early on, and has been reinforced many 
times at multiple industry conferences.  The vast majority of delegates drew a diagram similar to 
that shown in Figure 5-QQ. 
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Figure 5-QQ: Typical Venn diagram sketched by industry practitioners to illustrate the relationship 
between quality and compliance 
 
This implies that most of industry believes that there are aspects of quality that are unrelated to 
compliance, and more worryingly, that there are aspects of compliance that are unrelated to 
quality.  With this being the paradigm under which some members of industry operate, it is not 
surprising that quality culture has become a topic of concern with regulators, since this opinion 
could embitter personnel to compliance and QRM-related activities if the value is not understood.  
While an excellent article was written by members of the PRST to dispel this misconception (90), 
the frequency with which a void between quality and compliance is cited indicates the mindset has 
not yet taken hold. 
This poses a serious challenge to the enhancement of QRM maturity in industry, since the 
difference between quality and compliance (or compliance and effectiveness) is fundamental to 
understanding the role that QRM plays in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  
ICH Q9 notes that “appropriate use of quality risk management can facilitate but does not obviate 
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industry’s obligation to comply with regulatory requirements” (45)—a tenant that (in the 
researcher’s opinion) should be understood to mean that QRM is a mechanism through which 
compliance-related activities can be linked to product quality.  In addition, QRM offers industry 
an opportunity to define what quality looks like for their patients, products, and businesses, beyond 
the basic requirements associated with regulatory compliance.  As a result, the Venn diagram 
showing the relationship between quality and compliance through the lens of QRM looks more 
like that shown in Figure 5-RR. 
 
Figure 5-RR: Venn diagram of quality and compliance through the lens of QRM 
 
In this model, compliance has been wholly encompassed by quality, such that all compliance-
related activities likewise add to the quality of the product, and the circle representing quality has 
been enlarged based on the knowledge gained through QRM.  This is the purpose of QRM; in 
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ensuring compliance supports quality and quality is based on risk management principles and 
practices, the patient is adequately supported. 
A consequence of the misunderstanding of the role of risk management in protecting the patient 
has manifested with some members of industry claiming to use a “conservative approach” in lieu 
of QRM.  Philosophical dialogues with certain delegates (all of whom worked outside the QRM 
field) revealed a misunderstanding that QRM need not be used in certain circumstances if a 
“conservative approach” is employed.  One delegate summed up the intent of this term with regard 
to validation, indicating that he did not apply QRM to determine what and how much to validate, 
because he validates “everything.”  QRM practitioners cringe at this statement, since it indicates a 
void of knowledge about the purpose of risk management.  For example, validating “everything” 
circumvents any drive to distinguish between critical and non-critical elements, as identified in 
ICH Q8(R2) and Q11, and therefore dilutes the amount of attention and resources spent assuring 
that elements critical to the patient are under control—an approach that is certainly not 
conservative with regard to the patient.  It appears that some members of industry perceive QRM 
as a mechanism to do less, shrinking the amount of resources needed to perform an activity, rather 
than reallocating available resources to focus more on things that are critical and less on things 
that are not.  This misconception might be a driver behind the Level 3 maturity seen with regard 
to the purpose of QRM, explored within the governance pillar of QRM. 
Insufficient regulatory guidance combined with overly-prescriptive regulatory requirements 
Many delegates cited the lack of concrete, actionable guidance offered in ICH Q9 and regional 
regulations adopted from this guideline as a challenge associated with QRM implementation.  ICH 
153 
 
Q9 outlines a framework for QRM, and offers examples of how QRM can be applied, but does not 
provide tactical information regarding how QRM can used to fulfill these purposes.  This challenge 
has been compounded by the eagerness of regulatory authorities to encourage industry to adopt 
QRM practices, publishing a flurry of requirements to use QRM to accomplish certain deliverables 
without sufficient guidance on how this should be accomplished within a QRM framework (see 
excerpts from ICH Q11 discussed in section 2.2.3).   
For example, a small group of delegates at the September 2015 PDA/FDA Joint Regulatory 
Conference met after the day’s activities to discuss how their respective companies planned to 
implement the (then) recently released EU guideline “on the formalised risk assessment for 
ascertaining the appropriate good manufacturing practice for excipients for medicinal products for 
human use.”   This document requires the use of a formal risk tool (HACCP is suggested) to 
determine the rigor of GMP to be applied by suppliers of excipients and enforced by the drug 
manufacturer. (91)  The document lists eighteen factors to be considered in the risk assessment, as 
follows: 
1. “Transmissible spongiform encephalopathy 
2. Potential for viral contamination 
3. Potential for microbiological or endotoxin/pyrogen contamination 
4. Potential, in general, for any impurity originating from the raw materials, e.g. aflatoxins 
or pesticides, or generated as part of the process and carried over, e.g. residual solvents 
and catalysts 
5. Sterility assurance for excipients claimed to be sterile 
6. Potential for any impurities carried over from other processes, in absence of dedicated 
equipment and/or facilities 
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7. Environmental control and storage/transportation conditions including cold chain 
management, if appropriate 
8. Supply chain complexity 
9. Stability of excipient 
10. Packaging integrity evidence 
11. The pharmaceutical form and use of the medicinal product containing the excipient 
12. The function of the excipient in the formulation, e.g. lubricant in a tablet product or 
preservative material in a liquid formulation, etc. 
13. The proportion of the excipient in the medicinal product composition 
14. Daily patient intake of the excipient 
15. Any known quality defects/fraudulent adulterations, both globally and at a local company 
level related to the excipient 
16. Whether the excipient is a composite 
17. Known or potential impact on the critical quality attributes of the medicinal product 
18. Other factors as identified or known to be relevant to assuring patient safety” (91) 
The group of delegates lamented the challenges posed by this guideline: the poor fit between many 
items on the list of required considerations and formal risk tools (including HACCP as the 
document had suggested), the number of individual risk assessments to be performed (one each 
per excipient per supplier), and the short timeframe for required implementation (roughly one year 
from the date of publication).  Several delegates agreed that a tool such as risk ranking and filtering 
(RRF), also described in ICH Q9, would be a better fit than HACCP or FMEA; other delegates 
pointed out that RRF is typically considered a less formal tool and would not meet the requirement 
that a “formalized” risk assessment be performed.  One delegate expressed his wish that the 
guideline had simply included the expected format, so he could spend his time executing the 
approach rather than trying to define it.  The informal meeting concluded with no harmonized 
agreement on the best path forward. 
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This anecdote is just one example of the struggles reported by QRM practitioners when trying to 
meet the detailed requirements of regional regulatory bodies within a more fluid, loosely defined 
QRM framework as offered by ICH Q9.  The gap between an overly prescriptive “what” and an 
insufficiently prescriptive “how” has been identified as one of the obstacles preventing a more 
mature state to be reached. 
Excessive numbers of risk assessments 
As suggested above, several delegates cited the sheer numbers of risk assessments that have been 
created as a challenge in achieving a more mature state of QRM.  Some delegates noted that 
regulators appear to expect a discrete risk assessment for every decision or GMP direction in which 
their companies proceed.  Using the above example regarding excipients, a firm with five products, 
each having four excipients that can be purchased from a mere two qualified suppliers would need 
to create and periodically review forty risk assessments—just for the relatively narrow risk 
question regarding the level of GMP required of their excipient suppliers.  Indeed, this trend can 
be seen in other areas as well; regulators expect risk assessments related to elemental impurities 
as described in ICH Q3D, Guideline for Elemental Impurities (92), risk assessments related to viral 
or other contamination such as those implied (among other sources) in ICH Q5A(R1), Viral Safety 
Evaluation of  Biotechnology Products Derived from Cell Lines of Human or Animal Origin (93) 
and FDA Guidance Sterile Drug Products Produced by Aseptic Processing – Good Manufacturing 
Practice (94); risk assessments related to cross-contamination such as that suggested by EMA’s 
Guideline for setting health based exposure limits for use in risk identification in the manufacture 
of different medicinal products in shared facilities (95); and so on.   
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These individual, narrowly-construed risk assessments can quickly compound to the point of 
unmanageability.  In December 2009, Wallace Torres at Roche told The Gold Sheet that in 
response to the 2007 public health crisis associated with chemical contamination of their popular 
HIV drug Viracept, “we performed more than 100,000 full FMEA analyses worldwide in the first 
year [following the initiation of the company’s QRM program].” (96)  Though Torres positioned 
this as a triumph of QRM implementation, a delegate working for Roche-Genentech noted that 
excessive numbers of risk assessments can bog down the QRM program and minimize value that 
can be extracted from the assessments, as time is spent administering to the program is time not 
spent gaining knowledge.  Another delegate expressed regret that her company had not created a 
QRM deployment strategy when their program started, to help minimize effort while maximizing 
knowledge gained. 
Following the researcher’s presentation of the benchmarking survey results at the PDA Annual 
Meeting in March 2016, one delegate expressed particular interest in the characterization of 
industry regarding the targeted vs. holistic approach (discussed with the process pillar of QRM in 
section 5.2), noting that “the shotgun approach has created a monster.”  This is evident not only in 
regulatory guidance, as noted above, but also in the industry literature.  Figure 5-SS illustrates 
various topics for which QRM approaches are offered in the literature (based upon the mining of 
sources described in Chapter Two). This “word cloud” varies the text size based on the relative 
frequency of the topic; there is a wealth of articles on QRM for sterile processing and sterility 
control, for example, and fewer on QRM for supply chain management.  Curiously, there are few 
if any articles on risk control, risk review, governance, culture, the establishment of a QRM 
program, or strategic deployment of such a program available in the literature—gaps this research 
sought to bridge. 
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Figure 5-SS: Word cloud of QRM focus areas in the literature 
 
Lack of resources to focus on risk management 
Many delegates cited a lack of resources, including time and personnel, to focus on risk 
management as a potential obstacle in the way of further progress.  One delegate aptly 
characterized this concern as a lack of managers’ willingness to deploy resources towards QRM, 
rather than a lack of availability of these resources.  Formal risk management techniques such as 
Failure Modes and Effects (FMEA) are reported to consume between 40 and 80 hours of work for 
a team of 6 – 12 people, not including the resources needed to track and implement risk control / 
mitigation actions.  Another delegate indicated the difficulties with allocating resources towards a 
proactive effort in a fire-fighting culture, where personnel are largely (perhaps habitually) focused 
on solving existing problems rather than identifying and resolving potential risks.  Delegates 
generally agreed that without concrete ways to measure the effectiveness of QRM activities, such 
as Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) or financial return-on-investment (ROI), it is difficult to 
make a case to pursue QRM at the expense of more urgent issues.  This challenge is one that will 
be addressed in Phase 3 of the research. 
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Fear 
It is quite interesting that a primal emotion be listed as an obstacle preventing the successful 
implementation of QRM; however, this concept did indeed reveal itself in the philosophical 
dialogues.  Many delegates reported a general reluctance within their organizations to embrace the 
transparency needed to perform QRM tasks, manifesting in several ways: 
• Reluctance to analyze products, processes, and systems in a way intended to identify 
weakness, stemming from the fear that an urgent looming problem would be 
identified.  One delegate likened this to a perception that “what we don’t know can’t 
hurt us,” pointing out that in most cases, QRM results in more work through the 
identification of mitigation activities. 
• Uneasiness with the idea that, were weaknesses identified and documented, regulators 
would use the information to assign inspection observations.  One delegate compared 
risk assessments with internal audit reports, which must be completed as part of a 
larger program but are generally not reviewed by inspectors so as to not discourage a 
firm from thoroughly identifying actual and potential problems for fear of 
observations.  This delegate believed that risk assessments should be treated 
similarly, indicating that her firm went so far as to include certain types of risk 
management documents that should not be presented to inspectors in policy-level 
documents. 
• Discomfort with anticipated differences of opinion between the risk team who created 
a risk assessment and a third-party reader (whether internal or external to the 
company).  Because QRM is often a subjective endeavor, it ought to be difficult to 
proclaim its outputs correct or incorrect without data to prove otherwise; however, 
several delegates indicated that their internal stakeholders often disagree with the 
analysis performed and conclusions drawn, with one delegate noting that an 
inspection observation had been received when an inspector believed that certain 
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“rules” should have been applied to the scoring of individual risks where the risk 
team had felt otherwise. 
Dr. Janet Woodcock, head of the Center of Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER) at FDA, has 
also expressed concerns regarding a culture of fear, noting: 
“Let me just step back another step and say – and this would also disturb some people – 
that I really think the culture of regulation that we had over the years, [produced] a kind of 
a fear relationship. And I am still told that industry is in a state of fear, many of them, of 
FDA. That kind of a fear relationship is not going to grow a quality culture, because there 
is a fear of adverse consequences… That is antithetical to the idea of a quality culture, 
where people own quality and say, ‘we can stand up to the FDA because we make a quality 
product and we know it and we monitor it and we are proud of it. That is our quality 
culture.’” (97) 
The reluctance to embrace QRM based on these fears is indicative of a lack of risk maturity and a 
struggling company culture; these themes willed be explored further in Chapters Seven and Nine. 
The learnings from Phase 1 and 2 of the research enabled the researcher to reach several key 
conclusions, as follows: 
• The patient is no better protected following the implementation of ICH Q9 that before, 
• Industry has a lower level of risk maturity than might be expected based on the time 
elapsed since the publication of ICH Q9, 
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• There are fundamental challenges that are preventing industry from moving towards 
excellence in QRM, and, most importantly, 
• These challenges have solutions. 
Prior to endeavoring to define solutions to these problems herself, the researcher realized that a 
thorough inquiry into other industries with proven track records of successful risk management 
should be undertaken.  Chapter Six, considered to be of the Phase 2 research for the purposes of 
refining ideas for Phase 3, explores these practices. 
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6 Chapter Six: Learning from Risk Management Practices in 
Other Industries 
 
The research outputs from Phases 1 and 2 revealed the inadequacies inherent with the ways in 
which the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries are currently performing QRM.  The 
industry struggles with some basic elements, including robust QRM governance, a proactive 
culture comprised of engaged leadership and personnel, and the use of QRM in an anticipatory 
way.  Furthermore, there is little evidence that the patient is better protected than before the advent 
of QRM.  Yet there are many industries that have successfully implemented risk management 
principles and practices to improve their product quality and business practices.  This chapter 
begins with a discussion of ISO 31000, an internal standard on risk management that can be applied 
to multiple business models, regardless of industry.  The chapter continues with the identification 
and discussion of risk management systems in industries with proven histories of realizing the 
benefits of the practice.  Though examples abound, the researcher selected three such industries 
for further inquiry: medical devices, aerospace, and nuclear power. 
Literature review was selected as the research method for this portion of the research, continuing 
the literature review first introduced in Chapter Two (as illustrated in Figure 6-A).   
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Figure 6-A: Literature map highlighting the focus for Chapter Six 
 
Candidate literature was identified primarily through searches of ISO regulations and US 
government websites for those agencies responsible for the oversight of the applicable industries, 
including the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA; www.nasa.gov) and the 
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC; www.nrc.gov).  Throughout the literature review, the 
researcher identified key learnings that either: 
• Solved a problem related to risk management implementation, as identified in the earlier 
research 
• Filled a gap in risk management application or culture identified in the earlier research, or 
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• Represented a best practice in risk management that would benefit the pharmaceutical 
and biopharmaceutical industries and its patients, if implemented 
Of these, a subset was selected for discussion in this chapter based on the extent to which it 
informed the Phase 3 research. 
6.1 General risk management – ISO 31000 
Prior to 2009, there were a multitude of separate, general-use risk management standards in use 
across the globe.  Individual country authorities had developed and issued their own discrete (yet 
remarkably similar) documents to help guide companies, irrespective of industry, towards the 
introduction of risk management principles and processes into their business dealings. (98)   Long 
in practice in several fields, risk management garnered increased attention following the global 
crisis of 2008, in which ineffective (or inappropriate) risk management practices led to an 
estimated loss of global wealth of US$34.4 trillion—equivalent to the annual gross domestic 
product of the United States. (99) (100)  Soon thereafter, in 2009, ISO 31000, Risk management – 
principles and guidelines was published, leading to the retirement of many of the country-specific 
standards, including the Australia and New Zealand standard AS/NZ 4360, Risk Management, and 
the Canadian standard CAN/CSA Q850-97, Risk Management: Guideline for Decision Makers.37  
While ISO 31000 was in the planning stages far before the economic crisis of 2008, the timing of 
its release was applauded by regulators the world over.  For those familiar with ICH Q9, as 
                                                 
37 The retirement and replacement of these standards is asserted in 
https://shop.standards.govt.nz/catalog/4360%3A2004%28AS%7CNZS%29/view (for the Australia and New Zealand 
standard AS/NZ 4360) and  http://shop.csa.ca/en/canada/risk-management-archive-en/cancsa-q850-97-for 
r2009/invt/27003271997 (for the Canadian standard).  Both websites were accessed on September 25, 2017. 
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discussed in section 2.2.2 of this thesis, much of ISO 31000 will resonate.  There are some 
meaningful differences, however—ones that provide key learnings for the Phase 3 research.   
ISO 31000 outlines benefits beyond those proposed by ICH Q9, articulating principles that address 
some of the concerns and challenges identified in Phase 1 and 2 of the research.  These principles 
include: 
1. “Risk management creates and protects value. 
2. Risk management is an integral part of all organizational processes. 
3. Risk management is part of decision making. 
4. Risk management explicitly addresses uncertainty. 
5. Risk management is systematic, structured and timely. 
6. Risk management is based on the best available information. 
7. Risk management is tailored. 
8. Risk management takes human and cultural factors into account. 
9. Risk management is transparent and inclusive. 
10. Risk management is dynamic, iterative and responsive to change. 
11. Risk management fosters continual improvement of the organization.” (15) 
While the Phase 3 research, focused on crafting an ideal state for QRM, relied heavily upon each 
of these principles, this chapter will reflect upon the fourth principle regarding uncertainty—a 
neglected concept in the world of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical QRM. 
6.1.1 Learning #1: Acknowledge uncertainty 
ICH Q9 briefly addresses the concept of uncertainty and its role in QRM as follows: 
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“In doing an effective risk assessment, the robustness of the data set is important because 
it determines the quality of the output. Revealing assumptions and reasonable sources of 
uncertainty will enhance confidence in this output and/or help identify its limitations. 
Uncertainty is due to combination of incomplete knowledge about a process and its 
expected or unexpected variability. Typical sources of uncertainty include gaps in 
knowledge gaps in pharmaceutical science and process understanding, sources of harm 
(e.g., failure modes of a process, sources of variability), and probability of detection of 
problems.” (45) 
The differences in emphasis on uncertainty—as fundamental to risk management in ISO 31000, 
yet a small note positioned under risk assessment in ICH Q9—may have contributed to the 
differences in risk maturity within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries and other 
industries as explored in this chapter.  This difference in emphasis is inherent in the very definition 
of “risk”. 
As presented in section 1.2 and as reiterated in ICH Q9, the term “risk” is defined as an equation 
whereby: 
Likelihood (of the occurrence of harm) x Severity (of that harm) = Risk 
This definition of risk is presented in ICH Q9 and ISO 14971 for medical devices, both of which 
are focused on patient safety through the realization of medical products (drugs and devices, 
respectively).  Suitably, the origin of this definition is the ISO Guide 51, Safety aspects – 
Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, a document which itself describes risk management 
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as a means to achieve product safety. (45) (101) (16)  ISO 31000, however, offers an alternate 
definition of risk— “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.” (15)   
This definition allows the very concept of risk to be reimagined in the context of drug 
manufacturing.  Rather than an equation that implies precise measurements of risk can be made, 
the definition of risk in ISO 3100038, applied to the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries, can be framed as the effect of uncertainty on the patient.  Using the ISO 31000 
definition, the goal of QRM therefore can be positioned as one of minimizing uncertainty 
associated with the product and the associated manufacturing process in order to better protect 
the patient.  This would encourage industry to seek out knowledge in the form of deeper and 
more meaningful scientific analysis, rather than attempting to predict the likelihood of a given 
hazard or harm based on incomplete evidence or a cursory interpretation of available data.  Only 
a small number of published QRM methods, including the CQA identification approach 
described in PDA Technical Report No. 60 and the risk-based impact assessment tool offered by 
Waldron, explicitly include measures of uncertainty (or conversely, in statistical terms, 
confidence) within the risk assessment process. (102) (103) The pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries would benefit from placing more of an emphasis on disclosing, 
reducing, and thinking critically about sources and levels of uncertainty associated with the 
scientific knowledge that underpins QRM. 
                                                 
38 The definition of risk from ISO 31000 is in turn derived from ISO Guide 73, Risk management – vocabulary, which 
endeavored to bring a common vernacular to all forms of risk management, including those related to safety as defined 
in ISO Guide 51. (14)  Based on the breadth of terminology currently in use across industries of all types, and the 
preservation of different terms and definitions in a variety of risk management standards, it appears as through a 
harmonized risk management language has yet to take hold. 
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6.1.2 Learning #2: Define the context 
The risk management lifecycle depicted in ISO 31000 (shown in Figure 6-B) echoes that of ICH 
Q9 (described in section 2.2.2), and includes the fundamental phases of risk assessment, risk 
treatment/control39, review of the risks given new knowledge, and communication of the risks.  
 
Figure 6-B: Risk Management Lifecycle from ISO 31000:2009 
                                                 
39 “Risk treatment” in ISO 31000 replaces the “risk control” step in ICH Q9.  While the concepts are fundamentally 
the same—taking action based on the learnings from the risk assessment— “risk treatment” could include additional 
actions to embrace and pursue risks (opportunities) while “risk control” is focused on reducing and controlling the 
risk.  This difference stems from the perspective of each document, with ICH Q9 focusing on negative risks to product 
quality and patient safety and ISO 31000 addressing risks of all types, both positive and negative.  Because some 
quality risks may be reduced through the introduction of new, positive risks (such as those associated with the 
introduction of new technology that carries with it a high level of uncertainty), this researcher prefers the term “risk 
treatment” over “risk control.”  However, to preserve the terminology used in this thesis to this point and for fidelity 
with ICH Q9, the term “risk control” will continue to be used. 
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Despite the similarities between these risk management lifecycle, the initiating step of ISO 31000 
stands out—a step called “establishing the context.”  The ISO standard devotes a large portion of 
the document to the explanation and reinforcement of this critical step, one in which the internal 
and external business climate are carefully evaluated to ensure subsequent risk management 
activities are aligned with the environment in which they are performed.  In the pharmaceutical 
and biopharmaceutical industries, “establishing the context” might entail a critical analysis of 
internal conditions such as: 
• The availability of scientific knowledge to adequately assess the risks 
• The expertise and competencies necessary to perform risk management activities,  
• The resources available to assess and reduce the risk, where necessary 
• The type of medicinal product under evaluation (e.g. life-saving, life-sustaining, quality-
of-life),  
• The vulnerability of the product to shortage, and 
• The company’s risk tolerance 
In addition, conditions external to the company should also be identified and evaluated, such as: 
• Applicable laws and regulations in the markets for which the product is intended 
• The vulnerability of the patient community in the event of a drug shortage 
• Perceptions of risk in the regulatory and patient community 
• Regulatory authorities’ risk tolerance(s) 
• The patients’ risk tolerance(s) 
Indeed, the internal and external perspectives that may result from such a careful analysis of the 
context could significantly affect the QRM process and outcomes.  It is for this reason that ISO 
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31000 notes, “…attention to these and other relevant factors should help ensure that the risk 
management approach adopted is appropriate to the circumstances, to the organization and to the 
risks affecting the achievement of its objectives.” (15)  A robust review of the internal and external 
climate in which QRM activities are being conducted will ensure that such exercises better protect 
the patient. 
6.2 Risk management in the medical device industry 
The medical device industry has long felt the influence of risk management principles, having been 
subject to risk-based classification and regulation since the term “medical device” was formally 
defined.40  Risk management as part of medical device development and manufacture was 
introduced in the EU in 1993 with the issuance of the Medical Device Directive, 93/42/EEC, which 
included a clear statement in the first General Requirement that “…devices must be designed and 
manufactured in such a way that…any risks which may be associated with their intended use 
constitute acceptable risks when weighed against the benefits to the patient and are compatible 
with a high level of protection of health and safety.” (104)  This concept took hold in the US with 
the issuance of FDA’s Design Control Guidance in 1997, and a harmonized method for performing 
risk management for medical devices was published in 2000 with the first version of ISO 14971, 
Medical devices –risk management for medical devices. (101) (105)  ISO 14971 has some 
remarkably similarities to ICH Q9, but it is the differences between the two that lead to insight.   
                                                 
40 The US FDA “Medical Device Amendments” of May 28, 1976 introduced the classification of devices as Class I 
(low risk), Class II (moderate risk), and Class III (high risk) based on the potential to harm the patient and the level of 
control required to assure safety and effectiveness of the device.  Prior to this date, there was no harmonized definition 
for a medical device in the US and therefore no risk-based classification scheme. (197) Device classification remains 
risk based in major markets and is currently performed according to 21CFR860 in the US and 93/42/EEC in the EU. 
(198) (199) 
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6.2.1 Learning #3: Focus on the product 
Unlike ICH Q9, which is focused on the management of extrinsic risks, medical device risk 
management is primarily concerned with the management of intrinsic risks.  For example, ISO 
14971 notes in its introduction, “The requirements contained in this International Standard provide 
manufacturers with a framework within which experience, insight and judgment are applied 
systematically to manage the risks associated with the use of medical devices” [emphasis added]. 
(101)  ICH Q9, on the other hand, limits its scope to “aspects of pharmaceutical quality” and 
acknowledges that “the risk to [the drug’s] quality is just one component of the overall risk.” (45)   
The other risks referred to in this quote include intrinsic risks associated with the use of 
pharmaceuticals and biopharmaceuticals, such as those described in Chapter One. 
 Devices and drug products differ fundamentally with regard to intrinsic risks—while drugs often 
have inherent side effects and contraindications that manifest as a result of biochemical processes 
in vivo and are associated with the target molecule or biological pathway itself, intrinsic risks 
associated with medical devices can often be designed out of the product through the use of 
engineering principles.41  The differences between product designed through chemistry and 
biology and those designed through engineering may contribute to the differences in emphasis 
seen between ISO 14971, with a distinctly product perspective to risk management, and ICH Q9, 
with a product quality and quality systems perspective. 
                                                 
41 It is worth noting that emerging therapeutic modalities in the biopharmaceutical industry, such as gene therapies, 
cellular therapies, and personalized medicines, are seeing the scientific fields of biology and chemistry merge with 
engineering with regard to product development.  In this researcher’s opinion, for medicinal therapies that allow for 
engineering principles to be applied (e.g. gene editing), a medical device risk management perspective and regulatory 
framework might be better suited than the existing drug perspective due to the opportunity to eliminate many intrinsic 
risks, thereby directly increasing patient protection. 
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During medical device development, firms often create three separate risk assessments to address 
the requirements of ISO 14971 and similar device regulation: a design risk assessment, addressing 
risks associated with the design of the device, an application risk assessment, addressing risks 
associated with the healthcare practitioners’ handling of the device, and a process risk assessment, 
addressing risk associated with the manufacture of the device. (101) (106)  When subject to the 
process steps defined in the risk management lifecycle, these three risk assessments cover a 
majority of the risk-related concerns for medical devices.  These risk assessments are stored in a 
“risk management file” specific to the medical device or family of devices. (101)  In this way, ISO 
14971 has fostered the creation of a sort of “living risk assessment library” that can be used as a 
reference tool for knowledge management as well as streamlined summary of the major risks 
associated with a given device. 
With only 54.6% of benchmarking survey respondents reporting the consistent application of 
QRM to product and process characterization (as discussed in section 5.2.2), it seems unlikely that 
the concept and value of a living risk library, akin to the risk management file approach used in 
medical devices, has fully penetrated the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  The 
design and creation of such a library is discussed further in Chapter Eight. 
6.2.2 Learning #4: Risk control deserves the most attention  
Though no documents have been located by the researcher, to date, that expressly point to one 
phase of the risk management lifecycle as more important than the others, the regulatory and 
quality foundation upon which drug manufacturing occurs make this answer an obvious one: 
controlling risks to patient should be the primary focus of any QRM endeavor.  Detailed, science-
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based risk assessments, robust risk review, and frequent and transparent risk communication serve 
little purpose if the patient is not ultimately better protected in the end.  Risk control is the step at 
which the patient experience benefits.  It is the step during which control measures are established 
to address identified risks, leader to better quality product and, therefore, a safer patient.   
While ICH Q9 dedicates only a few cursory paragraphs to the topic, ISO 14971 devotes several 
pages to explaining the objectives of risk control, techniques to enable more effective control over 
risks to the patient, and the rationale behind these requirements. (101)  The emphasis placed on 
risk control is evident with a review of the risk management lifecycle for medical devices (Figure 
6-C), which denotes six sub-steps to what constitutes a single sub-step (“risk reduction”) in ICH 
Q9.  ISO 14971 seeks to ensure that the reader understands the importance, and the relative amount 
of attention, that should be paid to reducing risk to the patient. 
In ISO 14971, the risk reduction process begins with a thorough examination of available options 
for risk control, and comparing these options to determine the best fit to reduce a particular risk or 
portfolio of risks.  Risk reduction measures, or mitigations, must be both technological and 
economically feasible42 and be designed to reduce the risk as low as possible.  The standard  
                                                 
42 The topic of “economic feasibility” has been of much debate since the publication of the 2012 revision to ISO 
14971, which did not alter the content of the standard itself but instead updated Annexes Z-A through Z-C which 
reconcile the requirements of the standard with those of the EU Medical Device Directive (MDD).   The MDD does 
not, in letter or spirit, include an allowance to disregard a risk control option due to its cost; therefore the Annexes 
were updated to note that economic factors may not be a factor in selecting risk reduction options for those devices 
intended to registered in the EU. (100)  However, in the current era where drug pricing has become a heated political 
and practical issue, manufacturers are reluctant to apply risk reduction measures that may render the cost of treatment 
out of reach for patients.  It is this researcher’s opinion that the topic of economic feasibility is an important one that 
requires additional discussion, outside of the realm of this thesis.  As such, the researcher has chosen to preserve the 
requirement that a risk reduction strategy must be economically feasible in order to be effective and reach the patients.  
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Figure 6-C: Risk Management Lifecycle from ISO 14971:2009 
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requires one to consider the effect a given risk reduction option may have on the risk as well, listing 
a priority of “(a) inherent safety by design, (b) protective measures in the medical device itself or 
in the manufacturing process, [and] (c) information for safety.” (101)  This order lists control 
options from most to least effective, with elimination of risk through system or product design 
being most effective at patient protection, followed by risk mitigation by reducing the likelihood 
of harm, and finally informing patients and users of the risks and appropriate control measures to 
be applied through risk communication. 
Once the options for risk control have been identified, analyzed, and compared, the best fit option 
(or combination of options) is selected for implementation.  ISO 14971 requires that, once the risk 
control measures are in place, they be verified—twice.  The first verification confirms that the 
control measure has, in fact, been implemented, while the second verifies effectiveness by 
determining that the risk has actually been lowered. (101)  In most instances, because the risks are 
intrinsic to the product, effectiveness can be confirmed through design validation of the device 
itself; it may prove more difficult to measure risk reduction for other types of risks and related 
controls, particularly for proactively identified risks that have not been historically realized. (107)  
Once all risk control measures have been fully verified, ISO 14971 requires the residual risk to be 
determined. (101)  This process includes an evaluation of whether new risks have been introduced 
as a result of the risk control measures, and a determination of the new risk levels in light of the 
additional controls.  The acceptability of the residual risk is determined through a comparison of 
the risk level against pre-defined criteria—a similar process as was employed when determining 
which risks required reduction.  ISO 14971 goes further however, acknowledging that where the 
residual risk remains unacceptable, a risk/benefit analysis should be performed.  This risk/benefit 
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analysis seeks to compare the medical benefits of the device against the (individual) residual risk 
to determine whether, on balance, the patient is adequately protected.  This individual risk/benefit 
analysis often serves as an input into risk communication, assisting the manufacturer with the 
design of product labeling to disclose such risks to the consumer. (101) (108) 
 Per ISO 14971, once the individual risk/benefit analyses are complete, a second, overall 
risk/benefit analysis is performed to determine whether the cumulative effects of all residual risks 
associated with the device are outweighed by its benefits to the patient. (101)  This step, absent in 
ICH Q9, requires the risk practitioner to evaluate and understand the totality of risk to which the 
patient is subjected through use of the product.  Only where the device offers a greater benefit to 
the patient than it does risk is the overall residual risk deemed acceptable.  This process facilitates 
a strategic view of the complete risk portfolio, requiring the practitioner to redirect their attention 
from detailed line items captured in a spreadsheet back to the ultimate goal—protecting the patient.   
ISO 14971 acknowledges the paramount importance of risk control in the risk management 
lifecycle, and refocuses attention from what might often be an intellectual endeavor to the patient.  
The pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries would benefit from the adoption of these 
practices in their QRM work. 
6.2.3 Learning #5: Planning is key 
ISO 14971 describes the use of a Risk Management Plan for device risk management.  Unlike the 
Risk Management Plan designed to manage intrinsic drug risks, as discussed in Chapter One, this 
document is intended to outline the plan for risk management activities in support of device 
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development and manufacturing.  As noted by ISO 14971, “a risk management plan is required 
because (a) an organized approach is essential for good risk management, (b) the plan provides the 
roadmap for risk management, [and] (c) the plan encourages objectivity and helps prevent essential 
elements from being forgotten.” (101) 
The requirements for a Risk Management Plan read similar to what one might envision as a QRM 
procedure for the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  Role and responsibilities are 
defined and delineated, the scope of the plan with regard to the product lifecycle is outlined, a 
governance structure and associated processes are established, risk and residual risk acceptance 
criteria are defined, and requirements and data sources for the use of production and post-
production information (similar to the risk review phase of the ICH Q9 lifecycle) are described. 
(101)  In addition to these standard requirements, ISO 14971 notes that the Risk Management Plan 
may be used to define milestones, plan risk management activities, and outline risk tools that will 
be employed for the various activities.  In this way, the Risk Management Plan has an inherently 
flexible structure with the goal of better enabling the organization to plan for what risk 
management activities must be done to align with certain product-realization goals. 
ICH Q9 contains no notion of a Risk Management Plan.  There is an assumption that a QRM 
procedure or policy-level document would exist, of course, as is a general quality system 
requirement in those regions that have adopted the guidance. (45)  However, the idea that a firm 
should outline strategic goals for the QRM program and develop a plan to reach them is notably 
absent.  This is a plausible reason why the industry has struggled with the administration of the 
QRM program and the creation of myriad risk assessments with no holistic vision, as discussed in 
Chapter Five—in the absence of planning, the ICH Q9 lifecycle begins with a “QRM Initiation” 
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step, the focus of which is a rather myopic process to gather the information needed to begin a risk 
assessment and continue throughout the QRM lifecycle.  ISO 14971 has no need for this initiation 
step, as all risk management activities would be pre-defined in the Risk Management Plan and 
need merely be executed in accordance with those requirements.  By streamlining the initiation 
process and outlining overarching objectives for the QRM program, the use of a Risk Management 
Plan would enable the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries to spend less time “doing 
QRM” and more time managing risk to the patient. 
6.3 Risk management in the aerospace industry 
The aerospace industry has a history of highly publicized successes, where the application of risk 
management principles and practices have enabled monumental discoveries unprecedented in 
human history, as well as shocking disasters that have led nations to mourning.  The need for risk 
management in aerospace is clear: the risks associated with an environment that is completely 
beyond control, the (literally) astronomical costs associated with developing the technology to 
achieve spaceflight, and the shortage of opportunities to use that technology mandate that risks be 
understood and manage to achieve right-first-time missions—because in aerospace, the first time 
may be the only time. 
6.3.1 Learning #6: Acknowledge the two objectives of risk management 
The US National Aeronautics and Space Agency is generous with their learnings and operational 
practices, offering many of their internal guidebooks and operational manuals to the public from 
their website, www.nasa.gov.  The risk management process in use at the agency is summarized 
in the NASA Risk Management Handbook, issued by the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance.  
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The handbook details risk management tools and decision-making frameworks, and provides 
instructions on establishing performance-based risk tolerance, modeling and graphical 
representation of risks, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques43, and risk control 
planning.  Perhaps the most influential learning from NASA’s risk management program, 
however, is the way in which the agency has divided risk management into two sub-processes: 
risk-informed decision making (RIDM) and continuous risk management (CRM). (109) 
At NASA, CRM mirrors the risk management process as described thus far in this thesis.  Risks 
are identified, assessed, controlled, and reviewed in an iterative framework to ensure risks to the 
success of a space mission and the safety and security of the astronauts and payloads are 
continually evaluated, with risk controls designed in as engineering solutions.  The risks and 
scenarios in which they may manifest are communicated throughout the agency, from the technical 
experts through the top-levels elected officials who are responsible for the overall performance of 
the agency. (109)  In this way, the CRM process at NASA is similar to the QRM lifecycle described 
in ICH Q9. 
NASA, however, has acknowledged a separate risk management process that does not follow the 
risk management lifecycle in full—this process, risk-informed decision making, is a necessary 
component of robust risk management with its own process and objectives.  Figure 6-D illustrates 
                                                 
43 Probabilistic Risk Assessment is the name given to a series of risk management tools, including master logic 
diagrams, event sequence diagrams, fault tree analyses, and Monte Carlo simulations, used in concert to yield a result.  
PRA appears to be the preferred risk assessment approach for NASA and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), both of which have multiple handbooks available the public sphere regarding the method and its merits. (259) 
(259) (186)  The researcher chose not to include a detailed analysis of PRA in this thesis because the approach hinges 
upon mathematical models that continue to elude the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, which, as 
discussed in section 6.1.1, are still struggling with uncertainty in some of the fundamental science inherent in drug 
products and their manufacture.  Chapter Eleven includes inquiry into PRA as a topic for future work in the QRM 
field. 
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the process steps involved with risk-informed decision making.  RIDM begins with the 
identification of alternatives—that is, the potential decisions that could be made.  A risk analysis 
is then performed on each of the alternatives to enable a comparison of risks associated with each 
decision path.  Finally, considering the results of risk analyses (assessments) and other 
considerations, such as the benefits offered by each potential decision path, the decision is taken. 
(109)  The risk assessments performed to support the decision-making process are not subject to 
other aspects of the risk management lifecycle, such as risk control or risk review.  Rather, the risk 
assessment was performed for the express purpose of enabling a specific decision to be made at a 
specific point in time, using the best available information at the time.  Once the decision is made, 
the risk assessment has served its purpose. 
 
Figure 6-D: NASA’s Risk-Informed Decision Making (RIDM) Process (108) 
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These sorts of ad hoc risk assessments have utility in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries as well.  Decisions regarding product release in the face of a cGMP deviation, whether 
to proceed with a proposed change to the manufacturing process, the frequency and scope of 
internal or supplier audits, and other operational, quality, and compliance related decisions are 
made every day by drug manufacturers.  Do each of these decisions require a risk assessment to 
inform them?  As NASA’s Risk-Informed Decision Making Handbook explains: 
“[Decisions for which RIDM is appropriate] tend to have one or more of the following 
characteristics: 
• High Stakes — High stakes are involved in the decision, such as significant costs, 
significant potential safety impacts, or the importance of meeting the objectives. 
• Complexity — The actual ramifications of alternatives are difficult to understand 
without detailed analysis. 
• Uncertainty — Uncertainty in key inputs creates substantial uncertainty in the 
outcome of the decision alternatives and points to risks that may need to be managed. 
• Multiple Attributes — Greater numbers of attributes cause a greater need for formal 
analysis. 
• Diversity of Stakeholders — Extra attention is warranted to clarify objectives and 
formulate performance measures when the set of stakeholders reflects a diversity of 
values, preferences, and perspectives.” (110) 
The use of ad hoc risk assessments for risk-based decision making in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries would allow for more context-specific risk questions to be 
established while alleviating some of the administrative burden reported by QRM practitioners in 
the earlier research. 
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6.3.2  Learning #7: “Complacency is the enemy of quality”44 
While NASA’s many successes highlight the critical role risk management fills, the failures 
experienced by the agency offer similar lessons.  The story of two of the most stunning disasters 
in the history of space exploration—the explosion of the Challenger mission within moments of 
launch and the breakup of the Columbia spacecraft upon reentry to Earth—reveal an important 
element regarding the culture in which risk management is applied. 
On January 28, 1986, the Challenger mission began.  News outlets across the world broadcasted 
the launch to the public, many of whom sat with bated breath in front of their television sets to 
watch their newly-minted heroes begin their exploration into the solar system.  A mere 72 seconds 
after lifting off, a plume of smoke could be seen.  Moments later, Challenger burst apart, the result 
of an explosion caused by faulty seals in the shuttle construct.  Most of the world was shocked.  
Many at NASA were not. (111) (112) (113) 
Engineers at NASA had predicted the event.  They had inspected O-rings, the seals that connect 
the rocket boosters to the spacecraft, on numerous occasions following prior missions, and were 
aware of the erosion that occurred, destabilizing the connection and threatening the integrity of the 
hull.  They had accounted for this phenomenon in their PRAs, noting in particular that cold weather 
could render the O-rings so brittle that they would fail almost immediately, leaving no chance for 
the spacecraft to remain intact.  They had discussed the results of their risk assessments with NASA 
decision-makers, and, noting the freezing temperatures predicted for the Challenger launch day, 
                                                 
44 Quote attributed to Rick Friedman, Deputy Director of Science and Regulatory Policy, Office of Manufacturing 
Quality, FDA 
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recommended the mission be delayed.  Yet the mission proceeded, and lives were lost.  It was a 
failure of risk management on the world stage. (111) (112) (113) 
Seventeen years later, an eerily similar event occurred.  This time, it was the shuttle Columbia, 
and it was the end of the mission.  The public awaited the reentry of the spacecraft into Earth’s 
atmosphere, ready to celebrate the returning astronauts with parades and news interviews.  Not 
quite two minutes after reentry, the shuttle burst apart, the result of damage to the left wing caused 
by impact with a piece of foam that had dislodged during launch.  Again, the public was shocked, 
and again, NASA was not.  NASA engineers became aware of the impact the day after launch, 
during the routine video footage review and analysis intended to prevent failures of this type.  
Mission Control informed the crew of Columbia, asserting that the event was of no consequence 
and there should be no concern regarding the safety or integrity of the spacecraft.  After all, they 
had seen this before on successful missions. (114) (115) 
Despite their initial conclusion, NASA proceed to evaluate the impact event, though under the 
caution that it was an “information gathering” endeavor—not one that was critical to the safety of 
the mission.  They gathered their best and brightest, who began to apply proven risk management 
techniques and mathematical modelling to confirm their original assumption—that the impact to 
the left wing would not jeopardize the shuttle upon reentry.  The engineers, however, did not have 
enough information from the original launch footage to perform a thorough analysis.  They needed, 
and requested, more information.  Their request was discussed by NASA management, but no 
action was taken—the risk associated with the impact of the foam on the left wing was deemed 
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acceptable.45  No interventions were made.  Upon reentry, the shuttle and the lives of those within 
it were destroyed. (114) (115)  The “acceptable risk” proved to be anything but—risk management 
had again failed at NASA. 
As one might expect, post-mortem analyses following both the Challenger and Columbia disasters 
were as plentiful as they were critical.  Most sources agree that risk management had failed in 
these instances, as well as the reason it had failed; the risk management activities were conducted 
within a culture that, at that time, was complacent and did not learn from its mistakes.  Without a 
stronger culture, risk management was destined to fail. 
The primary cultural element that contributed to these failures is one that is also ubiquitous in the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries: the “normalization of deviance.” (116)  
Normalization of deviance is a phenomenon in which an organization becomes numb to failures 
that occur on a regular basis.  Because there are often no catastrophic consequences that occur 
from these failures, the organization accepts them as a normal part of operations and becomes 
complacent with their occurrence. (117)  Such a culture is widespread in the drug industry, as 
quality leaders cite process deviations as “normal” with a willingness to accept a certain (non-
zero) number.  This cultural norm, where failure is accepted by the organization, is anathema with 
regard to the goals to risk management—continual improvement and a proactive, risk avoidant 
mindset. 
                                                 
45 The additional data needed was satellite footage of the shuttle during its mission, which would have allowed the 
risk management team to better understand the angle of impact—knowledge critical to understanding the risks that 
were posed.  The US Department of Defense had historically provided such footage upon request, but given the 
“acceptable” classification of the risk associated with the Columbia event, a request was not made. (108) 
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6.4 Risk management in the nuclear industry 
The final industry chosen as a best practice benchmark for risk management is the nuclear industry.  
Nuclear power is perhaps best known for its adaptation of a military technique known as defense 
in depth to risk management, particularly in the area of risk control.  Defense in depth holds that 
multiple layers of risk control should be employed in concert, so that control over the risks 
associated with a system should never depend upon a single control, lest it fail and the risk be 
realized.  The US NRC states, “the key [to defense in depth] is creating multiple independent and 
redundant layers of defense to compensate for potential human and mechanical failures so that no 
single layer, no matter how robust, is exclusively relied upon. Defense in depth includes the use 
of access controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse key safety functions, and emergency 
response measures.” (118)  
The use of multiple control layers is not a foreign concept, although the nuclear industry employs 
it with excellence.  A metaphor for risk management known as the “Swiss cheese model” was 
initially conceived by James Reason in 1990, and has become ubiquitous across multiple academic 
and industry risk management circles. (119) (120)  This model holds that accidents happen (or risk 
are realized) when “holes” in “barriers” (i.e. risk controls), such as vulnerability points or failures, 
occur in tandem, allowing a hazard to reach the patient and cause harm.  This model is typically 
depicted in graphic form as shown in Figure 6-E, hence the “Swiss cheese” moniker. 
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Figure 6-E: Reason’s “Swiss Cheese model” of accidents (120) 
 
Using the Swiss cheese model, the objective of risk control is to construct barriers for which the 
holes will never overlap—that is, that are not so tightly coupled that a single point of failure would 
lead to the failure of all of the barriers. 
In the nuclear industry, these barriers form the core of the defense in depth system.  There are 
typically five barrier layers in a nuclear reactor system to manage the risks of reactor meltdown 
and any resultant radioactive fallout: 
1. “Prevention of abnormal operation and failures 
2. Control of abnormal operation and detection of failures 
3. Control of accidents within the design basis 
4. Control of severe plant conditions [to prevent accident progression and to mitigate the 
consequences of accidents] 
5. Mitigation of radiological consequences of significant release of radioactive material.” 
(121) 
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In the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, many of these barriers are inherent in 
quality system requirements and may be rephrased as: 
1. Eliminate or prevent quality risks through the use of QRM 
2. Detect quality risks through QRM and process/product monitoring 
3. Manage deviations when quality risks occur 
4. Manage the consequences of the deviation through disposition of affected product 
5. Manage consequences to the patient through recall and patient support 
In a robust quality system, including the application of effective QRM principles and practices, 
the defense in depth concept can be applied to ensure the patient is protected.46 
6.4.1 Learning #8: Communicate with purpose 
“[In the eyes of the public], risk = hazard + outrage.” (122)  This quote, drawing a playful 
juxtaposition with the notorious risk = likelihood x severity equation that permeates risk 
management, sets the stage for the US NRC’s handbook on external risk communication.  The 
topic, of course, is a serious one—how to frame risks and their criticality to a third party who lacks 
the intimate scientific knowledge that the communicator possesses.  In the realm of nuclear 
reactors, any accident or hazard is likely to be met with fear and indignation from the public.  The 
consequences of a nuclear meltdown affect not only the people living and working in the vicinity 
                                                 
46 The reader may question why the researcher has not chosen to identify defense in depth as one of the key learnings 
in this chapter; therefore it is important to proactively address this concern.  The researcher acknowledges that 
additional research into the application of defense in depth principles would be beneficial for industry.  However, the 
research effort is focused on the application of quality risk management in a proactive way (numbered items 1 and 2) 
in the list), and the researcher is loath to extend the scope of the research to include reactive risk and crisis management 
(numbered items 3 through 5 in the list).  While the topic of defense in depth and its utility in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries piques the researcher’s interest, she must relegate further discussion on the topic to 
Chapter Eleven. 
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of the accident, but also their children and their children’s children.  The severity scale for nuclear 
disasters can be measured in generations, and risk management must be held proportionately 
sacrosanct. 
While risk management forms the core of nuclear industry operations, risk communication is most 
often performed by its regulators, including the NRC in the United States.  As discussed in Chapter 
Two, risk communication occurs between the communicator and internal and external 
stakeholders.  The NRC understands the emotional aspects of communication and the 
consequences of miscommunication (or a lack of communication), and has therefore ensured that 
communication with the public regarding risks associated with the nuclear industry are thoroughly 
planned and controlled, and that all NRC employees are equipped to speak on behalf of the agency 
when called upon. (122)  These principles and the process for effective risk communication to the 
public is summarized in NUREG/BR-0308, “Effective Risk Communication: The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission’s Guidelines for External Risk Communication,” a handbook for all staff 
to use.  In addition, the NRC has a created a sister document, NUREG/BR-0318, “Effective Risk 
Communication: Guidelines for Internal Communication.” (123)  This document acknowledges 
the importance of knowledge sharing and communication regarding identified and analyzed risks 
within the NRC, as well as resultant decisions and policy changes.  The processes defined by the 
NRC for internal and external risk communication are shown in consolidated format in Figure 6-F. 
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Figure 6-F: US NRC process for risk communication (consolidated) (122)  
 
The NRC has assigned the first step in successful risk communication, whether internal or external, 
as “establish objectives.”  For the NRC, there may be several objectives associated with internal 
risk communication, such as: 
• Gathering information to assist with a risk assessment 
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• Seeking peer feedback or input 
• Providing input that may contribute to a decision 
• Providing background information 
• Conveying a decision 
• Building consensus or resolving issues 
• Supporting communication with external stakeholders, and/or 
• Developing a risk-informed, performance based assessment in a new area (123) 
 With regard to external risk communication, the objectives may be: 
• Providing information 
• Gathering information 
• Building trust and credibility 
• Seeking involvement, and/or 
• Influencing behavior or perceptions about risk (122) 
Within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, these lists might be combined, as 
they represent common objectives irrespective of whether the stakeholder is internal or external.  
For example, a drug manufacturer may communicate externally to regulators regarding decisions 
that have been made based on QRM, while an individual QRM practitioner may wish to build trust 
and credibility regarding identified risks internally with his or her leadership, staff, or peers.   
With the objectives for risk communication established, the process reaches the planning stage.  
This begins with the identification of stakeholders and a careful evaluation of their potential 
concerns, preconceptions, and existing knowledge regarding the risks or risk topics being 
communicated. The stakeholders will be the recipients of the risk communication, and must be 
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thoroughly understood in order for the communication to be effective.  Any imbalances in 
knowledge and underlying bias should be explicitly addressed in the communication plan, and risk 
communication methods should be selected to ensure that the risk information being 
communicated is clear to the intended audience. (122) (123) 
Preparation follows the planning stage, and entails the creation of communication materials (such 
as slides, speaker notes, email messages, or letters), the anticipation of potential questions or points 
of contention, and the collation of information and data to support key messages.  Finally, the 
communication occurs; this may be passive communication, as may be the case when the objective 
is to inform the recipient of facts or decisions, or it may be an active dialogue requiring the use of 
active listening skills.  Once the communication has occurred, the communicator should reflect on 
the experience and identify opportunities for improvement in the future. (122) (123) 
While the above discourse on effective risk communication can be viewed as “good 
communication practices” in a general sense, the fact that these principles are applied in a 
disciplined way to the communication of risk information within the nuclear industry is not 
inconsequential.  There is an entire field of study and related body of literature dedicated to how 
risk is perceived by individuals47, and the recipient’s state of mind and frame of reference can 
greatly influence their interpretation of both the information and message communicated. (124)  In 
order for the risk information to be transmitted from sender to receiver in the way in which it was 
intended, risk communication must not be marginalized or taken for granted.  This is particularly 
                                                 
47 The most notable of these is the work of Kahneman and Tversky on human heuristics and cognitive biases.   
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true of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, where the risk information 
directly affects the life and health of patients.   
 
Equipped with best practices and key lessons from industries with a history of effective risk 
management implementation, the research reached its third and final phase.  This phase, 
documented in Section Three (Chapters Seven through Ten), focused on synthesizing the learnings 
from Phase 1 and 2 of the research with additional research to define the ideal state of QRM: a 
state in which QRM truly enables the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries to manage 
risk to the patient. 
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Section Three: Recoding QRM to Better 
Manage Risk to the Patient 
  
193 
 
 
 
 
“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”   
- Albert Einstein 
 
“There is nothing about risk management that does not make common 
sense.” 
- Amanda Bishop McFarland 
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7 Chapter Seven: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - People 
 
This chapter marks the first of three aimed at characterizing the ideal state of QRM—a state in 
which a firm’s QRM program has been optimized to provide the maximum benefit to both the 
company and the patient.   
7.1 Research design and process for Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine 
The Phase 3 research discussed in Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine represents a synthesis of prior 
learnings and phase-specific qualitative research methods, as introduced in Chapter Three.  A 
combination of philosophical dialogues, literature review, and semi-structured interviews were 
used.  Philosophical dialogues took place primarily at industry conferences, such as those 
sponsored by PDA and IVT, which were attended by large groups of delegates with varying levels 
of expertise and practical experience in QRM.  The researcher sought out specific individuals to 
discuss QRM topics based on their current roles, and leveraged delegates attending conference 
sessions on or relating to QRM topics.  Themes were identified and later trended, and selected 
quotes were documented by the researcher during these exchanges.  In many cases, the themes that 
emerged from the philosophical dialogues echoed the researcher’s own experience and learnings 
from the Phase 1 and 2 research; these are cited accordingly in the chapters that follow. 
The literature review consisted of articles from industry periodicals, peer-reviewed journals, and 
reports, as discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis and as shown in Figure 7-A.  In addition, the 
researcher incorporated several books on quality and risk management topics, as well as 
whitepapers and reports published by renowned consulting firms (such as Deloitte and Price 
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Waterhouse Coopers) and risk management-related organizations (such as the Risk Management 
Society, or RIMS, and the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, 
or COSO).  The literature review therefore extended beyond QRM in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries to other industries, such as finance and insurance, and other risk 
management fields, such as Enterprise Risk Management (ERM).  These sources added depth to 
the Phase 3 research and enabled the characterizing of best practices from a variety of trades, 
further expanding upon the industries selected for the Phase 2 research in Chapter Six. 
 
Figure 7-A: Literature map highlighting focus for Chapters Seven, Eight, and Nine 
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As noted in Chapter Three, the semi-structured interviews of QRM experts were conducted either 
in person, via telephone, or via written correspondence in instances where the experts’ schedules 
were not conducive to a dialogue.  Each expert was asked to review a research brief, prepared in 
accordance with the DIT’s rules for ethical research conduct and approved by the Ethics 
Committee, and sign a declaration that they agreed to serve as research subject.  In person and 
phone interviews were recorded and later transcribed.  Each transcript (or written interview 
response) was coded for key words and analyzed to inform the applicable topic in Chapters Seven, 
Eight, and Nine.  These semi-structured interviews found many themes, as well as some disparate 
opinions that offered a richness to the research.  
This chapter intends to characterize maturity with regard to the people pillar of QRM and is divided 
into three sections.  The first section discusses the benefits of, and methods for, building awareness 
of QRM principles and practices throughout industry, as embodied within those personnel working 
at a given pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical manufacturing site.  The second section discusses 
the need for building expertise within industry for QRM as a discipline in its own right, and offers 
an educational approach to achieve this.  The third and final section of this chapter explores risk 
culture, including those characteristics indicative of mature and immature risk cultures, and 
summarizes some best practices to enhance risk culture. 
7.2 Building organizational awareness of QRM 
A common theme identified in the benchmarking survey, expert interviews, and literature review 
is the need for all employees to possess a basic level of awareness of QRM, irrespective of their 
individual job responsibilities.  Because QRM is an enabler of the quality system, and all 
employees are responsible for ensuring the quality of the products they manufacture or support, an 
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understanding of QRM principles and practices throughout each organization is necessary.  
However, O’Donnell summarizes that currently, “[most] people [in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries] don’t make the links between what they do and QRM.” (125) 
Ramnarine notes that at companies mature in QRM, individuals at all levels and functions are able 
to identify and communicate risks associated with their daily work. (126)  Vesper reiterates this, 
noting that firms mature in QRM implementation will have developed their staff such that 
“…people think about risks as part of their job.  They understand risks associated with their job, 
and they realize that before they start a task, they should run through it in their mind, [and ask] 
what can go wrong here?  What will I do if it goes downhill?  Where am I vulnerable in this 
particular activity?  So it’s where risk is a natural part of daily work.  It’s risk-based thinking.” 
(127)  Developing an organization that easily identifies risk and seamlessly integrates QRM 
principles into task preparation and execution provides a competitive advantage to drug 
manufacturers and a direct benefit to patients.  The risk-aware mindset allows for potential issues 
to be more readily identified and remediated in real time, before consequences on product quality 
manifest.   
In order to develop the appropriate level of organizational awareness of QRM, companies with 
mature QRM programs often employ role-based training. (128) (129) (130)  This model enables a 
tailored approach to QRM knowledge transfer based on an individual’s level of interaction with 
QRM.   While certain roles may require minimal technical knowledge of QRM, those who interact 
more frequently and deeply with QRM will require a commensurate level of training to ensure 
they can fulfill their responsibilities within the program. Table 7-1 provides a training model for 
the roles described in Chapter Nine. 
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Table 7-1: Role-based training model to enable risk maturity 
Role Objective of training Points to emphasize 
All employees Provide an overview of 
QRM principles and 
practices 
• QRM does not replace the obligation 
to follow cGMP 
• Risk management is part of daily life 
• It is everyone’s responsibility to 
manage risks to the patient 
Subject Matter 
Experts 
Enable participation in 
QRM activities 
• QRM is not surrogate for sound 
science 
• QRM requires the use of data and 
scientific knowledge to be effective 
System or Process 
Owners 
Ensure ownership and 
accountability for QRM  
• Roles and responsibilities for QRM 
• Appropriate and inappropriate use of 
QRM 
QRM Experts 
(Facilitators) 
Build expertise in QRM • Refer to section 7.3 
Decision makers Enable risk-based 
decision making 
• QRM is an input into decision 
making; it is not the decision 
Leadership Secure a commitment to 
QRM 
• The role of governance and culture in 
successful QRM (refer to Chapter 
Nine and section 7.4, respectively) 
• The importance of leadership 
commitment in the success of QRM 
• The value of QRM to the patient and 
the business  
 
The role-based training described above should not be delivered only once; it is important to 
periodically refresh individuals on QRM principles and practices to ensure the knowledge remains 
current and easily accessible to the employee.  Companies mature in QRM tend to perform annual 
re-trainings, either as standalone efforts or as part of other routine training such as cGMP 
refreshers. (128) 
Developing organizational awareness of QRM principles and practices achieves several objectives 
that serve to enhance risk maturity.  It gives employees the tools to identify, reduce, and 
communicate quality risks that might be present in their daily work.  It enables a continuous 
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improvement mindset by giving employees the vocabulary and opportunity to speak up about 
quality risks and opportunities for improvement. (131)  It helps overcome cultural inertia that may 
be present in historically reactive operational cultures.  Finally, organization-wide familiarity with 
QRM ensures that all employees remain aware of their role in managing risk to the patient. 
7.3 Building expertise in QRM 
Many experts and authors espouse the need to build quality risk management expertise within the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  These industries are founded in various sorts of 
expertise: expertise in patients’ medical needs, the clinical benefits of medicines, the science 
underpinning drug research and development, the manufacturing science required to produce these 
drugs, the quality system elements to ensure patient protection, and the regulatory science 
underpinning the manufacturer-regulator relationship.  Despite this, there is a lack of deep 
understanding of the principles and practices of QRM: the very principles and practices that are 
being integrated throughout each of these areas. (125) (132) As stakeholders have evolved their 
appreciation of the benefits offered by QRM, each of these areas of expertise, once considered 
sufficient to deliver value to the patient, are now rendered vulnerable.  Critical knowledge 
necessary to fulfill their role is lacking.  The need for a deeper understanding of the ways in which 
QRM should be used to enable product realization and ongoing safety and efficacy is clear. 
Some of the experts interviewed as part of the research made a distinction between training and 
education. (132) (132) Training, they noted, teaches people basic concepts required to fulfill their 
job responsibilities and execute tasks as intended.  Education, on the other hand, provides a deeper 
perspective on the intent, principles, and practices associated with a given area to enable people to 
go further than what might be provided by training alone.  It transfers knowledge and gives 
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students the skill set to synthesize this knowledge and create additional knowledge as they 
progress.  Education, rather than training, is what is needed within industry for QRM.  The 
researcher proposes that such an education program might apply three categories to each student, 
based on their level of progression through the program and demonstrated mastery of QRM 
principles and practices, as illustrated in Table 7-2. 
Table 7-2: Education levels to develop QRM experts 
Level Level of 
educator 
involvement 
Level of 
structure 
Focus of 
education 
Educational 
premise 
Skills gained 
Candidate High High Course work, 
case study 
review 
“learn by 
seeing” 
Broad understanding 
of principles, tools, 
and application 
Apprentice Moderate High Use of skills 
under a 
seasoned QRM 
expert 
“learn by 
doing” 
Application of 
student skills in real-
life settings, 
flexibility to “think 
outside the box” 
Expert Low Low Independent use 
of skills, 
mentorship of 
apprentices 
“learn by 
teaching” 
Refinement of 
expertise, knowledge 
transfer 
At the Candidate level, the coursework progresses from a basic review of QRM regulation, terms, 
and tools through more complex concepts such as the development of risk control strategies, QRM 
facilitation skills, risk communication, and risk review, finally ending with advanced concepts 
such as human heuristics and bias and adaptation of QRM approaches to real-life scenarios. Table 
7-3 summarizes recommended coursework during the Candidate level of QRM education, based 
largely on the research described in this thesis.  
At the Apprentice level, the student is expected to apply knowledge gained during the Candidate 
coursework to real-life scenarios in a work setting, under the tutelage of a seasoned QRM expert.  
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Such apprenticeship may involve activities such as co-facilitation of risk assessments, participation 
in Community of Practice-type knowledge sharing forums, and exposure to senior leadership as 
risk-based decisions are discussed and taken.  The apprenticeship program benefits from a high 
level of structure, with defined opportunities and mentor partners, to ensure the apprentice has an 
opportunity to exercise skills and be exposed to scenarios outside of their comfort levels.  The 
apprenticeship program provides a way for students to learn on the job and experience success and 
failure in QRM endeavors without exposing the business and the patient to undue risk. 
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Table 7-3: Coursework for QRM Candidates 
Course Included topics Section references in this thesis 
QRM Basics • ICH Q9 
• QRM standards: ISO 14971 and ISO 31000 
• QRM terms 
• 2.2.2 
• 6.2 
• 6.1 
QRM Applications 
• ICH Q8(R2) and ICH Q11 
• ICH Q10 
• 2.2.3 
• 2.2.4 
• 8.3 
QRM Tools 
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
• Bowtie Analysis: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
• Risk-based Impact Assessment (RBIA) 
• 8.2.2 
QRM Initiation • Developing the risk question 
• Risk tool selection 
• Building a risk team 
• Preparing for a risk assessment 
• 8.2 
Risk Control 
• Risk control methods 
• Identifying GMP controls 
• Risk control option analysis 
• 6.2.2 
• 6.4 
• 8.48.4 
Risk Review 
• Risk review timing and objectives 
• Data sources 
• Making sense of the data 
• 8.5 
Risk Communication • Identifying stakeholders 
• Communication methods 
• What should be communicated 
• 6.4.1 
• 8.6 
Facilitation skills • Situational leadership 
• Managing conflict 
• Leading meetings 
• Heuristics and biases 
None48 
                                                 
48 With the exception of heuristics and biases, facilitation skills are not specific to QRM and are therefore not discussed in this thesis.  Heuristics and biases did not 
warrant significant discussion based on the research question, however are critical knowledge for the QRM Candidate.  See, for example, (63), (64), (157), (222). 
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Students at the Expert level49 focus on using their mastery of QRM for the benefit of the patients 
they and their organizations serve.  In addition, they nurture the next generation of QRM Experts 
as coaches and mentors.  The process of mentoring brings with it an additional level of learning, 
as students with new knowledge, ideas, and mindsets challenge the mentor. 
Companies with mature QRM programs invest heavily in building this level of QRM expertise. 
(130)  This investment offers a significant return, of course, in the form of core knowledge that 
can be applied throughout the quality system and over the entire product lifecycle.  The people 
working with and through QRM are assets to be invested in and championed; developing core 
expertise in QRM principles and practices enables companies to better manage risk to the patient. 
7.4 Risk culture 
Several experts who participated in the Phase 3 research cited a company’s culture with respect to 
QRM as the aspect most predictive of success, and also of failure, in managing risk to the patient.  
Cultural influences have made or broken risk management in other industries as well, as in the 
culture of complacency and the normalization of deviance seen at NASA (discussed in Chapter 6) 
and the failure to implement appropriate design controls in the 1970s model Pinto at Ford that is 
common attributed to the unethical prioritization of profits over people.50 (133) 
                                                 
49 Indeed, even experts should be considered students of QRM, as the consistent evolution of the practice necessarily 
entails an ongoing commitment to learning. 
50 The Ford Pinto debacle is commonly studied by business ethicists and risk management practitioners alike.  The 
1970s model Pinto had a serious design flaw; the fuel tank was positioned in a way that made it vulnerable to explosion 
upon impact, and also made it difficult or impossible for the vehicle occupants to subsequently escape the fiery crash.  
Pinto designers admitted to keeping this information from the CEO at the time, since safety was not a priority at the 
company.  Cost and time, however, were.  Once the Pinto went to market and drivers began to suffer as a result of the 
design issue, the company still chose to continue selling the vehicle.  Ostensibly the justification was that a mass recall 
and part replacement was more expensive than the expected legal settlements in wrongful death tort suits. (141)  The 
company culture at Ford serves as a cautionary tale for any QRM practitioner. 
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The Phase 2 research identified fear as an obstacle that is currently preventing progression towards 
more mature QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  Other experts cited a 
lack of interest in exploring uncertainty as a hallmark of an immature risk culture, while others 
cited reactive, “fire-fighting” cultures that reward problem solving instead of problem prevention. 
(134) (132) (127)  The lack of a common risk vocabulary, and the willingness to use it, is another 
indicator of weak risk maturity, as is the feeling that QRM adds value only so far as the regulations 
require it. (129) (135)  In immature risk cultures, personnel are loath to participate in QRM 
activities, often actively avoiding them. (128)   
These immature risk cultures may be relics of older regulatory paradigms, predating ICH Q8, Q9, 
Q10, and Q11.  The semi-structured expert interviews and philosophical dialogues held in the 
Phase 3 research indicated that there may be lingering fear of risk, drawn off the impression that 
regulators, in particular, would historically not tolerate quality risk of any sort. (127) (128)  
Mohachkar et al reflect that “the industry [has] too long been regulated into a culture in which a 
static process [is] the only safe process.” (136)  Indeed, as discussed in Chapter Two, 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical regulation has been historically rule-based, rather than risk-
based.  Compliance was king, and there was an assumption that perfect compliance would result 
in perfect quality.  Some companies, low in risk maturity, may still cling to this older paradigm as 
the way it has always been done. 
The unfortunate fact is that in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, culture change 
often follows regulatory sanctions, such as an import alert, warning letter, consent decree, or 
revocation of a GMP certificate—all situations that represent grave quality problems and 
associated risks to the patient.  The challenge becomes how to identify ways to change culture 
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proactively.  Juan Andres, head of quality at Novartis, positions it as an issue for leadership: “We 
need to be able to articulate and to be able to catalyze that mindset and that cultural change in our 
organizations with the business leaders prior to punished, or punishing the patients…” 
(137)[emphasis added]  The challenges in achieving momentum with a new organizational mindset 
were summarized by Richard Bowles, head of quality at Schering-Plough, who discussed the 
evolving levels of commitment as cultural change takes hold. (137)  Table 7-4 summarizes these 
levels of commitment. 
Table 7-4: Levels of commitment in cultural change 
Level of commitment Mindset 
Denial “I will do it if I have to.” 
Resistance “I will obey the rules.” 
Exploration “I will support the effort.” 
Commitment “I stand for this.” 
 
There are ways to accelerate the organization through these levels of commitment, steepening the 
learning curve associated with understanding and adopting new ways of thinking—as QRM surely 
entails.  A first step is to develop organizational awareness of QRM, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.  Some large pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical coupled the initial role-based training 
efforts with company-wide “QRM Days”, engaging personnel with QRM-themed games, “lunch 
and learn” talks about QRM topics from all levels of the organization, and QRM poster sessions.  
One site achieved quick success in permeating the organization with a QRM mindset through their 
“12 Days of Riskmas” event, using holiday themes to introduce and reinforce QRM topics 
throughout their site. (128)  Events such as these can diffuse some of the fear associated with risk 
identification and management, and can allow personnel to engage with leadership and decision 
makers who reinforce their commitment to a risk-savvy culture. 
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Other firms have “branded” QRM through the design of risk management slogans and logos.  The 
branding is then used on multiple forms of communication—email signatures, presentation slides, 
reports, and posters around the facility—to remind personnel of QRM. (138) (130)  Uydess and 
Meyers describe such branding as a key element of a successful cultural transformation, noting 
“To help drive and sustain [cultural] changes, a compelling… message must be developed—in 
effect, internally branding the effort.  The message must be clear, relevant, understood by all, and 
designed to provide a point around which every employee can rally, motivating them to contribute 
to the effort.” (139)  This effort should also work to reverse any preconceptions that risk 
management is “the brakes of the operation more so than valued partners.” (140) 
In addition, crafting a reward and recognition program for personnel who exhibit anticipatory and 
avoidant behaviors will encourage others to follow and demonstrate the organization’s 
commitment to the new risk culture. (132) (127)  This is particularly important within 
organizations that have historically rewarded reactive behaviors, as these organizations have 
reinforced the perception that problem-solvers are valued, while risk managers go unnoticed.  
Vesper shared an anecdote to demonstrate the point: 
“I was working with a biopharma company and they prided themselves as fire-fighters.  If 
something went wrong, they would work twenty hours a day and over weekends to fix it, 
and once they did they would get their picture taken with the site director and it would be 
put on their interval website or newsletter.  They were rewarding fire-fighters.  And what 
was so hard about this firm, is that QRM is proactive.  And they weren’t rewarding 
proactive behaviors, or avoiding a problem instead of solving it.” (127) 
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Reward and recognition programs to reinforce proactive behaviors can vary from formal to 
informal in line with typical company policies, however it should be similar in measure to the 
programs used for reactive behaviors—those with a QRM mindset should get equal or greater 
symbols of appreciation as those who capitalize off the failure of QRM. 
For those firms ready to transition to the modern quality archetype of risk-based quality and 
compliance have a clear idea of what maturity looks like.  Pat Barrett, Auditor-General for 
Australia, listed ten attributes of mature risk cultures (positioned as KPIs for risk management): 
1. Integrated risk management approach: an organization in which risk management is 
forward-looking and integral to all business processes 
2. Committed and led: an organization with a strong leadership commitment to risk 
management at the highest levels  
3. Positive and proactive focus: an organization that seeks to identify and manage risks 
before they manifest, rather than after 
4. Process-driven: an organization with a framework capable of executing risk management 
processes 
5. Planned for continuous improvement: an organization with a clearly defined risk 
planning process and ongoing monitoring and review 
6. Audited and documented: an organization that confirms its application of risk 
management principles and processes 
7. Active communication: an organization with a defined risk communication plan, that 
communicates risks actively to internal and external stakeholders 
8. Resourced: an organization that has committed adequate resources, both financial, time, 
and personnel, to the management of risks 
9. Trained and Educated: an organization that is committed to training and education of 
staff in risk management principles and is willing to fund such education 
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10. Value-based decisions: an organization that makes business decisions based on risk 
assessment outcomes (141) 
 Mature risk cultures are composed of people with an innate curiosity and drive to better understand 
and manage risks. (134) (126)  These are open, transparent cultures that have not assigned an 
inherently negative value judgement to risks; risks and their management are seen not as 
mandatory compliance element but as opportunities to improve the business and better protect the 
patient. (134) (132) (142) (130) (125)  In mature risk cultures, there is eagerness to employ QRM 
principles and practices since the benefits of doing so are clear to all.  People actively champion 
QRM; that is, until the highest level of maturity is reached where QRM is so fully integrated into 
everyday work that the use of risk management concepts no longer requires conscious effort.  Of 
course, a strong risk culture is one that is proactive, anticipatory, and risk avoidant; it is a culture 
that puts patient protection first. 
 
This chapter outlined an ideal state of QRM with regard to the people working within it, including 
role-based training and awareness, the process and benefits of nurturing QRM experts, and the role 
of risk culture.  Chapter Eight will characterize maturity for the QRM process to be used by these 
QRM practitioners, aimed at shifting the focus from “doing QRM” to “managing risk to the 
patient.”  
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8 Chapter Eight: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - Process 
 
This chapter seeks to characterize risk maturity with regard to the process—the activities that 
comprise the QRM lifecycle.  This chapter begins with the introduction of a concept intended to 
serve as the guiding light for subsequent quality risk management efforts, the living risk 
assessment library.  This library focuses the organization on holistically managing aspects of that 
directly relate to the patient, minimizing the emphasis on performing QRM activities for less 
important aspects.  It is, in a sense, the principle of risk management applied to risk management 
itself.  The sections that follow characterize what maturity looks like over the QRM lifecycle, and 
proceed in rank order of QRM initiation, risk assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk 
communication.  Finally, an alternative QRM lifecycle is proposed, based upon the more effective 
QRM process proposed in earlier sections.   
8.1 Constructing a holistic risk assessment library 
ICH Q9 does not distinguish between two complementary but distinct concepts: quality risk 
management and risk-based decision making.  This difference is more effectively communicated 
in ICH Q10, which distinguishes between the product lifecycle and the quality system working 
within that lifecycle.  The QRM lifecycle proposed by ICH Q9 implies that risk management 
activities necessarily entail each of the process steps to a greater or lesser extent; there is no 
acknowledgement that QRM principles may be applied, in the absence of the complete QRM 
lifecycle, throughout the quality system.  Industries such as aerospace (discussed in Chapter Six) 
and companies with mature QRM programs distinguish between these two applications of QRM 
and have structured their programs appropriately. (109) (129) (134) (128) 
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An operational definition for risk-based decision making for the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries might be “the use of the principles of quality management risk 
outside of the lifecycle framework to assist with quality-related decision making.”  For example, 
one might apply QRM to help determine a commensurate depth of investigation for a process 
deviation or complaint, or to evaluate the appropriate frequency for preventive maintenance, 
calibration, or self-inspection.  These applications of QRM do not necessarily require the totality 
of the lifecycle to be followed; rather, a risk assessment or risk-based approach may be conducted 
to facilitate a decision without continuing into the risk reduction, risk acceptance, and risk review 
portions of the lifecycle.  It is therefore necessary for firms to distinguish between living risk 
assessments, which follow the full breath of the QRM lifecycle, and ad hoc risk assessments, which 
may only address a portion or portions of the lifecycle, depending on the risk question.  This 
alleviates some of the administration burden of a QRM program by focusing energy and resources 
(particularly within risk review) on the applicable portions of the lifecycle.   
Living risk assessments should represent the core of the QRM program.  These are performed on 
a product, process, or system, with the objectives of understanding the associated risks, controlling 
them to an acceptable level, and reviewing the risks in light of changing conditions to evaluate the 
continued relevance of the identified risks and the continued effectiveness of risk controls.  On the 
other hand, ad hoc risk assessments are likely to be performed as part of an integrated quality 
system, to make decisions within specific contexts.  These risk assessments need not be subject to 
risk review, but are often the input into the review of living risk assessments.  Many companies 
struggle as they attempt to review risk assessments intended for risk-based decision making rather 
the QRM lifecycle, since related decisions have been taken and resultant next steps enacted.  A 
mature QRM program addresses and embraces both of these types of risk assessments. 
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It follows, of course, that the products manufactured by a firm should be subject to the full rigors 
of the QRM lifecycle, and therefore have living risk assessments associated with them.  These 
represent the most direct link to the patient and should be continually evaluated in a QRM 
framework throughout their lifecycle. (143)  The question then becomes, what living risk 
assessments are necessary to ensure that risks to the patient are fully understood and controlled?   
As discussed in the Viracept story in Chapter One, many firms have approached this by creating 
thousands of risk assessments, each covering a small segment of the total knowledge required to 
truly manage risks to the patient.  Schmitt notes that in his experience working with numerous 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies, “… one is left with hundreds (sometimes 
thousands) of risk assessments all over the place, not linked to a plan or a process, just floating.”  
(135)  At companies with less mature QRM programs, risk assessments, and therefore the QRM 
lifecycle, are initiated as the need arises, and are seldom planned in advance to fit within an 
overarching strategy to achieve full risk understanding. (135) (144)  This approach soon proves its 
folly, as the forest is lost for the trees and a complete picture of the risks to which the patient might 
be exposed are not fully understood.  Further, the administrative burden posed by the need to 
perform risk review activities on thousands of individual risk assessments soon becomes 
unmanageable, causing an increased focus on “doing QRM” at the expense of managing risk to 
the patient. 
A mature QRM program would have a clear picture of the minimum scope required to achieve 
holistic risk knowledge and would have established a QRM plan to achieve this.  For example, a 
firm may elect to use the approach commonly employed by medical devices, with one risk 
assessment (and QRM lifecycle initiation) each for the product, process, and use.  However, 
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discomfort with this sparse approach is often voiced by various departments: what about the risks 
associated with the manufacturing facility?  The utilities within the facility?  The equipment used 
to run the manufacturing process?  The computer systems used to run those equipment?  And once 
again the firm moves to the other side of the pendulum, with an excess of risk assessments of small 
scope ruling the day. (128) (138)  A more streamlined and comprehensive approach is to evaluate 
the parts that comprise the whole and proactively design a holistic living risk assessment library.  
Such a living risk assessment library might leverage platform processes and technologies and 
similarities in design and construction to cover the totality of product considerations, as shown in 
Table 8-1. 
Using the living risk assessment library model, risk identification would occur within the context 
of a pre-planned risk assessment, rather than before.  Therefore, individual efforts to perform risk 
assessments for pre-defined risks, such as cross-contamination, integrity of the supply chain/value 
stream, or the level of cGMP required of excipient manufacturers, would no longer be necessary; 
these would already be addressed in the applicable living risk assessment.  In this way the living 
risk assessment library model enables a more streamlined yet comprehensive approach such that 
all applicable risks are identified within the context of a holistic risk assessment.   
In order to maximize the effectiveness of the living assessment risk library concept, the 
organization must be aware that these must be kept living; that is, a new living risk assessment 
should only be created if a gap is discovered within the library construct.  Rather, the risk 
assessments that already compose the library should be revisited, revised, expanded, or contracted 
based changes that may occur to the topic that was assessed, in accordance with the principles of 
risk review. 
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Table 8-1: Example of an optimized living risk assessment library 
Focus of risk 
assessment Includes components of… Delivers knowledge related to… 
Manufacturing 
process 
• Manufacturing equipment 
• Automation 
• Equipment cleaning and 
sterilization 
• Design and content of master batch 
production records 
• Process and operational control 
strategies 
• Process monitoring strategies 
• Product sampling and testing plans 
• Cleaning process design and 
validation 
• Computer systems design and 
validation 
• Maintenance and calibration plans 
• Inspection plans and acceptance 
levels 
Facility 
• HVAC systems 
• Critical utilities (e.g. water, 
steam, and process gases) 
• Facility flows (e.g. 
personnel, product, waste) 
• Contamination and cross-
contamination control strategies 
• Cleanroom capabilities and 
classification 
• Environmental monitoring plans 
• Critical utilities monitoring plans 
Starting/raw 
materials and 
components 
• Material quality and safety 
• Extractable and leachable 
profiles 
• Product impurity profiles 
• Supplier qualification 
• Supplier management 
• Component lifecycle management 
Analytical 
methods 
• Method capability and 
repeatability 
• Laboratory instruments 
• Analyst interface 
• Data capture and trending 
systems (e.g. Laboratory 
Information Management 
Systems) 
• Data integrity 
• Analytical method design and 
qualification 
• Computer systems design and 
validation 
Product 
shipping 
• Shipping lanes 
• Stability requirements 
• Temperature requirements 
• Handling requirements 
• Import/export 
considerations 
• Counterfeiting, tampering, and 
diversion prevention and response 
plans 
• Shipping configuration design and 
qualification 
• Cold chain requirements 
• Supplier qualification 
• Supplier management 
• Good distribution practices 
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8.2 QRM initiation 
In many companies, the QRM process is initiated informally, without any minimum requirements 
that would prove critical to the success of the effort; in some cases there is no communication that 
QRM has been invoked until after a risk assessment is complete.51 (128)  These practices could 
lead to false-starts and other problems, such as weak, unclear or conflicting objectives, inadequate 
expertise on the risk team, selection of a sub-optimal risk tool, or redundant or vague scope of the 
QRM effort.  Companies with mature QRM programs tend to pre-plan QRM efforts, as discussed 
in the context of the QRM Plan in Chapter Nine, and apply a structured approach to the initiation 
process to provide an appropriate level of oversight and direction for the activities to follow.  A 
mature QRM initiation process would require the initiator to define the risk question or objective 
select an appropriate risk tool, and identify the expertise and data needed and individuals 
possessing that expertise and knowledge, and ensure that the QRM effort is aligned with the overall 
QRM strategy.  Depending on the level of risk maturity of the organization, a defined QRM 
initiation process may also include requirements to ensure the proper ownership, select a qualified 
facilitator, prepare for the risk assessment, and understand the resources available to control any 
resultant risks.  The QRM initiation process should be considered a planning step critical to the 
success of the effort, and should entail a commensurate level of structure and energy.  Appendix I 
offers a template that can be used by pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies to enhance 
their maturity in QRM initiation. 
                                                 
51 In companies with very mature QRM programs, QRM would be seamless within the organization and therefore 
initiation of QRM would not require a formal process or associated communication effort.  However, as discussed in 
Chapter Five, most pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies have not yet reached this level of maturity and 
should follow a structured approach to QRM initiation until such time as control and oversight over this phase of the 
lifecycle is no longer necessary. 
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8.2.1 The risk question 
Though ICH Q9 mentions it only in passing, perhaps the most important deliverable from QRM 
initiation is the definition and documentation of the risk question.  The risk question is that which 
the risk assessment seeks to answer.  It encompasses the problem statement in a question format, 
serving as a compass for the activities to come.  Broad risk assessments, such as those used to 
construct the living risk assessment library discussed earlier in this chapter, tend to use short and 
simple risk questions, such as “what are the risks associated with this process?”  Narrowly-scoped, 
specific risk assessments tend to employ more complex risk questions, such as “what are the risks 
of exceeding the storage temperature during transport of this product by air freight from Ireland to 
Hong Kong in February?” (61) 
Some companies forgo a risk question and instead document the objective of the risk assessment.  
The researcher cautions against this practice for several reasons: an objective may encourage 
incorrect use of QRM by implying a foregone conclusion, such as a decision that has already been 
made or a justification of an inappropriate practice (as in “The objective of this risk assessment is 
to justify a reduced level of training for aseptic processing operators.”) and may also introduce 
bias into the QRM exercise through the assumption that the objective is appropriate.  The use of a 
risk question has several advantages over an objective in QRM, including: 
• Minimizing bias by positioning the QRM exercise as one of learning, rather than 
assertion, which in turn means there are no “right” or “wrong” answers 
• Allows the data to speak for itself in the context of a risk assessment, rather than to 
support a pre-defined goal 
• Allows for uncertainty to be present and acknowledged 
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This is not to say that the use of risk questions always represents a greater level of risk maturity.  
Weak risk questions may exhibit characteristics similar to an objective, as in “what is the risk of 
not doing <activity>?”  Conversely, strong risk questions will be agnostic to the outcome. 
Table 8-2 illustrates how varying levels of risk maturity might manifest during this step of QRM 
initiation. 
Table 8-2: Examples of QRM objectives and risk questions relative to the level of risk maturity 
QRM Topic Least mature More mature Most mature 
For 
environmental 
monitoring 
“The objective of this 
risk assessment is to 
justify a reduction in 
sampling locations and 
frequency for the 
environmental 
monitoring program.” 
“What are the risks of 
removing sampling 
locations and reducing 
the frequency of 
sampling in the 
environmental 
monitoring program?” 
“What sampling 
locations and frequency 
should be employed in 
the environmental 
monitoring program, 
based on the risk?” 
For deviations “The objective of this 
risk assessment is to 
justify the release of 
product implicated in 
deviation X.” 
“The objective of this 
risk assessment is to 
determine whether 
product implicated in 
deviation X should be 
released.” 
“Given that deviation X 
occurred, what are the 
risks to product quality 
and patient safety?” 
For change 
management 
“This risk assessment 
was performed to 
satisfy the QRM 
requirement in the 
Change Management 
procedure.” 
“This risk assessment 
was performed to 
determine the risks 
associated with the 
proposed change and 
reduce them to an 
acceptable level.” 
“Should the proposed 
change proceed based 
on the risks?  If so, what 
effect does this change 
pose on the risk profile 
of the associated 
process?” 
 
8.2.2 QRM tool selection 
Two-thirds of the experts interviewed for the Phase 3 research noted that a mature QRM program 
would have an extensive risk “toolkit” that can be used to support the QRM lifecycle. (129) (134) 
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(135) (132) (126) (127) (142)  Risk tools support the conduct of risk assessments, including 
elements of risk identification and risk analysis, at a minimum.  A variety of risk tools are listed 
in ICH Q9, including: 
• Flowcharts 
• Check sheets 
• Process maps 
• Ishikawa diagrams (also known as fishbone or cause and effect diagrams) 
• Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
• Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
• Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
• Hazard Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
• Risk Ranking and Filtering (RRF) 
• Supporting statistical tools, such as control charts, histograms, and process capability 
analyses (45) 
 
Despite this, many companies less mature in QRM application tend to use a single tool.  By far the 
most common tool in use the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries is FMEA, a fact 
lamented by QRM experts. (129) (134) (135) (132) (126) (127) (142)  While FMEA has its place 
in any QRM toolkit, the rigidity of the tool construct poses challenges when used for risk questions 
that are ill-fit for the tool design.  For example, the identification of failure modes, causes, and 
effects inherent in FMEA is useful when trying to optimize a process to minimize risk, however is 
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of little value when trying to understand the impact of an event on product quality and patient 
safety for which the underlying cause may be of minimal relevance.   
A robust toolkit enables QRM practitioners to select the best-fit approach for the risk question at 
hand and empowers organizations to fully avail themselves of different levels of formality inherent 
in each tool.  As mentioned in section 2.2.2, ICH Q9 advises that “the level of effort, formality, 
and documentation of the quality risk management process should be commensurate with the level 
of risk.” (45)  FMEA is generally recognized as a formal risk tool; the over-use (and therefore 
misuse) of FMEA means that less mature QRM programs do not apply this principle of 
proportionate formality and effort.  Vesper and O’Donnell listed “using formal QRM on 
everything” as a major trend and misapplication of QRM seen across industry. (145)  Darrel 
Morrow, Senior Director of Quality Systems at Acceleron Pharma, reiterates that “it cannot be 
stressed enough that good systems use simple tools and avoid complexity. In this industry, it is 
easy for scientists to become hung up on ensuring accuracy; that means that people often add 
details and specifics to risks that do not actually help create a meaningful risk assessment.” (142) 
Several sources note that formality is not a binary concept in QRM; rather, it is a “spectrum” 
ranging from informal to very formal, with each risk tool having its place along the spectrum. (62) 
(126)  It is this researcher’s opinion that the formality spectrum described by these sources has 
minimal utility in a practical sense, since the distinction between risk tools is less a matter for 
formality than it is of conceptual design and intended application.  Companies seeking to enhance 
their level of risk maturity would benefit most from acknowledging the difference between formal 
and less formal risk tools, and then developing risk toolkits to include a small selection of both 
types.  A recommended minimum toolkit is offered in Table 8-3. 
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Table 8-3: Recommended minimum risk tools to increase risk maturity 
Tool Formality Optimized for… Enables delivery of… 
FMEA Formal Product, process, and 
system optimization and 
continuous improvement 
Process control strategies 
HACCP Formal Facility and utility 
optimization and 
continuous improvement 
Monitoring plans 
Risk-based Impact 
Assessment (RBIA) 
Formal Impact assessments Risk-based decision making 
Risk Estimation 
Matrix (REM; 
sometimes called a 
simple hazard 
analysis) 
Less 
Formal 
Frequent use in a variety 
of circumstances 
• Resource and project 
prioritization 
• Identification of areas that 
may require analysis 
through more formal tools 
Risk Ranking and 
Filtering 
Less 
Formal 
Customization Integration of QRM principles 
into the quality system 
Decision trees and 
Ishikawa diagrams 
Less 
Formal 
Customization • Integration of QRM 
principles into the quality 
system 
• Risk-based decision making 
Check sheets Less 
Formal 
Risk identification List of applicable risks from a 
pre-identified set 
Ishikawa diagrams Less 
Formal 
Risk identification List of causal factors 
 
Once an appropriate toolkit has been defined, the most challenging aspect of QRM initiation 
begins-- selecting the most appropriate risk tool.  Murray and Reich explain the challenge as 
follows: 
“Successful QRM tool selection begins with an awareness of the interrelationship between 
risk understanding and the choice of QRM tools.  Knowledge pertaining to potential risks 
both influences, and is influenced by, the selection of QRM tools… This interrelationship 
may seem paradoxical; QRM tools are typically used to facilitate and organization risk 
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identification, yet it is premature to select a QRM tool without knowing the nature of the 
risks to be assessed.” (146) 
This paradox can be overcome through a deep understanding of the capabilities and limitations of 
individual risk tool, combined with an evaluation of the risk question at hand.  Murray and Reich 
compare and contrast the characteristics of some common risk tools in a matrix format, as shown 
in Figure 8-A.  While this comparison is valuable, it does not acknowledge the level of formality 
required of the assessment, nor is the risk question taken into account.  This researcher, using 
learnings from Murray and Reich, philosophical dialogues, expert interviews, and work experience 
has addressed these shortcomings through the development of a decision tree to facilitate risk tool 
selection in mature QRM programs, as shown in Figure 8-B. 
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Figure 8-A: Murray and Reich’s comparison of common risk tools (146) 
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Scope and Objective/
Risk Question
Is there a 
procedural 
requirement to use 
a specific risk 
tool?
Use tool 
defined in the 
applicable 
procedure
  Yes
Is this a
 living risk 
assessment?
  No
Is the objective of this 
risk assessment to 
determine patient impact 
following an event?
Use Risk-based Impact 
Assessment (RBIA)
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Formal
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Formal
Use Hazard 
Analysis and 
Critical Control 
Points (HACCP)
Use Failure 
Modes and 
Effects 
Analysis  
(FMEA)
Is the 
development of a 
sampling plan a 
primary 
objective?
  Yes
  No
  Yes
  No
  Yes
Is this risk assessment 
related to a process or 
system that is critical to 
product quality or patient 
safety?
Use Failure 
Modes and 
Effects Analysis  
(FMEA) tool
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Formal
  Yes
  No
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Less Formal
  No
Use Risk Estimation Matrix (REM), Risk 
Ranking and Filtering (RRF), decision tree, 
Ishikawa diagram, or other risk-based 
approach
Is the objective of this 
risk assessment to 
determine root (or 
potential) cause?
Use Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) or 
other formal root 
cause analysis tool
Is the issue simple and 
loosely coupled or 
complex and tightly 
coupled?
  Yes
Use Five Whys or 
other less formal 
root cause analysis 
tool
  Simple
  Complex
  No
 
Figure 8-B: Decision tree to aid in risk tool selection 
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8.2.3 QRM team selection 
With over a decade of experience in the pharmaceutical, biopharmaceutical, and medical device 
industries, this researcher has become a strong proponent of the use of multidisciplinary teams to 
solve problems.  Ideas and intelligence are cumulative, and having the best and brightest work 
together on a topic almost always leads to a better outcome.  ICH Q9 acknowledges the importance 
of using a team approach to QRM, stating “Quality risk management activities are usually… 
undertaken by interdisciplinary teams. When teams are formed, they should include experts from 
the appropriate areas… in addition to individuals who are knowledgeable about the quality risk 
management process.” (45)  A critical component of the QRM initiation process includes the 
identification of the QRM team and chartering its membership. 
Companies less mature in QRM tend to struggle with the idea of expert teams.  McFarland 
describes her least mature clients as “those that do not require cross-functional team involvement 
in risk exercises.” (134)  In addition, many firms confuse functional group affiliation with 
expertise; for example, working within the quality control microbiology laboratory at a 
pharmaceutical firm does not necessarily render one an expert microbiologist. (128)  Companies 
mature in QRM do not seek to ensure departments are represented in a risk assessment; rather, 
they aim to have all necessary scientific expertise at the table when QRM is initiated. 
The term “subject matter experts”, or SMEs, is typically used to identify these individuals.  A 
subject matter expert might be defined as one who has both access to scientific data and the 
knowledge to interpret that data through the lens of risk.  This expertise tends to be in a scientific 
or engineering discipline of course, and should entail an appropriate level of education, experience, 
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and ongoing learning to ensure the expert’s reference point is not solely academic nor industrial, 
and is kept in tune with scientific advancements over time.  These experts, comprising the bulk of 
the QRM team, need only possess a superficial knowledge of QRM tools in order to fulfill their 
role on the team.  Under the guidance and tutelage of a qualified risk facilitator, their expertise can 
be translated into a QRM framework to create deliverables. 
At QRM initiation, the necessary data and expertise should be identified before membership on 
the QRM team is selected.  This ensures that individuals are not asked to participate based on 
functional group affiliation or availability, but instead based on their knowledge and the relevance 
of that knowledge to the topic under evaluation.  Appendix I provides a template for QRM 
initiation that guides the user through this essential process. 
8.3 Maturity with regard to risk assessment 
There is a wealth of literature available on risk assessments—books and articles describing risk 
tools, methods, considerations, and “best practices” abound.  The gap in this literature, as discussed 
in Chapters One and Two, is a discussion about how to use risk assessment to better manage risk 
to the patient.  The researcher has therefore chosen to approach this section, focused on maturity 
of risk assessment, not on those tips already socialized throughout the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries, but rather on how to best execute living risk assessments to ensure 
patient protection.  The living risk assessment execution strategy described in this section was 
initially proposed and authored by the researcher as part of her work with the PDA QRM Task 
Force, and has since been published in the resultant technical report Quality Risk Management for 
the Design, Qualification, and Operation of Manufacturing Systems. (147)  For reference 
throughout this section, the approach will be referred to as SmartRA. 
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8.3.1 Hierarchies and QbD and failure chains, oh my! 
Stephen Covey offered some wisdom that should be held sacrosanct when performing QRM: 
“begin with the end in mind.” (148)  The “end” for pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
companies is, of course, is the end user—the patient.  All activities undertaken by drug 
manufacturing firms ultimately link to the patient, as shown in Figure 8-C.  The patient crowns the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy, and is supported by the medicinal product.  The product, 
in turn, is realized through the manufacturing process, which is possible through the use of 
manufacturing systems, equipment, and technology.  These are comprised of individual 
components—the constituent parts of the production and support systems.  In order to protect the 
patient by assuring the safety and efficacy of the drug product, each of the layers in this hierarchy 
must be fully understood and carefully controlled.  
 
Figure 8-C: Hierarchy of pharmaceutical manufacturing 
Patient
Product
Manufacturing 
Process
Production and 
Support Systems
Components
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Visualized a different way in Figure 8-D, the product is enabled by the process, with is enabled by 
systems, which are enabled by components.  When the underlying hierarchy is well characterized, 
even a simple valve or gasket can be linked to patient protection. 
 
Figure 8-D: Enabling chain of pharmaceutical manufacturing 
As discussed in Chapter Two, ICH Q8(R2) describes the Quality by Design process and introduces 
specific vocabulary to describes the linkages between patient, product, and process.  The aspects 
of a medicinal product that are critical to ensuring product efficacy and patient safety are called 
Critical Quality Attributes, or CQAs. (49)  Examples of CQAs include potency, concentration or 
dose, sterility, and the presence of impurities in the product.  CQAs are identified through product 
development data and preclinical and clinical evidence, illustrating how variation in a given quality 
attribute affects patient outcomes and product quality.  Companies mature in QRM often employ 
a risk-based approach to CQA determination, using a risk tool that measures the strength of impact 
of the quality attribute on the patient and the uncertainty associated with that impact.  Only those 
quality attributes that have strong scientific data supporting a lack of patient impact can be ruled 
out as CQAs.  In the event there is insufficient evidence to support a claim that a given quality 
attribute will not affect the patient, the attributes will be considered a CQA to ensure it is 
adequately controlled. (103)  CQAs therefore make a link between the product and the patient, as 
shown in Figure 8-E. 
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Figure 8-E: Quality by Design linkages within the pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy 
Once the CQAs for the medicinal product have been identified, the manufacturing process can be 
similarly evaluated.  The process parameters that are critical to ensure CQAs are met are deemed 
Critical Process Parameters, or CPPs.  These are identified during process development, using 
experimental data (such as Design of Experiment or DoE) and risk-based impact assessments.  
Only those process parameters that exhibit a strong correlation with, or causal link with, CQAs are 
deemed critical.  As a result, CPPs link the process with the medicinal product in the 
pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy. 
The CPPs are, in turn, controlled by manufacturing systems, including facilities, utilities, and 
production equipment.  The elements of these systems that are critical to ensuring the CPPs are 
adequately controlled and monitored are deemed Critical Aspects, or CAs.  Finally, the CAs 
require various components functioning in specific, reliable ways in order to be adequately 
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controlled; these components are referred to as Critical Aspect Design Elements, or CADEs.52  The 
term “critical elements” is used throughout the remainder of this section to refer to CQAs, CPPs, 
CAs, and CADEs as a group. 
When viewed through the lens of QRM, the enabling chain of pharmaceutical manufacturing 
(shown in Figure 8-D) becomes a failure chain.  Because of the relationship between each critical 
element, the failure of an upstream element necessarily can cause downstream elements to fail, as 
illustrated in Figure 8-F.  For example, if an impeller fails (CADE), the mixer will fail (CA).  This 
will lead to the mix speed or time being less than the process requires (CPP), which in turn could 
affect the homogeneity of the applicable solution being mixed (CQA).   
 
Figure 8-F: Critical element failure chain in pharmaceutical manufacturing 
The totality of the linkages between various levels of the pharmaceutical manufacturing hierarchy 
and the associated controls for the critical element failure chain are captured in what ICH Q8(R2) 
                                                 
52 ICH Q8(R2) does not extend to a discussion of manufacturing systems or the associated CAs or CADEs.  The term 
“critical aspect” in this context originates from ASTM E2500, Standard Guide for Specification, Design, and 
Verification of Pharmaceutical and Biopharmaceutical Manufacturing Systems and Equipment. (50)  The term 
“critical aspect design element” was coined by the researcher for the purpose of continuing the pharmaceutical 
manufacturing lifecycle to its most basic element, the component level.  This term has been defined and published 
within the PDA Technical Report No. 54-5, which the researcher authored in part. (146) 
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calls a control strategy— “a planned set of controls, derived from current product and process 
understanding that ensure process performance and product quality.” (49)  Through 
implementation of the control strategy, a given stakeholder can focus on the level of the hierarchy 
that suits their job function (such as engineers for manufacturing systems, manufacturing personnel 
for manufacturing processes, and quality control personnel for product attributes), all the while 
ensuring that the patient needs are met.  The structure of the product-process-systems interface as 
described in ICH Q8(R2), therefore, enables the first principle of ICH Q9 (i.e. “…The evaluation 
of the risk to quality should be based on scientific knowledge and ultimately link to the protection 
of the patient;”) to be applied in a clear and accessible way. (45)  In a mature QRM program, the 
fundamental concept of the critical element failure chain and the applicable control strategy is 
derived from (or captured in53) each living risk assessment; this ensures that elements critical to 
product quality and patient safety are given a level of attention proportionate to their importance. 
8.3.2 Developing a living risk assessment to ensure patient protection 
The development of failure chains could, alone, serve as a robust living risk assessment to identify 
critical elements, calculate the risk, and develop controls.  However, in order to illustrate the 
application of the living risk assessment model through a traditional risk tool, the risk tool decision 
                                                 
53 The researcher acknowledges that the approach described in this section varies slightly depending on the product 
lifecycle phase in which it is applied.  For example, “legacy” products and processes in the commercial manufacturing 
stage of the product lifecycle may not have been created using a Quality by Design approach, and may have been 
characterized for criticality post hoc.  In these instances, the approach to risk assessment maturity will leverage pre-
defined critical elements.  Products and processes in the development phase, however, can use the same approach to 
identify critical elements.  This section and the examples that follow describe the application of this model for new 
products, but is equally applicable to legacy ones.  
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tree located in Appendix I was used and FMEA was selected as the best-fit risk tool.  A brief 
primer on FMEA is warranted, before more sophisticated concepts are introduced.54 
The risk identification step of an FMEA involves the identification of three components of risk: 
failure mode, failure cause, and failure effect.  A failure mode can be defined as the manner in 
which an item could fail to meet its requirements.  The consequence of a failure mode is termed a 
failure effect, while the reason for the failure mode is called a failure cause.  In FMEA, there is no 
direct relationship between failure cause and failure effect; the failure mode intervenes between 
the two, as illustrated in Figure 8-G.   
Failure Mode
Failure 
Effect(s)
Failure 
Cause(s)
Could result in
Due to
 
Figure 8-G: Relationship between failure mode, failure cause, and failure effect in FMEA 
Once risk identification is complete and all failure modes and related causes and effects are 
defined, risks are ranked for frequency (or likelihood, where insufficient data exists), severity, and 
                                                 
54 The researcher acknowledges that there are as many ways to perform and structure FMEA as there are sources that 
discuss it.  For example, IEC 60812 does not explore causal factors in its version of FMEA while Dyadem explores 
the frequency at which the cause, rather than effect or harm, occurs. (261) (262)  For a number of reasons not pertinent 
to risk maturity, the researcher prefers the approach defined by Dyadem and has chosen that form of FMEA for 
discussion in this section.  
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detectability, given existing controls (if any).  Failure modes are ranked for their detectability, 
failure causes for their frequency, and failure effects for their severity, as illustrated in Figure 8-H. 
Failure
CAUSE
Failure
MODE
Failure 
EFFECT
FREQUENCY
Rating Decision
DETECTABILITY
Rating Decision
SEVERITY
Rating Decision
How frequent would the 
failure cause be given the 
controls in place?
Would you be able to detect 
the failure mode given the 
controls in place?
If the failure effect occurs, 
how severe would this 
be?
 
Figure 8-H: Risk ranking in FMEA 
The individual frequency, detectability, and severity ratings are then multiplied together to 
determine the RPN, which is used to prioritize risk control or as basis for risk acceptance decisions, 
as discussed further in section 8.4. 
When performing a living risk assessment for a process, the failure modes will define the manner 
in which the process will fail; for example, a process parameter of mixing speed may stray outside 
its proven acceptable operating range, resulting in two failure modes: mix speed less than X and 
mix speed greater than Y.  Each of these failure modes will be traced to determine failure effects, 
such as lack of homogeneity, and failure causes, such as mixer failure.  This approach is called a 
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process FMEA, since the central perspective (failure mode) is related to the manufacturing 
process.  In the event the failure of given process parameter could impact a CQA, it is, by 
definition, a CPP.  Conversely, where a process parameter failure has no impact on a CQA, that 
process parameter is not critical.  Using the same logic, the system-level cause of a CPP failure is 
a CA, while system-level cases that affect non-critical process parameters are not CAs.  Figure 8-I 
illustrates how a process FMEA captures this segment of the failure chain. 
 
Figure 8-I: SmartRA process risk assessment using FMEA 
When used in this manner, the process FMEA will explore the severity of a CQA failure, the 
detectability of a CPP failure, and the frequency of a CA failure.  The controls in place, or 
established through risk reduction, become part of the process control strategy, aimed to ensure 
that the failure chain never manifests through a combination of preventive measures for CA failure 
and control and montoring of CPP performance, risk control strategies to be discussed further in 
section 8.4. 
The astute reader will have noticed that the process FMEA neglects one of the components of the 
failure chain—CADE failure.  This critical elements is explored through a system design FMEA.  
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The concept is the same as for the process FMEA, except that failure modes are set at the system, 
or CA, level.  This enables the exploration of the severity of CPP failure, the detectability of a CA 
failure, and the frequency of CADE failure, using the risk ranking relationships described in Figure 
8-H and as illustrated in Figure 8-J.  Only those components that, in the event they fail, will result 
in CA failure are considered CADEs; components that do not affect CAs are considered non-
critical., 
 
Figure 8-J: SmartRA system design risk assessment using FMEA 
Examples of completed process and system design FMEAs for saline solution preparation using 
these concepts are provided in Table 8-4 and Table 8-5.  The CQA of interest for this solution is 
concentration, which has a specification of 4.0 – 6.5 mg/mL.  The risk ranking and risk evaluation 
criteria are shown in Table 8-6 through Table 8-9.55 
                                                 
55 The researcher acknowledges the limitations of ordinal risk ranking scales, as well as the use of excessively 
subjective ranking criteria—these limitations are explored in depth in the researcher’s published article “Risk Analysis 
and Ordinal Risk Ranking Scales: A Closer Look” and are briefly discussed in section 8.4.4 of this thesis. (69)  Because 
this section is dedicated to a discussion of the living risk assessment approach, rather than the specifics of rating scales 
and risk calculations, the researcher has chosen to use qualitative ranking scales and risk evaluation criteria. 
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Table 8-4: Example process FMEA using the SmartRA approach 
Risk # Failure Mode Detectability Controls D Failure Cause Preventive Controls F Failure Effect S RPN 
1 
Mix time < 30 
minutes 
Start and end time for 
mixing documented in batch 
record 
2 
Timer failure None 2 
Concentration < 
4.0mg/mL 5 
20 
2 Mixer failure None 3 30 
3 Automation recipe is incorrect None 5 100 
4 
Mix time > 40 
minutes 
Start and end time for 
mixing documented in batch 
record 
2 
Timer failure None 2 Delay in 
downstream 
production 
2 
8 
5 Mixer failure None 3 12 
6 Automation recipe is incorrect None 5 20 
7 Mix speed < 40 
rpm None 5 
Mixer failure None 3 Concentration < 
4.0mg/mL 5 
45 
8 Automation recipe is incorrect None 5 125 
9 Mix speed > 100 
rpm None 5 
Mixer failure None 3 Equipment 
damage 3 
45 
10 Automation recipe is incorrect None 5 75 
11 Water added > 
1.2L 
Water is weighed on floor 
scale with display 2 
Operator error None 3 Concentration < 
4.0mg/mL 5 
30 
12 Floor scale failure None 2 20 
13 Water added < 
0.8L 
Water is weighed on floor 
scale with display 2 
Operator error None 3 Concentration > 
6.5mg/mL 5 
20 
14 Floor scale failure None 2 20 
15 
NaCl added < 4.8g NaCl is weighed on bench scale with printout  3 
Operator error None 3 Concentration < 
4.0mg/mL 5 
45 
16 Bench scale failure None 2 30 
17 
NaCl added > 5.2g NaCl is weighed on bench scale with printout  3 
Operator error None 3 Concentration > 
6.5mg/mL 5 
45 
18 Bench scale failure None 2 30 
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Table 8-5: Example system design FMEA using the SmartRA approach 
Risk # Failure Mode Detectability Controls D Failure Cause 
Preventive 
Controls F Failure Effect S RPN 
1 
Timer failure None 2 
Power outage None 2 Mix time < 30 
min 5 
20 
2 Insufficient/inappropriate electrical 
connection None 5 50 
3 
Mixer failure None 2 
Power outage None 2 Mix time < 30 
min 
5 
20 
4 20 
5 Impeller damaged None 4 40 6  40 
7 Impeller incorrectly oriented (not 
centered properly) 
None 3 Mix speed < 40 rpm 
 30 
8 5 30 
9 Automation recipe 
incorrect None 5 Improper coding 
None 
5 
Mix time < 30 
min 5 125 
Mix speed < 40 
rpm 5 10 125 
11 
Floor scale failure None 5 
Power outage None 2 Water added > 
1.2L 5 
40 
12 40 
13 Sensor failure None 3 60 14 60 
15 Weigh pan not level None 2 Water added < 0.8L 5 
40 
16 40 
17 
Bench scale 
failure None 5 
Power outage None 2 NaCl added < 
4.8g 5 
50 
18 50 
19 Sensor failure None 3 75 20 75 
21 Weigh pan not level None 2 NaCl added > 5.2g 5 
50 
22 50 
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Table 8-6: Example severity ranking criteria for SmartRA 
Rating 
(value) Description 
Criteria 
Process FMEA System Design FMEA 
1 Insignificant / Minor Impact 
Minor disruption 
No loss of product 
No impact on product quality or patient safety 
No impact on the performance of the product/system. 
The usability of the product/system is not affected. 
2 
Moderately 
Significant / 
Medium Impact 
Minor disruption 
Deviation with no loss of product 
No impact on product quality or patient safety 
The performance of the product/system is reduced. 
The usability of the product/system is slightly 
affected. 
3 Significant / High Impact 
Minor disruption 
Portion of batch/lot must be scrapped 
Minor impact on product quality.  No impact 
on patient safety. 
The performance of the product/system is greatly 
reduced. 
The usability of the product/system is greatly 
affected. 
4 
Extremely 
Significant / 
Very High 
Impact 
Major disruption 
Loss of 100% of batch/lot. 
Moderate impact on product quality.  No 
impact on patient safety. 
The performance of the product/system is reduced to 
the point of diminished efficacy/ability to meet 
intended use or product/system life expectancy. 
The usability of the product/system is significantly 
impaired. 
5 Catastrophic / Critical Impact 
Failure of a critical quality attribute (CQA). 
Hazardous situation that may endanger patient 
or result in loss of data integrity. 
Failure of a critical process parameter (CPP). 
Immediate or sudden loss of product/system function 
resulting in serious injury or death. 
The product/system cannot be used without 
successful completion of mitigation activities. 
Loss of data integrity 
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Table 8-7: Example frequency ranking criteria for SmartRA 
Rating (value) Description Qualitative 
1 Remote Failure unlikely 
2 Low Relatively few failures 
3 Moderate Occasional failures 
4 High Repeated failures 
5 Extreme Failure almost inevitable or unknown 
 
Table 8-8: Example detectability ranking criteria for SmartRA 
Rating (value) Description Criteria 
1 Very high Will be detected in (nearly) every instance before it causes harm. 
2 High High likelihood of detection before it causes harm. 
3 Moderate Moderate likelihood of detection before it causes harm. 
4 Low Remote likelihood of detection before it causes harm. 
5 Remote Cannot / will not be detected until after the product has been used, or detectability is unknown. 
 
Table 8-9: Example risk evaluation criteria for SmartRA 
RPN Risk Level Risk Acceptability / Required Action 
≤ 20 Low Risk is acceptable.  No further action required. 
21 - 40 Medium The risk must be evaluated and dispositioned as acceptable or not acceptable with appropriate rationale.  Risks deemed not acceptable must be subject to risk reduction or mitigation. 
≥ 41, and/or frequency 
or detectability = 5 High 
Risk is not acceptable.  Mitigation required.  If continued use of the system or process will 
occur, interim controls must be identified to protect the patient while risk reduction is pursued. 
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8.3.3 Extracting knowledge from the living risk assessment 
The SmartRA approach to risk assessment ensures a clear line of sight to the patient, regardless of 
the level of detail and associated distance from the patient that may result from performing risk 
assessments on processes and systems.  The model also maximizes the amount of knowledge that 
can be gained, without the need to perform individual risk assessments, ensuring a holistic control 
strategy can be developed based on the learnings from the effort.  This sub-section illustrates the 
knowledge that may be gained through review and interpretation of the SmartRA approach. 
Identification of CPPs, CAs, and CADEs using SmartRA 
As discussed above in the context of failure chains, the relationship between process parameters, 
manufacturing and support systems, system components and quality attributes can reveal the 
criticality of each and pinpoint those failures that render the patient vulnerable.  ICH Q8(R2) 
defines CPPs as “a process parameter whose variability has an impact on a critical quality 
attribute;” therefore, any process parameter that, when operating outside of ranges established with 
a consideration to acceptable variability, could result in a CQA failure is, by definition, a CPP. 
(49)  The relationship between process parameters and CQAs are explored through the example 
process FMEA developed using the SmartRA approach (Table 8-4).  The process parameters that 
are identified as CPPs in the example include: 
• Mix time (> 30 minutes) 
• Mix speed (> 40 rpm) 
• Water addition (0.8 – 1.2 L) 
• Sodium chloride addition (4.8 – 5.2 g) 
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These parameters are those that, when operating outside of the specified range, could impact the 
CQA (concentration 4.0 – 6.5 mg/mL)—providing a direct link to the patient.  On the other hand, 
the process parameters of “mix time > 40 minutes)” and “mix speed >100rpm” are not considered 
CPPs, as they do not impact CQAs. 
Using the CPPs, one can then identify CAs, as follows: 
• Timer 
• Mixer 
• Automation recipe 
• Floor scale 
• Bench scale 
These CAs are those systems that, should they operate outside of acceptable limits, would result 
in CPP failure, and are “…necessary for the manufacturing process and systems to ensure 
consistent product quality and patient safety.” (50)   
Using the SmartRA approach, the CPPs and CAs carry from the process FMEA to the system 
design FMEA shown in Table 8-5, which allows for the identification of CADEs, including: 
• Power supply 
• Electrical connections 
• Integrity of the impeller 
• Positioning of the impeller 
• Coding of the automation recipe 
• Floor scale sensor 
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• Bench scale sensor 
• Weigh pan positioning (both floor and bench scales) 
Because only critical aspects (rather than non-critical systems and functions) are explored in the 
system design FMEA, all component-level failure causes are deemed critical aspect design 
elements. 
Using the SmartRA approach, the critical elements of the manufacturing process and associated 
systems can be identified.  It is important to note that the risk ranking is not considered in the 
identification of these critical elements—only the causal relationships, as captured by the failure 
chain or failure mode/failure cause/failure effect relationships, are relevant to meet this objective.   
Informing the control strategy with SmartRA 
ICH Q8(R2) defines the control strategy as the set of controls necessary to ensure product quality 
and patient safety; reframed in the context of QRM, these controls are synonymous with risk 
controls—those controls that prevent or detect failure before the patient is impacted. (49) (45)  
Therefore, the control strategy can be developed directly from the learnings of the SmartRA 
approach, mapping to the identified CPPs, CAs, and CADEs. 
One can use the SmartRA approach in a process FMEA to define CPP monitoring based on the 
detection score, as is the case in FMEA because failure modes are linked to detectability.  The 
prevention of CA failure, through a review of the frequency score of the failure causes, can also 
be gleaned.  In cases where the detectability and frequency scores are low, the prevention and 
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detection controls listed are adequate to include in the control strategy.  However, in cases where 
the detectability of a CPP or frequency of a CA failure are high, the existing controls are inadequate 
and risk reduction, in the form of additional or more reliable monitoring and prevention is 
necessary.  Once the mitigation activities have been defined, these additional controls will be 
added to the control strategy for the associated CPPs and CAs, thereby enhancing the management 
of risk to the patient. 
For example, using the process FMEA from Table 8-4, all identified CPPs and CAs should be 
actively controlled.  The control strategy should include the following in the monitoring plan for 
CPPs: 
• Documentation and verification of start and end mixing times 
• Documentation verification of water and sodium chloride additions 
In addition, a monitoring plan for the mix speed should be established, because of the lack of 
existing detection controls and the associated high detectability ranking.  To optimize the process 
further, more reliable detection controls (such as automated recording of mix time, mix speed, and 
material additions combined with alarms or equipment-stops in the event the limits are exceeded) 
may be established to further reduce the risk. 
Assurance that the CPPs remain within acceptable limits are provided through the CAs of the 
related manufacturing systems, and the associated preventive controls.  In the example process 
FMEA, this includes the use of timers, mixers, automation, and weighing devices to ensure the 
CPPs are met, as well as controls to ensure those systems remain in control.  Based on the 
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preventive controls listed (none, in the example) and the related frequency rankings, controls 
preventing mixer failure, assuring the accuracy of the automation recipe, and preventing scale 
failure should be explored.  The means to accomplish this are discussed in the context of validation, 
maintenance, and calibration strategy development later in this sub-section. 
A similar analysis of the system design FMEA example in Table 8-5 reveals additional information 
to be included in the control strategy.  CA failures, which were evaluated for frequency in the 
process FMEA, are now evaluated for detectability, enabling the monitoring plan to be extended 
to the system level.  Additional preventive controls can be established using the frequency of 
CADE failure, and the existing risk controls.  Additional benefits materialize as the QRM process 
continues— the adequacy of the control strategy is assessed when the residual risk is calculated 
and evaluated, and the ongoing effectiveness of the control strategy is explored during risk review 
(both concepts that are explored later in this chapter).  In this way, the control strategy—inclusive 
of preventive and detective controls, associated limits, and ongoing effectiveness—can be derived 
directly from the SmartRA approach within the larger QRM framework. 
Developing a validation strategy using SmartRA 
FDA’s 2011 Process Validation guidance defines process validation as “the collection and 
evaluation of data, from the process design stage through commercial production, which 
establishes scientific evidence that a process is capable of consistently delivering quality product.” 
(149)  The process validation provides assurance of process capability, repeatability, and 
performance, which requires proof of the same for the manufacturing systems and instrumentation 
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that run the process through an equipment qualification.56  The equipment qualification consists 
of four sub-types: design qualification (or DQ) which ensures the system design meets the 
specifications, installation qualification (or IQ) which ensures that the system has been installed 
properly, operational qualification (or OQ) which ensures that the system operates as intended, 
and performance qualification (or PQ) which ensures the system can operate reproducibly within 
the specific parameters necessary for product manufacturing. (150)  It follows that the validation 
strategy should focus on those critical elements identified through the SmartRA—the CPPs, CAs, 
and related preventive and detection controls that ensure these critical elements are functioning 
properly. 
Using the process FMEA example shown in Table 8-4, the following pieces of equipment should 
be qualified: 
• Timer 
• Mixer 
• Automated recipe 
• Floor scale 
• Bench scale 
                                                 
56 The 2011 Process Validation guidance from the FDA includes equipment qualification as a step in the overarching 
process validation—a step known as Phase 2a. (148)  In the EU, validation and qualification remain separate concepts, 
as described in Annex 15. (263)  With regard to the assurance of product quality and patient safety, this distinction is 
without a difference.  The researcher has chosen to employ the terms “process validation” and “equipment 
qualification” (rather than “Phase 2a”) in this thesis, as these terms are more commonly used throughout the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries than those used in the US FDA guidance.  
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These equipment, of course, are the same systems that were previously identified as CAs.  Using 
additional information from the system design FMEA example in Table 8-5, a more complete 
qualification strategy can be developed, as shown in Table 8-10. 
Table 8-10: Example qualification strategy derived from SmartRA approach 
System Element to test Qualification type 
Timer Electrical connections IQ/OQ 
Mixer Impeller damage IQ/OQ Impeller positioning IQ/PQ 
Automation recipe 
Coding IQ/PQ 
Security measures to prevent authorized 
changes to code IQ/PQ 
Floor and bench scales 
Sensor IQ 
Weigh pan positioning IQ 
Print function for bench scale IQ/OQ/PQ 
Validation of the process would focus on ensuring that the manufacturing systems adequately 
support the process, and that the process yields product of the appropriate quality.  In this way, 
qualification and validation reduce uncertainty associated with the process and manufacturing 
system performance by providing data that precisely reflects upon the risks identified through the 
SmartRA approach.  Following qualification and validation, the risk ranking may need to be 
adjusted to better reflect the additional knowledge gained.  Requalification and revalidation, 
performed at defined intervals or based on planned changes and reviews, provides further 
assurance over the course of the product lifecycle and can be coupled with risk review to maximize 
the use of data trends and analysis. 
Developing a maintenance and calibration strategy using SmartRA 
Finally, the knowledge gained from the SmartRA approach can be used to develop (and 
subsequently adjust) maintenance and calibration activities for CAs and CADEs.  This is easily 
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demonstrated using the system design FMEA example from Table 8-5.  The identified CADEs 
each have an associated frequency of failure, since the CADEs serve as failure causes within a 
system design FMEA.  Maintenance (ideally preventive, rather than corrective, in nature) should 
be performed on all CAs and CADEs.  During maintenance, the system should first be inspected 
for overt damage and wear and tear, allowing for a window of opportunity to detect failure of the 
system as whole.  Specific inspections, based on the CADEs identified and their vulnerability to 
failure, may also be included.  The inspection is followed by maintenance activities, which are 
defined based on the system design FMEA.  Table 8-11 suggests a list of maintenance activities 
that should occur for each system (CA) listed. 
Table 8-11: Example maintenance strategy using SmartRA 
System Component Maintenance activity 
Timer Electric wiring 
Inspect wiring for damage. Replace as needed (not to 
exceed 10 years, based on metallurgical properties of 
the wiring).  Follow with calibration. 
Mixer Impeller 
Inspect impeller for damage.  Ensure all surfaces are 
smooth with no gashes, warping, or metal damage (such 
as rust).  Replace when the impeller integrity is 
compromised (not to exceed 15 years based on material 
of construction lifespan). 
Test impeller to ensure it is properly positioned within 
vessel.  The shaft of the impeller should be positioned 
perpendicular with respect to the vessel floor and 
parallel with the vessel walls.   Follow with calibration. 
Automation 
recipe Coding 
Review audit trail associated with the code to ensure it 
has not changed.  Take appropriate action based on 
findings. 
Floor and 
bench scales 
Weigh pan 
positioning 
Clean under the weigh pan to remove any particulate 
that may alter the positioning of the weigh pan on the 
sensors.  Inspect weigh pan to ensure the metal is not 
warped and the surface remains level.  Follow with 
calibration. 
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The frequency at which system maintenance and instrument calibration should occur can also be 
derived from the SmartRA approach.  While the initial maintenance and calibration intervals for 
new systems or instruments may be established based on supplier recommendations combined 
with the firm’s historical of similar systems, any increases in failure rates (manifesting as increases 
in frequency ranking) identified during risk review should trigger a review and potential increase 
of the frequency at which maintenance and calibration is performed, or the system replaced. 
 
The SmartRA approach offered as an example of maturity of risk assessment may appear to be 
quite an obvious model for pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies.  Indeed, it is.  
Despite its elegant simplicity, the researcher has not identified companies making use of this or 
similar approaches during the Phase 2 or 3 research.  Quite the contrary—philosophical dialogues 
and literature reviews revealed that many firms spend time and energy performing process and 
system design FMEA and fail to evaluate critical elements at all.  The researcher infers that risk 
assessments of non-critical things likewise fail to add value, either to the organization or the 
patient.  The SmartRA approach offers a direct connection to the patient by using critical elements 
as the foundation for risk assessment (and therefore subsequent risk control, risk review, and risk 
communication).  It also provides an operational benefit—streamlining the QRM process and 
minimizing “noise” that may result from excessive numbers of risk assessments can ensure that 
QRM is simplified, but not simplistic.  It allows the organization to focus on managing risk to the 
patient, rather than “doing QRM.”  It is therefore set as the benchmark of maturity with regard to 
risk assessment. 
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8.4 Maturity with regard to risk control 
As discussed in Chapter Six with respect to ISO 14971, risk control is perhaps the most important 
aspect of the risk management lifecycle.  It is when companies must act to improve (or maintain) 
product quality and reduce risk to the patient, and is therefore deserving of a proportionate level 
of analysis, resource commitment, and intellectual energy within a QRM program.  Yet many 
companies do not treat risk control with the appropriate attention, choosing instead to implement 
questionably effective controls such as procedural revisions and re-training of operators or analysts 
instead of striving for more effective and permanent solutions. (128)  Maturity with regard to risk 
control would assure careful consideration, vetting, and implementation of measures to reduce 
risk. 
8.4.1 Fundamentals of risk control 
Vesper distinguishes between two fundamental types of risk control (also described as 
“mitigation”): preventive and protective.  Preventive mitigation aims to prevent the risk from 
occurring. These types of mitigation activities are typically designed to eliminate the risk 
completely or to reduce the likelihood of a given risk.  Protective mitigation seeks to protect the 
product or patient in the event the risk occurs, through either increasing the detectability of a failure 
that has already occurred, or breaking the causal chain between hazard and harm. (61)  Preventive 
mitigation is typically preferred over protective mitigation, as it targets underlying quality issues 
within the process or system being assessed and can increase reliability accordingly. 
For example, in the FMEA shown in Table 8-12, a preventive mitigation might be one that reduces 
the frequency score (e.g., increasing the frequency of gasket replacement or changing the gasket 
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material to one that generates fewer particles). A protective mitigation would reduce the 
detectability score (e.g., improve visual inspection for particulates) or break the causal chain 
between the failure mode and failure effect (e.g., implementing a downstream filtration step that 
would remove particles from the product prior to patient exposure).  In this example, the preventive 
mitigations are a better choice than the protective, although a combination may be used to better 
manage the risk to patient. 
Table 8-12: Example FMEA to illustrate preventive and protective mitigation activities 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure 
Cause 
Frequency Failure 
Effect 
Severity RPN 
Particulates 
present in product 
3 Degradation 
of gasket 
4 Adverse 
event in 
patient 
5 60 
 
As discussed in Chapter Six, ISO 14971 describes several general risk mitigation techniques, 
listing them in priority order according to effectiveness.  This list, as interpreted by the researcher 
for the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, includes: 
• Design/process changes - This type of mitigation involves the alteration of the product, 
equipment, or process design to redefine the overall risk profile (e.g., through the 
addition of fail safes, process simplification, automation). Design changes are typically 
the most effective type of mitigation that can reduce or eliminate risk; however, 
substantial cost and resources are often involved and the design changes may introduce 
new risks to the overall process.  
• Safeguarding -  This type of mitigation focuses on shielding the hazard to contain its 
impact, installing redundant backups, implementing in-process or release testing to 
confirm quality prior to further processing, or implementing alarms/warning that allow 
for immediate intervention. Safeguarding tends to be less effective than design changes at 
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reducing risk, although when used judiciously to impact specific risks can successfully 
reduce risk to the patient. 
• Descriptive safety means - This type of mitigation focuses on providing written and 
verbal instruction regarding the presence of certain risks and offers methods to avoid or 
otherwise control them when they occur. Examples include instruction within an SOP, 
production record, or literature accompanying the product, and the associated training. 
Due to the reliance on human intervention, this mitigation technique tends to be less 
robust than design changes or safeguarding, however, due to the relative ease of 
implementation, this technique is often the most widely used in pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries. 
The risk control options available to reduce a given risk will, of course, vary, depending on the 
nature of the risk. 
8.4.2 Selecting risk controls 
One approach to the selection of risk controls entails an evaluation of each option as to the impact 
it would have on risk reduction.  The tool below can be used to illustrate the strengths and 
limitations of each risk control option to better communicate the rationale for selection of a given 
risk control strategy.   The scoring model has been developed to apply a weighting to the effect of 
each risk control option, in that more effective results (such as elimination of one or more risks) 
carries more weight than do less effective results (such as improving the detectability of one or 
more risks).  The scoring method is optional; while scoring adds a layer of complexity to the risk 
control option analysis, it allows for a more objective relative ranking of each option which may 
be desired in certain circumstances.  It is important to note that the mathematical result from the 
scoring model shown below has no meaning in itself; it exists merely to demonstrate the relative 
benefit of each risk control option in the context of QRM.  In the event a qualitative (rather than 
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semi-quantitative) method is desired, a simple check box approach may be used.  In example 
provided in Table 8-13, risk control option #2 provides the greatest benefit in terms of risk 
reduction and would be the best option of those listed. 
Table 8-13: Example approach to risk control option analysis 
Consideration Scoring Risk Control 
Option #1 
Risk Control 
Option #2 
Risk Control 
Option #3 
Eliminates the risk + (4 x [number of risks eliminated]) 
+ (4 x 3) =  
+ 12 N/A N/A 
Alters the harm 
(reduces severity) 
+ (3 x [number of risks 
with reduced severity]) N/A N/A N/A 
Prevents, but does 
not eliminate, the risk 
from occurring 
+ (2 x [number of risks 
with reduced 
likelihood]) 
N/A + (2 x 8) =  + 16 N/A 
Increases the 
detectability of the 
risk before it causes 
harm 
+(1 x [number of risks 
with improved 
detectability) 
N/A N/A + (1 x 10) = + 10 
Introduces new 
risk(s) 
- [4 x [number of new 
risks introduced] 
- (4 x 2) =  
- 8 N/A 
- (4 x 1) =  
- 4 
Increases severity of 
one or more risks 
- (3 x [number of risks 
with increased severity]) N/A N/A N/A 
Increases likelihood 
of one or more risks 
- (2 x [number of risks 
with increased severity]) N/A N/A N/A 
Reduces detectability 
of one or more risks 
- (1 x [number of risks 
with increased severity]) N/A N/A N/A 
 Total 4 16 6 
 
While the risk control option analysis model enables QRM practitioners to critically evaluate 
mitigation activities and select amongst them, there is core vulnerability associated with the 
method—that a single risk control option should be selected.  The review of defense in depth 
principles in Chapter Six revealed that layered controls, or combinations of controls, often offer 
more complete and reliable risk control than does a single option.  Where resources and technical 
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feasibility permit, combinations of risk controls should be explored in order to more fully manage 
risk to the patient.   
8.4.3 Additional points to consider in the development of a risk control strategy 
Anticipated effectiveness of each mitigation activity (or combination of mitigations) is only one 
consideration in the selection of risk controls.  Improvements in risk maturity require the mitigation 
of individual risks to be considered as component parts of an overarching risk control strategy, 
comprised of: 
• “GMP” controls, such as those required to achieve compliance with international and 
local law (90) 
• Existing controls that were taken into consideration during the risk assessments, such as 
those incorporated in the quality system and existing process and equipment design 
• Newly identified mitigation activities as determined through the risk assessment 
In a mature QRM program, optimized risk control strategies will be developed in consideration of 
several points, including which activities should be prioritized for implementation, what aspect of 
the risk should be targeted for control, the anticipated completeness of risk control, the anticipation 
of any new or changed risks that might be introduced through implementation of the risk controls, 
the need for interim controls, and the availability of resources. 
Prioritizing risk control 
For risks identified through a qualitative risk-ranking scale (e.g., high, medium, low; as in Hazard 
Analysis and Critical Control Points and Risk-Based Impact Assessment), mitigation of high risks 
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should take priority over mitigation of medium risks, which are further prioritized over mitigation 
of low risks.  For example, in the HACCP shown in Table 8-14, mitigation of Risk #2 should take 
priority over Risk #1. 
Table 8-14: Example HACCP to illustrate the prioritization of risk control 
Risk # Hazard Likelihood Severity Risk Ranking 
1 Introduction of microbial contamination Remote Critical Medium 
2 Introduction of particulate contamination Average Critical High 
 
For risks identified through a semi-quantitative ranking scale (e.g., Risk Priority Number or RPN; 
as in Failure Modes and Effects Analysis) mitigation priority is from the highest RPN to the lowest 
RPN.  For example, the FMEA shown in Table 8-15, the priority for mitigation, from highest to 
lowest, is Risk #1, Risk #2, then Risk #3. 
Table 8-15: Example FMEA to illustrate the prioritization of risk control 
Risk 
# 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure 
Cause 
Frequency Failure 
Effect 
Severity RPN 
1 Introduction of microbial 
contamination 
2 
HEPA 
failure 4 
Loss of 
100% of 
batch 
4 
32 
2 
Poor 
aseptic 
technique 
3 24 
3 
Breach of 
closed 
system 
2 16 
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Determining the target of risk control 
Where there are opportunities to implement design changes to the system or process that was 
evaluated through the risk assessment, risk control should seek to eliminate the hazard/risk 
altogether.  In the FMEA shown in Table 8-16, for example, the mitigation effort should focus on 
eliminating the use of animal-derived raw materials, thereby eliminating the source of the risk. 
Table 8-16: Example FMEA to illustrate elimination of the risk 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure Cause Frequency Failure Effect Severity RPN 
Transmissible 
Spongiform 
Encephalopathy 
(TSE) present 
in finished 
product  
5 
Use of animal-
derived raw 
material 
(serum) 
5 
Severe 
adverse event 
or death 
(unsafe 
product) 
5 125 
 
In the event the risk cannot be completely eliminated, risk controls should be tailored to directly 
impact the element of risk that is driving the unacceptable ranking (e.g., frequency or detectability).  
For example, risk controls for the example FMEA in Table 8-17 should focus on increasing the 
detectability of the failure mode (reducing the detectability ranking; making the pH level more 
detectable), while risk control for the HACCP in Table 8-18 should focus on reducing the 
likelihood that the hazard will occur (preventing metal particulates from being introduced into the 
solution). 
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Table 8-17: Example FMEA to illustrate the target of risk control 
Failure 
Mode 
Detectability Failure Cause Frequency Failure 
Effect 
Severity RPN 
pH too low 
 
5 Too much 
HCl added 
1 Cell death 4 20 
 
Table 8-18: Example HACCP to illustrate the target of risk control 
Hazard Likelihood Severity Risk Ranking 
Introduction of metallic particulates in 
solution to be sterile filtered 
Frequent Minor High 
 
Anticipating the completeness of risk control 
When planning mitigation activities for a given risk, QRM practitioners should consider whether 
the proposed activity will be sufficient to reduce the risk to an acceptable level (i.e. whether the 
anticipated residual risk will fall within acceptable limits defined by the firm’s risk tolerance). If 
the proposed activity will be insufficient to reduce the risk to an acceptable level, alternative or 
additional risk control should be proposed and implemented in parallel.  For example, in the FMEA 
shown in Table 8-19, a mitigation activity of "implement a Preventive Maintenance (PM) program 
or HEPA filters" may have been proposed by the team. This control is expected to reduce the 
frequency score to a 2 (once PM is implemented, the HEPAs will fail less often). However, the 
RPN will remain at an unacceptable level (in this example, 32), due to low detectability.  Therefore, 
the anticipated residual risk is not acceptable and additional mitigation activities (such as air-borne 
particulate monitoring) should be explored. 
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Table 8-19: Example HACCP to illustrate completeness of risk control 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure 
Cause 
Frequency Failure Effect Severity RPN 
Unacceptable 
levels of air-
borne 
particulates 
present 
4 HEPA filter failure 4 
Contamination of 
product with 
viable or non-
viable 
particulates 
4 64 
 
Anticipating the introduction of new risks 
As the risk control strategy is being planned, the QRM practitioner should consider whether the 
proposed activity will introduce any new risks into the system or process, and take to minimize 
these new risks.  Prior to the acceptance of residual risk, these new risks must be further analyzed 
in the risk assessment and will be subject to risk control, based on the associated risk level.  In the 
example FMEA in Table 8-20, a mitigation activity of "eliminate the use of serum in the cell 
culture process" has been proposed by the team. While this mitigation successfully eliminates the 
hazard of concern, there may be additional risks that arise when serum is no longer used (such as 
slow or no cell growth due to the absence of necessary growth factors). The additional risks should 
be explored and further mitigation (replacement of missing growth factors) implemented. 
Table 8-20: Example FMEA to illustrate the introduction and prospective mitigation of new risks 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure 
Cause 
Frequency Failure Effect Severity RPN 
Transmissible 
Spongiform 
Encephalopathy 
(TSE) present in 
finished product  
5 
Use of 
animal-
derived raw 
material 
(serum) 
5 
Severe 
adverse event 
or death 
(unsafe 
product) 
5 125 
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Anticipating an impact to other risks 
In addition, proposed risk controls may affect the risk level or state of control for other identified 
risks. Care should be taken to minimize a negative peripheral impact of a mitigation activity. The 
impact to any other risks must be further analyzed in the risk assessment and may necessitate the 
need for re-ranking of affected risks.  In the HACCP shown in Table 8-21, for example, a 
mitigation activity of "sanitize work surface with a sporicidal solution prior to each use" may have 
been proposed by the team to reduce the likelihood of microbial contamination of the lab bench. 
However, if the particular sporicidal solution is corrosive, it might increase the likelihood of 
surface pitting of the lab bench. If this is the case, an alternative risk control should be explored, 
or if there are no other viable alternatives, the likelihood rating of rouging should be increased to 
reflect the actual level of risk. 
Table 8-21: Example HACCP to illustrate changes to other risks introduced through risk control 
Hazard Likelihood Severity Risk Ranking 
Microbial contamination of lab bench work surface Frequent Serious High 
Rouging / pitting of stainless steel lab bench work 
surface 
Unlikely Minor Low 
 
Evaluating the need for interim controls 
In certain instances, the length of time necessary to implement sufficient risk control warrants the 
design or definition of interim controls.  This is due to the continued exposure of the product, 
process, system, and patient to the risk until mitigation activities are in place and proven effective; 
the implementation and evaluation of interim controls may be necessary to contain the problem 
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and adequately manage the risk to the patient until full control has been achieved.  For example, 
in the FMEA shown in Table 8-22, the team proposed design changes (machining of the filling 
needles to reduce the diameter) to mitigate the associated risk.  These design changes are expected 
to span a significant period prior to full implementation.  While the supporting data is being 
gathered, the unacceptable risk continues to be a concern, and interim controls (such as increased 
inspection for metal particles or glass damage prior to product release) should be employed to 
reduce the vulnerability until the long-term risk control can be fully vetted, validated, and 
deployed. 
Table 8-22: Example FMEA to illustrate the need for interim controls 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure 
Cause 
Frequency Failure Effect Severity RPN 
Filling needle 
may contact inner 
rim of vials 
during filling 4 
Filling 
needle 
diameter 
too large 4 
Metallic 
particulates 
present in 
finished product 
5 80 
Glass damage to 
vial 5 80 
 
Resourcing 
The amount of available resources should be considered during the development of a risk control 
strategy; after all, a firm with infinite resources would have little need to prioritize risks and 
associated controls. (127)  Resources often include money, time, and expertise—each of which is 
limited to some extent in a business environment.  While the prioritization of risks for reduction, 
described earlier in this section, provides a mechanism to allocate resources in risk control, 
companies mature in QRM implementation will also consider whether the level of effort and 
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amount of resources to be expended are proportional to the level of risk.  In the FMEA shown in 
Table 8-23, for example, the team proposed that the process be automated, which could eliminate 
the failure mode altogether. However, automating the process would require large amounts of 
resources that might be better spent reducing other risks more relevant to the patient.  The team 
should explore the benefits of automation in reducing the risk, the total associated resource 
expenditure, and alternate risk reduction options to assist with decisions on risk mitigation. 
Table 8-23: Example FMEA to illustrate the consideration of available resources for risk control 
Failure Mode Detectability Failure 
Cause 
Frequency Failure 
Effect 
Severity RPN 
Failure to follow SOP 3 
Operator 
error 3 
Loss of 
100% 
of 
batch 
4 
36 
Procedure 
unclear 2 24 
 
A risk control strategy indicative of a high level of risk maturity takes into account the 
effectiveness of proposed controls and the completeness of control and the need for combinations 
of controls, as well as other factors.  The application of controls is prioritized based on the level 
of risk, and tailored to directly impact the element of risk that is driving an unacceptable 
classification.  Any new or changed risks that may be introduced through the implementation of 
risk controls are actively anticipated and prospectively mitigated.  In this way, the patient is best 
protected. 
8.4.4 Accepting the residual risk 
Residual risk acceptance is not a topic that has merited much discussion in industry or regulatory 
circles.  ICH Q9 offers minimal guidance on this step, simply stating: 
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“Risk acceptance can be a formal decision to accept the residual risk or it can be a passive 
decision in which residual risks are not specified. For some types of harms, even the best 
quality risk management practices might not entirely eliminate risk. In these circumstances, 
it might be agreed that an appropriate quality risk management strategy has been applied 
and that quality risk is reduced to a specified (acceptable) level. This (specified) acceptable 
level will depend on many parameters and should be decided on a case-by-case basis.” (45) 
Curiously, of those responsibilities of decision makers listed in ICH Q9, risk acceptance is not 
included.  Not surprisingly, the dearth of information on risk acceptance in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries has led to some practices that indicate a lack of understanding of 
QRM principles and the need for patient protection.  Lorianne Richter, Senior Consultant with 
ValSource, notes that signs of a mature QRM program include “…understanding risk reduction 
versus risk acceptance, documenting risks that have been accepted, and really understanding risk 
tolerance.” (129) 
Philosophical dialogues from the Phase 2 and 3 research revealed that a typical company (having 
a low-to-moderate level of risk maturity as discussed in Chapter Five), accepts residual risk 
through a comparison between the risk level and risk acceptance tables or action levels. (128)  
Where the risk level exceeds a defined threshold, the risk is considered unacceptable and additional 
risk reduction must be pursued.  Risks below that threshold are considered acceptable with no 
further inquiry. (130)  This practice does not evaluate residual risks case-by-case, as suggested by 
ICH Q9, nor does it distinguish between risks with a potential impact to the patient and those that 
do not.  In addition, this practice does not assign responsibility and accountability for risk 
acceptance to any individual party—policies and procedures do not accept risk; people do.  It is 
 260 
 
the opinion of this researcher that decision makers, rather than documents or lower-level personnel, 
should be held responsible for risk acceptance. 
Industries mature in risk management offer some insight into mature practices for the evaluation 
and acceptance of residual risk, as reviewed in Chapter Six.  The first learning that can improve 
risk maturity and the management of risks to the patient is including both an evaluation of 
individual residual risks and the overall residual risk posed by the product, process, or system.  
The overall residual risk should be evaluated in light of the medical benefits offered to the patient, 
as discussed in ISO 14971 and the external (patient) context, as discussed in ISO 31000.  For 
example, if there are numerous identified risks that could jeopardize product quality or patient 
safety, the decision maker should determine whether, on balance, the patient would be better 
served through exposure to those risks given the benefits they would expect to receive through the 
medicinal product, or whether the risks outweigh those benefits.   
In some cases, the scope of the risks subject to acceptance may not be of the nature that the patient 
is affected; for example, those that may manifest as product loss or production delays.  However, 
in certain circumstances, such in instances of drug shortage or where product time directly relates 
to product efficacy (as is the case with radiological therapies), those same consequences may 
extend to the patient.  Decision makers should therefore evaluate the external context with respect 
to the patient when making risk acceptance decisions. 
Individual residual risks are also subject to acceptance, in a slightly different context.  Mature 
QRM programs can employ the “acceptance threshold” approach described earlier in this section, 
provided the thresholds were developed in an appropriate way.  Risk acceptance thresholds should 
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directly reflect the firm’s risk tolerance for the particular product, patient population, and external 
context.  The acceptance thresholds should be carefully compared with the specific risk rating 
criteria and algorithm inherent in all risk tools to ensure that the derivation of the risk level (i.e. 
the specific combinations of likelihood, severity, and where used, detectability) are appropriate 
given the threshold.  This is particularly challenging for risk tools that apply arithmetic to ordinal 
ranking scales, such as FMEA.57 
For example, an RPN of 20 in an FMEA that employed 1-5 rating scales for frequency, 
detectability, and severity can be the result of eight possible combinations, as shown in Table 
8-2458: 
Table 8-24: FMEA risk rating combinations with identical RPNs 
Scenario Frequency Detectability Severity RPN 
A 1 4 5 20 
B 1 5 4 20 
C 2 2 5 20 
D 2 5 2 20 
E 4 1 5 20 
F 4 5 1 20 
G 5 2 2 20 
H 5 4 1 20 
 
                                                 
57 It should be noted that FMEA, as described in IEC 60812, results in a Risk Priority Number, or RPN, and not a risk 
level such as high, medium, or low.  The intent of the RPN is just as it sounds—to prioritize risks relative to one 
another.  FMEA was not designed to be used with such qualitative measures of risk or risk acceptability thresholds.  
Despite this, many pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies add on the artificial construct of acceptability, 
dividing RPNs into “buckets” intended to represent high, medium, and low risks.  This practice tends to bias towards 
lower risk scores and therefore may not motivate the firm to take action where needed.  Without a complete 
understanding of the tool design and the shortcomings of ordinal risk ranking scales, it is unlikely that these companies 
will reach a high level of maturity with regard to risk acceptance. 
58 The discussion of risk acceptance through ordinal ranking scales was previously published by the researcher. (69) 
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While the RPN is the same in each case, the eight situations above represent quite different risk 
scenarios that should be considered individually with regards to acceptability.  For example, 
scenarios A, C, and E all represent instances in which the consequences are incredibly dire 
(severity = 5).  However, the narratives associated with these scenarios differ significantly.  In 
scenario A, for example, we have what might be considered a “black swan” event—one that is rare 
yet catastrophic.  The scenario is very unlikely to occur (frequency = 1), however if it did, it’s 
improbable we would know about it (detectability = 4) before the catastrophic outcome (severity 
= 5) is realized.  Conversely, in scenario E, we have a risk or failure that occurs quite often 
(frequency = 4), but we can detect it readily (detectability = 1) before the catastrophic consequence 
(severity = 5) transpires.  Scenario C represents a middle ground, where a failure that could pose 
a severe consequence (severity = 5) is fairly infrequent (frequency = 2) and readily detectable 
(detectability = 2).  These risk scenarios are of course all different, but this is not evident when 
one only considers the RPNs, without taking into account the individual scores that gave rise to 
those RPNs.  The RPNs alone do not indicate where the differences lie.   Thus, when RPN 
thresholds are used to determine whether risk reduction or acceptance is warranted, flawed 
decision-making is often the result. 
In order to ensure the appropriate risk acceptance decisions are made, companies mature in QRM 
apply a second set of considerations to be used in concert with the RPN.  For example, a company 
may require any risk with a severity score of 5 to be reduced as low as possible, irrespective of the 
RPN, since such scenarios could result in a significant impact to process, product, or patient and 
should be handled with those consequences in mind.  A company may also require risks with a 
frequency or detectability of 5 to be reduced as well, as in many cases these are indicative of lack 
of effective process controls.  These considerations can be added to an analysis of the RPN to assist 
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with decisions regarding residual risk acceptance, to ensure the firm’s risk tolerance is adequately 
and consistently represented. 
8.5 Maturity with regard to risk review 
As mentioned briefly in Chapter Four, risk review tends to be the most neglected portion of the 
QRM lifecycle.  Risk review is when new knowledge gained over the product lifecycle is used to 
reflect upon the risk, and is performed to determine whether QRM has been effective and whether 
updates to the risk assessment or risk control strategy are warranted in light of changing conditions.  
ICH Q9 notes of risk review: 
“A mechanism to review or monitor events should be implemented… Once a quality risk 
management process has been initiated, that process should continue to be utilized for 
events that might impact the original quality risk management decision, whether these 
events are planned (e.g., results of product review, inspections, audits, change control) or 
unplanned (e.g., root cause from failure investigations, recall). The frequency of any review 
should be based upon the level of risk.” (45) 
The understanding of the purpose and process of risk review throughout the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries is rather weak.  The lack of literature on the topic, as well as multiple 
philosophical dialogues throughout the Phase 2 and 3 research, attest to this.  At the PDA Annual 
Meeting in April 2017, one delegate from a large pharmaceutical company stated, “[my company] 
doesn’t see the value in risk review.  We just figure that if the process hasn’t changed, there is no 
need to update the risk assessment.”  Several other delegates confessed that their companies have 
not yet performed risk review, with one noting that their company “just got [cited by a regulatory 
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agency] on that… Most of our risk assessments were put on the shelf and never looked at again.  
Most of [the assessments] are over six years old.” 
These anecdotes are clearly indicative of immature QRM programs—programs missing the 
opportunity to exploit risk review for the purposes summarized in ISO 31000: 
• “…ensuring that controls are effective and efficient in both design and operation; 
• obtaining further information to improve risk assessment; 
• analyzing and learning lessons from events (including near-misses), changes, trends, 
successes and failures; 
• detecting changes in the external and internal context, including changes to risk criteria 
and the risk itself which can require revision of risk treatments and priorities; and 
• identifying emerging risks.” (15)  
Mature programs acknowledge the value risk review offers both as a continuous improvement tool 
and for ongoing protection of the patient.  One need only to refer to complacency at NASA, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, to understand how building new information into an existing risk 
assessment can help save lives.  There are several considerations into risk review that are addressed 
in increasingly robust ways as risk maturity increases: when risk review is performed, the data and 
knowledge that serves as an input to the review process, and how those data impact previously-
conducted risk assessments and QRM decisions. 
8.5.1 Types of risk review– periodic v. event-driven 
Risk review is the process where the output/results of the risk management process are reviewed 
to ensure the risks remain acceptable considering changing conditions and new knowledge and 
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experience.  As mentioned in section 8.1, living risk assessments cover an entire product, process, 
or system over its lifecycle and are therefore subject to risk review.  Ad hoc risk assessments, on 
the other hand, are performed to address a specific event at a given point in time and need not 
continue through the QRM lifecycle to risk review.  The objective of risk review is to ensure that 
living risk assessments continue to reflect the current state of the product, process, or system with 
regard to identified risks, risk levels, and acceptance decisions.  Risk review also provides 
assurance that the identified risk controls continue to effectively maintain risk within acceptable 
limits. 
Risk review should be performed following residual risk acceptance; in the event the risk has not 
yet been accepted, other aspects of the QRM lifecycle are still in play and the review phase has 
not yet been reached.  While this is evident based on the flow of the QRM lifecycle in ICH Q9, 
some companies begin risk review before risk reduction is complete, which may confuse the 
objectives of the effort. (128)  As one delegate at the April 2017 PDA Annual Meeting noted, “[my 
company] has [historically] used risk review to follow up on open mitigation activities and close 
out the risk assessment.”  This practice changes the intent of risk review from one of reflective 
learning to one redundant to an earlier QRM process step—namely, risk control. 
In order to glean the greatest benefit from risk review, two types should be employed: periodic and 
event-driven.  Periodic risk reviews occur at a defined interval, based on the level of risk associated 
with the topic of the QRM effort.  Periodic risk reviews are comprehensive and include an 
evaluation of all data, information, and knowledge gained since the prior periodic risk review.  
Event-driven risk reviews, on the other hand, occur based on a trigger within the quality system, 
operating condition, or internal or external business climate.  These types of reviews should 
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generally be more targeted and specific that periodic risk reviews, and entail an evaluation of the 
impact of a particular data set or event on the risk assessment. 
ICH Q9 implies that the frequency of periodic risk review be based upon the level of risk identified 
in the risk assessment; it is the opinion of this researcher, however, that the frequency of periodic 
risk review should be established based on the risk inherent to the topic and the anticipated rate at 
which the risk assessment contents might become stale or obsolete.  After all, it is unlikely that a 
critical or complex manufacturing process, having reached the point where all identified risks are 
well-controlled and acceptable, will suddenly become static both in the process details and the 
firm’s knowledge and understanding of that process.  It is therefore fruitful to assign a discrete 
periodic risk review interval to each living risk assessment based on the criticality of the topic and 
the anticipated (or actual) rate of change and knowledge accrual.  The researcher proposes that a 
simple risk tool be used to facilitate this decision.  The tool includes the assignment of a topic 
criticality rating using the criteria in and a rate of change rating using the criteria in Table 8-25 
and Table 8-26.  The intersection of these two ratings in Figure 8-K offers an appropriate periodic 
risk review interval for the particular living risk assessment. 
Table 8-25: Topic criticality ratings and criteria 
Rating Criteria 
Minor 
Product: Product intermediate 
 
Process/System: Support processes and associated equipment/systems, such as 
solution/media preparation, packaging and labeling processes and equipment, 
component preparation, or general use utilities. 
 
Facility: Uncontrolled and controlled-not-classified (CNC) cleanrooms. 
Moderate 
Product: Non-sterile products, or non-life-saving/life-sustaining product that are not 
at risk of shortage. 
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Process/System: Upstream processing and associated equipment, such as API 
production, and quality control methods not associated with product release. 
 
Facility: Grade C cleanrooms 
Critical 
Product: Sterile products, non-life-saving/life-sustaining products at risk of shortage, 
or life-saving/life-sustaining products. 
 
Process/System: Downstream processing and associated equipment, such as 
purification and fill/finish, and quality control methods associated with product 
release. 
 
Facility: Grade A and B cleanrooms. 
 
Table 8-26: Rate of change ratings and criteria 
Rating Criteria 
Rare 
Product, process, or system is mature (in the commercial phase of the product 
lifecycle); additional learnings have plateaued. 
 
Actual (historical) or anticipated rate of change of the product, process, system, or 
facility under assessment is rare (e.g. less than two significant changes per year).  
Average 
Product, process, or system has recently entered the commercial phase of the 
product lifecycle; additional learnings are expected as experience is gained. 
 
Actual (historical) or anticipated rate of change of the product, process, system, or 
facility under assessment is average (e.g. between two and four significant changes 
per year). 
Frequent 
Product, process, or system is in the development phase of the product lifecycle; 
significant and frequent knowledge gains are expected. 
 
Actual (historical) or anticipated rate of change of the product, process, system, or 
facility under assessment is frequent (e.g. more than four significant changes per 
year). 
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Figure 8-K: Periodic risk review interval determination matrix 
 
As with all risk tools, the specific numerical criteria and examples, as well as the periodic risk 
review intervals themselves, should be evaluated in the context of a given firm’s product portfolio 
and quality system conditions and tailored as appropriate. 
In addition, companies should also define circumstances, events, and data trends that should trigger 
an event-driven risk review, for example:  
• A critical deviation occurs that represents a previously-unknown risk 
• A significant change is proposed that may introduce new risks to the overall process or 
system 
• A trend is identified that may warrant adjustment of the identified risks/risk levels in the 
living risk assessment 
• A significant complaint is received that may affect the identified risks/risk levels in the 
living risk assessment 
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• Changes in inventory levels with the product (or similar competitor products) render the 
drug more or less susceptible to shortage 
• The indication or patient population for the drug changes (e.g. approved for use in 
pediatrics) 
• A request for an event-driven risk review is received from internal or external 
stakeholders 
Such events would require a reevaluation of identified risks, risk levels, or risk tolerance and 
resultant risk acceptance decisions given the new information. 
8.5.2 Performing a risk review 
Despite the fact that information on risk review in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries is sparse, once again industries mature in risk management have many lessons to offer.  
ISO 14971, for example, lists a variety of data that should be reviewed as part of the product/post-
production phase of the medical device risk management lifecycle.  A basic list of information 
inputs into periodic risk review includes: 
• Related deviation/investigation data 
• Related customer complaint and adverse event data 
• Related change management data 
• Related ad hoc risk assessments 
• Documented sources of high uncertainty in the original risk assessment 
• Recommendations or “parking lot” issues from the original risk team 
• Related regulatory trending data, such as new or changed standards and guidance 
documents 
• Related industry trending data and scientific publications (e.g. applicable data from 
scientific journals, industry magazines, technical reports, whitepapers, or conferences) 
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• Related data from suppliers, sister sites, contract manufacturers, service providers, and 
business partners 
• Additional quality system data as applicable to the topic of the risk assessment (e.g. 
quality control, computer systems, validation and qualification, automation records) 
Event-driven risk reviews are typically smaller in scope than periodic risk reviews, may only 
require those data related to the trigger event to be evaluated. 
These data should be reviewed to determine what impact, if any, the data and resultant new 
knowledge has on the living risk assessment.  For example, hazards might be present that were 
previously unknown or unrecognized—these hazards might be reactively identified where 
realized, or they may be proactively identified through data sources that allow for such 
anticipation.  The risk levels, or individual risk ratings, may have changed, as might be the case 
when moving from a likelihood scale based on probabilities to a frequency scale based on historical 
failures.  Assumptions made during the original assessment may have been confirmed or refuted 
through the data. The firm’s (or patients’) risk tolerance may have changed, or the internal or 
external context may have evolved, calling previous risk acceptance decisions into question.  
Finally, the QRM program might have reached a more mature state such that the original risk 
assessment no longer meets current standards or objectives.  In the event the living risk assessment 
is affected in any way based on the learnings from the event (for event-driven risk review) or over 
time (for periodic risk reviews, the risk assessment and associated documentation should be 
updated to reflect the current state of the art.  Incorporating these practices and perspectives of risk 
review will enhance risk maturity and better protect the patient. 
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8.6 Maturity with regard to risk communication 
As discussed in the context of the nuclear industries in Chapter Six, communication is an art not 
to be taken lightly; this is particularly true of risk communication, where sensitive technical 
information may be misinterpreted if not communicated appropriately.  ICH Q9 defines risk 
communication as “the sharing of information about risk and risk management between the 
decision maker and other stakeholders,” noting: 
“The output/result of the quality risk management process should be appropriately 
communicated and documented… Communications might include those among interested 
parties; e.g., regulators and industry, industry and the patient, within a company, industry 
or regulatory authority, etc. The included information might relate to the existence, nature, 
form, probability, severity, acceptability, control, treatment, detectability or other aspects 
of risks to quality. Communication need not be carried out for each and every risk 
acceptance. Between the industry and regulatory authorities, communication concerning 
quality risk management decisions might be effected through existing channels as specified 
in regulations and guidances.” (45) 
There is little guidance offered in ICH Q9 regarding what, specifically, needs to be communicated, 
to whom, and for what purpose.  To answer these question, other sources must be evaluated. 
Fischhoff, Brewer, and Downs describe three objectives of risk communication: to share 
information, to change beliefs, and to change behaviors. (151)  Based on the definition of risk 
communication offered in ICH Q9, it appears that the first of the objectives was considered critical 
to QRM; the other two objectives are not addressed.  Companies mature in QRM, however, 
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recognize that these goals are not mutually exclusive.  Informing people about risks without 
providing sufficient context to enable them to make their own decisions and act accordingly is sure 
to be ineffective.  Where included context is weak or absent, the recipients of the risk 
communication will apply their own context—their values, belief systems, risk tolerance, and 
heuristics.  This may blur the intent of the message and have unintentional, negative results. 
8.6.1 Understanding stakeholders 
As counseled by the NRC in Chapter Six, the first step in effective risk communication is to 
determine the objective of the communication—to share information, change beliefs, or change 
behaviors (or a combination of these).  The stakeholders must then be identified, and their risk 
perceptions, risk tolerances, and existing knowledge evaluated.  These stakeholders will be the 
recipients of the risk communication, and may include individuals both internal and external to the 
company, such as: 
• Internal stakeholders 
o Decision makers and leadership 
o Operators, analysts, and specialists 
o Personnel from other manufacturing sites 
• External stakeholders 
o Suppliers, service providers, and partners 
o Regulators 
o Public/shareholders 
o Physicians, pharmacists, or other healthcare providers 
o Patients and their families 
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The existing perceptions of risk will vary for each of these stakeholder groups, and may be 
influenced by key heuristics, such the “degree of dreadfulness” of the risk59 and expert-lay bias.  
The communicator should take care to diffuse any inflammatory language and avoid overly 
technical jargon where these heuristics and perceptions might be at play. 
Communicating risk to internal and external stakeholders may also fulfill additional objectives that 
are worth mentioning here.  External risk communication often fulfills commitments to these 
parties.  For example, contractual obligations with third party partners may require communication 
of significant known or anticipated issues.  Regulatory bodies may have explicit or implicit 
requirements to communicate certain information within certain timeframes.  Healthcare providers 
might need additional information regarding the drug or course of treatment in order to best support 
their patients.  And of course, patients and their families have a right to understand the risks 
associated with their care.  Risk communication to internal stakeholders, on the other hand, is a 
critical form of knowledge management, offering opportunities for improvement and risk 
avoidance.  One delegate at the June 2017 PDA QRM for Manufacturing Systems workshop 
summarized this function of risk communication with a relevant anecdote, explaining how his site 
had been working for several months to solve a persistent manufacturing problem.  At a company 
party, he met a colleague who worked at a sister site that employed a similar technology platform, 
and shared his challenge.  The colleague had experienced a similar issue and described the solution 
his site had implemented, which led to a longer conversation between the two parties.  As it turned 
                                                 
59 This researcher recalls viewing a direct-to-consumer television advertisement that disclosed a known side effect of 
the drug: “urgent diarrhea with fainting”—quite a dreadful and embarrassing side effect in her opinion.  It would have 
been interesting and helpful to have the prevalence of that particular side effect disclosed in the advertisement. 
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out, the delegate noted, both sites were solving the same problems over and over and were never 
aware of the shared experience. 
Vesper describes important considerations for mature, successful risk communication in his article 
“Q9 + Ten Years:  Examining Risk Communication.”  These include building transparency and 
trust, establishing credibility, and communicating the big picture, among others.  With regard to 
transparency, trust, and credibility, Vesper explains: 
“One of the most important elements in risk assessment and risk management is the 
credibility – the trustworthiness and competence, as perceived by the stakeholders – of 
those involved. If the stakeholders do not have confidence in those conducting, managing, 
or sponsoring the activities, the stakeholders may demand higher levels of control or decide 
to accept only the lowest levels of risk. Conversely, if there is trust, the stakeholders may 
be willing to accept more risk. Open, honest, two-way communication between all the 
stakeholders is essential when working to assess and manage risks.” (152) 
Vesper also recommends the use of visual aids, such as heat maps and Pareto diagrams in risk 
communication, as these can help position the risk information in a broad context. (127) For 
example, where several risks have been found to be unacceptable and are being communicated to 
decision makers, providing a diagram to show that these unacceptable risks are but a small portion 
of all assessed risks may temper any immediate emotional response and enable a more fruitful 
discussion on next steps.  In addition, visual aids of risk communication can be employed on a 
continuous basis, using icons to highlight hazards to users. (153)  In the pharmaceutical and 
 275 
 
biopharmaceutical industries, such icons may be embedded within batch records or standard 
operating procedures to communicate risks associated with the process described in the document. 
Companies mature in risk communication will identify their stakeholders and take time to 
understand their interests and perceptions.  Trust and credibility will be established and maintained 
through frequent, transparent communication of risk information.  These companies see internal 
risk communication as a form of knowledge management, and acknowledge their obligation to 
external stakeholders through risk communication. 
8.6.2 Planning for risk communication 
The nuclear industry has embraced planning as key to successfully risk communication, and avails 
itself of the documentation of thoughtfully constructed plans for transmitting risk information to 
stakeholders in an organized and controlled manner.  Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
companies seeking to increase their risk maturity might likewise develop such plans, which may 
include information such as: 
• Groups, roles, or individuals responsible for initiating communication, 
• Groups, roles, or individuals responsible for receiving communication (stakeholders), 
• Groups, roles, or individuals responsible for reviewing messages prior to communication 
(e.g. medical, legal, or public relations experts for external communication) 
• The nature of the communication (e.g. the types of information to be communicated), 
• The method of communication (e.g. meetings, email, formal report distribution), and 
• A mechanism to document that the communication has taken place (e.g. meeting minutes, 
printed email) 
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Table 8-27 offers an example internal risk communication plan that may help firms increase their 
risk maturity. 
A risk communication plan can be valuable in many situations, as it informs individuals of the 
expectations for communicating certain types of QRM information, helping build a culture of 
transparency.  However, it is reasonable to expect certain situations to arise that are not covered 
by a communication plan.  For example, Krivkovich and Levy claim that “the most effective risk 
management we have observed act quickly to move risk issues up the chain of command as they 
emerge, breaking through rigid governance mechanisms to get the right experts involved whether 
or not…they sit on a formal risk-management committee.” (154) 
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Table 8-27: Example of a risk communication plan for internal stakeholders60 
QRM 
Activity 
What needs to be 
communicated 
Communicator Recipient Format When to communicate 
QRM Plan 
• Objectives 
• Roles and 
responsibilities 
• Activities and 
timing 
Head of QRM 
• Leadership (decision 
makers) 
• System/ Process Owners 
• Facilitators 
• Subject Matter Experts 
• Circulation of 
approved QRM 
Plan 
• Presentations  
• Upon approval of the plan 
• Upon changes to the plan 
• Upon completion of 
activities within the plan 
QRM 
Initiation 
• Risk question/ 
objective and scope  
• Team membership 
• Target timeframe 
for completion 
System/ 
Process Owner 
• Facilitators 
• Subject Matter Experts 
• Leadership (decision 
makers) 
• Circulation of 
approved risk 
assessment 
request 
• Email, phone, etc. 
• During planning of the 
risk assessment request 
• Upon approval of the risk 
assessment request 
Risk 
Assessment 
• Unacceptable risks 
• Recommended 
control measures 
that will require 
resources not at the 
disposal of the team 
System/Process 
Owner 
• Leadership (decision 
makers) 
• Internal customers (e.g. 
functional groups that 
may be affected by the 
unacceptable risk or be 
involved in 
implementation of the 
risk controls) 
• Presentations 
• Email, phone, etc. 
• Upon completion of the 
risk assessment, prior to 
finalization of the interim 
report 
Risk Control 
• Unacceptable 
residual risks 
• Risk acceptance 
decisions 
System/ 
Process Owner 
• Leadership (decision 
makers) 
• Subject matter experts 
• Circulation of 
final report 
• Presentations 
• Email, phone, etc. 
• Upon completion of risk 
control 
Risk Review • Outcomes of risk review 
System/Process 
Owner 
• Leadership (decision 
makers) 
• Presentations 
• Email, phone, etc. 
• Upon completion of 
the risk review 
Ad Hoc 
• Realized risks 
• Newly identified 
risks 
Person who 
identified the 
risk 
• System/Process Owner 
• Leadership (decision 
makers) 
• Email, phone, etc. • As soon as possible following identification 
                                                 
60 Portions of this plan were previously constructed by the researcher during her work with the PDA QRM Task Force and published in PDA Technical Report No.  
54-5. (223) 
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8.7 An optimized QRM lifecycle 
Once the ideal state of QRM was defined, the researcher recognized a key point—that 
the QRM lifecycle as proposed by ICH Q9 did not seem sufficient to enable the ideal 
state to be achieved.  Being that the ideal state was defined as a synergy of techniques 
from multiple authoritative documents (including ICH Q9, ISO 14971, and ISO 31000) 
as well as learnings for industries with a history of excellence in risk management, it 
follows that the QRM lifecycle would need to be revisited to incorporate learnings from 
each of these sources.  Indeed, the quality system-centric ICH Q9, product-centric ISO 
14971, and business-centric ISO 31000 are simultaneously complementary and 
different, each having advantages over the other.  To maximize the value that arise from 
a QRM mindset and associated activities, these lifecycles must be synthesized to yield 
an optimal lifecycle.   
An important first step, described in ISO 31000, is to establish both the internal and 
external context under which QRM will be performed. (15) The approach taken, and 
the risk tolerance used, should be founded in an understanding of patients being served, 
the regulatory climate, and business considerations such as the availability of life-
saving product and their vulnerability to shortage.  This context will inform QRM 
strategies, such which activities should be prioritized for QRM and the risk tolerance 
that would be most appropriate given the circumstances.  Therefore, an optimized QRM 
lifecycle would certainly begin with this critical step. 
Once the context has been understood and a related strategy has been established, the 
QRM process should be initiated and then continue with risk assessment, broken down 
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into three sub-steps of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk evaluation.  A risk 
control option analysis would follow, to plan for risk reduction. 
Based on the length of time that may pass between the identification of the risk control 
strategy and its implementation, an interim report would be written. This report 
documents the QRM efforts up to that point, including the applicable internal and 
external context, the QRM initiation, the risk assessment, and the risk control strategy.  
Approval of this report serves as a gating mechanism to reinforce ownership and 
accountability, and triggers the population of the risk register. 
The lifecycle would continue with the risk control phase, which would consist of four 
separate steps: risk reduction, evaluation of new or changed risks, residual risk 
evaluation, and residual risk acceptance.  Risk reduction entails the implementation of 
the risk control strategy.  Once risk reduction is complete, the new/current state is 
evaluated for new risks or changes to existing risks, which facilitate the calculation and 
evaluation of the residual risk.  Finally, the residual risk is evaluated (for both individual 
risks and the risk portfolio as a whole), and a decision as to acceptability is made based 
on the risk tolerance.   
A final report is then written to summarize the QRM lifecycle to this point, including 
the risk assessment and risk control activities and outcomes.  This would also detail the 
outcomes of the risk-based approach to identify the periodic risk review interval.   
Risk review occurs at the frequency defined by the periodic review interval, as well as 
when triggered by an event within the quality system.  The risk review is intended not 
only to incorporate lifecycle data back into the QRM process but also as an opportunity 
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to augment the QRM efforts based on new knowledge (of both the topic assessed and 
of risk management in general).  Throughout the lifecycle, risk communication occurs 
according to the Risk Communication Plan. 
The optimized QRM lifecycle, as described above, is illustrated in Figure 8-L.  In this 
way, ICH Q9, ISO 14971, and ISO 31000 are synthesized with lessons from multiple 
industries to capitalize on best practices and engender a holistic risk culture. 
 281 
 
 
Figure 8-L: Optimized Quality Risk Management Lifecycle 
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This chapter outlined how the QRM process can be performed effectively to manage 
risk to the patient, including the living risk assessment library, QRM initiation, risk 
assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk communication.  Chapter Nine aims to 
characterize maturity with regard to QRM governance—the leadership, oversight, and 
accountability associated with a QRM program.  
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9 Chapter Nine: What QRM Maturity Looks Like - 
Governance 
 
This chapter marks the third and final pillar of effective QRM—governance.  
Governance plays a critical role in managing risk to the patient, ensuring QRM 
activities are as effective as possible.  Governance has as many definitions as there are 
sources.  Merriam-Webster provides the mundane and grammatical definition of 
“government.” (155)  The Business Dictionary offers an explanation with a bit of 
context:  
 “[the] establishment of policies, and continuous monitoring of their proper 
implementation, by the members of the governing body of an organization. It 
includes the mechanisms required to balance the powers of the members (with 
the associated accountability), and their primary duty of enhancing the 
prosperity and viability of the organization.” (156)   
The International Risk Governance Council61 offers definitions of governance and risk 
governance: “Governance refers to the actions, processes, traditions and institutions by 
which authority is exercised and decisions are taken and implemented. Risk governance 
applies the principles of good governance to the identification, assessment, 
management and communication of risks.” (157) 
                                                 
61 Despite the enticing name for this organization, the risk governance framework developed and 
promoted by the International Risk Governance Council is closer to the risk management processes and 
lifecycle from ICH Q9, ISO 31000, and ISO 14971 than a governance structure over risk management.  
As a result, the utility of this organization’s work to the research described in this thesis is limited to 
these definitions only. 
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For the purposes of this thesis, the researcher proposes the following operational 
definition of governance with regard to QRM: 
QRM governance is the set of organizational policies, practices, and norms necessary 
to ensure QRM is performed effectively. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of the purpose of governance in a QRM context.  
A discussion of the infrastructure and governance processes needed to successfully 
execute QRM follows.  The chapter continues to briefly describe the content of a mature 
QRM plan, and finishes with a discussion of metrics and key performance indicators 
for QRM.   
9.1 The role of governance in QRM 
 All programs need law and order.  Established governance structures and processes 
ensure there is a level of oversight and accountability for QRM, and that its principles 
and practices are widely and effectively deployed.  In a typical organization, senior 
management serves as the governing body, tasked with defining policies and ensuring 
they are followed as intended.  Many regulatory standards make the link between senior 
management and governance.  For example, the EU GMPs point out: 
“The attainment of [product quality] is the responsibility of senior management 
and requires the participation and commitment by staff in many different 
departments and at all levels within the company... To achieve this quality 
objective reliably there must be a comprehensively designed and correctly 
implemented Pharmaceutical Quality System incorporating Good 
Manufacturing Practice and Quality Risk Management.” (158)    
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ICH Q10 notes that “senior management has the ultimate responsibility to ensure an 
effective pharmaceutical quality system is in place to achieve the quality objectives, 
and that roles, responsibilities, and authorities are defined, communicated, and 
implemented throughout the company.” (52)  ISO 14971 prescribes that “top 
management shall… review the suitability of the risk management process at planned 
intervals to ensure continuing effectiveness of the risk management process and 
document any decisions and actions taken.” (101)  In addition, ISO 9001, Quality 
management systems, requires that 
“top management … provide evidence of its commitment to the development 
and implementation of the quality management system and continually 
improving its effectiveness by communicating to the organization the 
importance of meeting customer as well as statutory and regulatory 
requirements, establishing the quality policy, ensuring that quality objectives 
are established, conducting management reviews, and ensuring the availability 
of resources.” (159)   
In their article devoted to the role of senior leadership in QRM, Richter and Haddad 
state that “…senior leadership must empower the organization to implement the QRM 
program and obtain support throughout the company to bring the program to 
realization.” (160)  Within a mature QRM program, the purpose of governance 
includes: 
• Establishing and maintaining the appropriate infrastructure, including policies, 
procedures, and personnel 
• Overseeing the QRM program and its deliverables 
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• Setting strategic direction for QRM and planning work to support it 
• Measuring the performance of QRM (161) 
Each of these is discussed in detail in the remainder of this chapter. 
Three-quarters of the experts interviewed in the Phase 3 research cited management 
commitment as the one key thing that secures success or failure in QRM. (125) (129) 
(130) (132) (134) (142) (144) (162) (163)  A study of risk management professionals 
from a variety of industries, conducted by the Harvard Business Review, echoed this 
sentiment, with an overwhelming majority of respondents citing the “tone at the top” 
as critical to establishing effective risk management. (164)  Unfortunately, as discussed 
in Chapter Five, the current maturity level of industry with regard to QRM governance 
is rather low.  Bishop McFarland offers her opinion as to why: 
“The primary challenge that exists, from my perspective, is the lack of 
leadership within our industry. This is to say, there are individuals that are 
running firms; however, there is, based on my experience, a lack of leading. 
Organizations are still very much focused on metrics and compliance. This 
‘tunnel vision’ approach to leadership fails to acknowledge the value of the 
culture of an organization. Without top management engaged with the quality 
culture of their organization and without a true intent of changing it, they will 
not move toward achieving the benefits of Q9 and Q10 simply because they will 
not be interested in what the outcome of those guidance documents represent: 
an exploration of uncertainty.  Leadership may appear to be risk averse but this 
is not true... they are not risk averse, they are uncertainty averse. Risk 
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management has the potential to expose uncertainty but often the [management] 
culture interrupts…this very critical role.” (134) 
In this quote, Bishop McFarland alludes to the potential impact on risk maturity that 
may be realized through incomplete management commitment—the dedication of 
senior management to the conduct of QRM and the consistency of their words and 
actions to that dedication.  The expert interviews, philosophical dialogues, and the 
researcher’s own experience show evidence of a lack of management commitment at 
companies with immature QRM programs.  This often manifests as a disconnect 
between senior management’s vernacular and the fundamental principles of QRM.  For 
example, throughout the philosophical dialogues for the Phase 2 and 3 research, the 
researcher noted several “catch phrases” that seem to have become ubiquitous with 
senior leaders of pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies.  These include: 
• “Risk it out,” meant to communicate that QRM should be used to justify a 
reduction in requirements like sampling or testing 
• “There’s no risk in <x>,” meant to communicate that QRM would be useless 
in the specific situation 
• “[We performed] a risk assessment to justify,” meant to communicate that the 
risk assessment would be reverse engineered to support a pre-determined 
outcome (as discussed in Chapter Eight with respect to risk questions) 
The use of these phrases implies a lack of knowledge of QRM and quality principles at 
the senior management level, a situation to be remedied through the role-based 
leadership training described in Chapter Seven.  In addition, because personnel often 
take their cue from their management, these sorts of catch phrases can be damaging the 
risk culture of the organization.   
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In addition, there are often gaps between senior management’s espoused values for 
QRM and their actions.  This was most often mentioned by conference delegates in the 
context of resourcing QRM activities—when resources are in short supply, those that 
are earmarked for supporting QRM are often redirected towards more urgent matters.62 
(128)  This phenomenon is not unique to QRM, nor the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries, as illustrated by Srinivasan and Kurey in their Harvard 
Business Review article:  “Even when executives have the best intentions, there are 
often gaps between what they say and what they do. As a result, employees get mixed 
messages about whether quality is truly important. Company leaders must first buy into 
quality improvement initiatives and clearly demonstrate their own personal 
commitment to this effort to employees.” (165) 
A strong portfolio of governance policies and processes can minimize the impact of 
these mixed signals from management by ensuring that risk-centric behaviors are 
exhibited at a defined frequency and understood across the organization.  In addition, 
senior management may also evolve their own thinking and level of QRM knowledge 
by following the governance models they, themselves, have established.  In this way, 
governance offers stability and focus to organization as it increases its level of risk 
maturity. 
9.2 Establishing QRM infrastructure 
One purpose of QRM governance is to establish the appropriate infrastructure to enable 
the organization to perform QRM effectively.  Such infrastructure consists of 
                                                 
62 The irony of this is not lost on the researcher, nor the conference delegates who participated in the 
philosophical dialogues.  Though QRM is the very thing that can prevent quality crises from occurring, 
quality crises often limit the organization from performing QRM.  This cycle is very difficult to break, 
particularly in the traditional “fire-fighting” cultures described in Chapter Seven. 
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documents (policies and procedures) as well as human resources.  This section 
describes the characteristics of a mature QRM infrastructure, designed to better enable 
QRM and protect the patient. 
Pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies are familiar with the use of 
documents to guide everyday operations; all cGMP regulations worldwide require 
procedures to be written and followed.  Industry executes these requirements in a 
variety of ways.  For example, some companies elect to have different “levels” of 
documents depending on the scope and intent; these may include, listed from broad 
application to specific application, policies, standards, global operating procedures that 
apply to all sites within a company, and standard operating procedure (SOPs) that apply 
to a single site or department within a site.  Other companies may elect to only use 
SOPs to govern their cGMP activities.  Regardless of such document hierarchies, the 
content to be described for QRM remains the same. 
The QRM benchmarking survey (discussed in Chapter Five) found that at least 90% of 
the respondents’ companies currently have a document that describes the use of QRM, 
with at least 86% of those complying with ICH Q9.   What is not clear from the 
benchmarking survey is whether these documents enable risk maturity and 
effectiveness as well.  The minimum content for an effective primary QRM document 
includes: 
• Purpose and scope of the document, including a list of which product lifecycle 
phases and quality system elements are within scope of QRM 
• Roles and responsibilities for QRM, including the training requirements for 
each role 
 290 
 
• Principles of QRM, including statements of and related program design to 
ensure; 
o QRM cannot be used to attempt to justify not following applicable law 
o QRM formality should be proportional to the risk of what is evaluated 
through QRM 
o QRM must be based on scientific evidence, but not a surrogate for 
science in decision-making 
o QRM must ultimately link to the patient 
• Description of when and how QRM should be initiated 
• Description of the minimum requirements for risk assessment, including the 
distinction between living and ad hoc risk assessments 
• List of risk tools that may be employed 
• Description of risk tolerance for each applicable product or product family and 
associated levels (where used) 
• Requirements for risk control and residual risk acceptance, based on the risk 
tolerance(s) 
• When and how risk review should be undertaken 
• When, how, and to whom risk communication should occur, including the 
urgent escalation of critical risks to decision makers 
• Descriptions of governance processes 
Based on the current and desired levels of risk maturity of the organization, additional 
procedures may need to be installed to guide the organization.  For example, the 
creation of a guidance document or whitepaper to describe best practices for risk 
assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk communication (using the learning from 
Chapter Eight) may be advisable for companies with a moderate level of maturity who 
seeks to gain efficiencies and expand knowledge.  For companies will low levels of 
maturity, it is advisable to standardize practice of risk tools through the creation of 
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procedures, to ensure consistency of execution and to augment the training facilitators 
have received, until such time as the procedures are no longer necessary.63 (138) 
The other aspect of QRM infrastructure to be established through governance is the 
personnel who will work within the program.  As discussed in the benchmarking survey 
in Chapter Five, there is a widespread misconception in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries that the quality unit or department “owns” QRM.  While 
the quality unit has an important role to play, the actors in a QRM program may come 
from any number of functional groups.  After all, “siloed approaches to risk 
management create dangerous blind spots for business.” (166)  In companies with 
mature QRM programs product quality and patient safety risks are ultimately owned 
by those who own the product.  Who else should be more invested in managing risk to 
the patient?  These individuals are called System or Process Owners and often work 
within manufacturing functions. (138)  In owning the risks associated with their portion 
of product manufacturing (such as solution preparation, component preparation, 
upstream processing, or fill/finish), the System or Process Owners carries the following 
responsibilities under the QRM program: 
• Initiates the QRM process for his or her scope of responsibility (i.e. system or 
process) 
• Participates on the risk team for all applicable risk assessments 
• Directs implementation of mitigation activities 
• Authors risk reports 
• Initiates and participates in all applicable risk reviews 
• Communicates risks to the appropriate stakeholders 
                                                 
63It is the researcher’s opinion that SOPs on risk tools should never become irrelevant, provided they are 
not so restrictive to prevent customized tool creation or thoughtfully conceived and appropriately 
documented alteration.  To better manage risk to the patient, consistency is key. 
 292 
 
• Ultimately accountable for the application of QRM principles and practices for 
his or her scope of responsibility 
While System/Process Owners are accountable for the risks associated with their area 
of responsibility, they are not accountable for the functioning of the overarching QRM 
process as a whole.  In mature QRM programs, this privilege is granted to the Head of 
QRM.  This role is likely to align functionally within quality, and preferably reports 
into the head of quality for the site or organization. (130) (138)  This allows the 
individual a direct line of access to senior management and associated governance 
forums.  It also appears, based on philosophical dialogues, that there may be a 
correlation between the number of “full time equivalent” (FTE) resources dedicated to 
QRM and the organization’s risk maturity.64  For example, QRM warrants at least one 
FTE at most companies.  Larger sites or campuses may require multiple FTEs to fully 
support the QRM program, while small companies may not be able to financially justify 
a fully dedicated person and may instead allocate a fraction of an FTE to the role.  
Regardless of resource allocation, the responsibilities of the Head of QRM (or QRM 
department) include: 
• Accountable for the design and deployment of the QRM program 
• Authors policies and procedures 
• Oversees QRM training and education 
• Provide ongoing mentoring and coaching of personnel on QRM principles 
and practices 
• Leads QRM governance processes (refer to section 9.3) 
 
                                                 
64 In the US, one FTE is generally equivalent to 40 hours of work per week, as it assumes that one person 
would be solely dedicated to the work topic, with the average workweek spanning 40 hours. 
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In addition to the Head of QRM and System/Process Owners, QRM governance 
requires the identification of a Facilitator role.  These are highly trained QRM experts 
(refer to Chapter Seven for a discussion of the applicable educational program) who are 
responsible for leading risk assessments using particular risk tools and serving as QRM 
SMEs for the organization.  Companies mature in QRM resource facilitators from a 
variety of functional groups, who commit a portion of their time (perhaps 20%) to 
QRM.  This model ensures that QRM knowledge is spread throughout the company in 
a way that enhances risk culture and maturity. (138)   
QRM governance must also define roles and responsibilities for Subject Matter Experts 
(SMEs) and the quality unit.  SMEs are those individuals with expertise in a particular 
topic who will share their knowledge and data analyses in risk assessments and risk 
reviews, as described in Chapter Eight.  While personnel from the quality unit may 
serve as experts in quality and compliance as an input into a risk assessment or review, 
an independent quality professional should also be required to ensure the output of these 
align with applicable internal and external quality standards. 
Finally, it is a purpose of governance to not only defines roles and responsibilities for 
the QRM program, but also to ensure that the individuals who fulfill these roles to be 
aware of it.  Companies with immature QRM programs often have requirements for, 
for example, System/Process Owners or SMEs, but are not clear on who fills these roles, 
often because the roles do not directly correlate with job titles. (128)  This can lead to 
quite a few false-starts and much finger-pointing.   All System or Process Owners, 
Facilitators, and SMEs should be aware of their role in QRM and should have the 
associated responsibilities listed in his or her job description.  This will ensure that 
accountability for QRM is directly and explicitly associated outlined. 
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9.3 Overseeing the QRM program 
The second purpose of QRM governance is to oversee the QRM program, including 
ensuring that decision makers and senior leadership have a direct line of sight to risks 
that may affect product quality and patient safety.  This is accomplished, in part, 
through risk communication, as described in Chapter Eight, which should complete 
governance processes and forums that focus specifically on QRM.  In an effective QRM 
program, these should cover both tactical risks, such as those identified through living 
or ad hoc risk assessments, and more strategic or systemic quality risks.  There are two 
such processes that can enable this holistic view when performed in parallel: the risk 
register, which is designed for tactical risks, and the quality risk profile, intended for 
strategic risks.  Figure 9-A illustrate these QRM governance processes, which merge as 
part of overall quality management to be reviewed during Quality Management 
Review. 
 
Figure 9-A: Parallel governance processes for QRM 
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Though many pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical companies perceive the risk 
register as a regulatory requirement, the origins the risk register as a QRM governance 
tool are unclear. (138) (128)  ICH Q9 does not mention a risk register in any form, nor 
is a risk register explicitly discussed in any authoritative document in the US or EU.  
The mention of the use of such a register for QRM can be traced back to a question and 
answer webpage from the Medicines and Health Product Regulatory Agency (MHRA) 
in the United Kingdom, posted in 2010. (62) (167)  In response to the frequently asked 
question (FAQ) “should site have a formal risk register and management process?”, the 
MHRA responded: 
“Yes, a risk register (or equivalent title document) should list and track all key 
risks as perceived by the organisation and summarise how these have been 
mitigated. There should be clear reference to risk assessments and indeed a list 
of risk assessments conducted should be included or linked to the register. A 
management process should be in place to review risk management – this may 
be incorporated into the quality management review process.”65 (168) 
Irrespective of the regulatory basis for the risk register as a requirement of QRM, it 
remains a vital governance tool to inform decision makers of critical risks identified 
through QRM and for tracking risk reduction and mitigation activities. 
                                                 
65 MHRA has since removed any reference to the risk register from its webpage.  As of May 1, 2017, the 
MHRA FAQs on Risk Management remained available through the UK’s National Archives at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120913151405/http://mhra.gov.uk/Howweregulate/Medici
nes/Inspectionandstandard/GoodManufacturingPractice/FAQ/QualityRiskManagement/index.htm.  
However, as of this writing, this webpage is no longer available at this link, and a search of the archives 
for these FAQs yielded no results.  The FAQs remain available through International Pharmaceutical 
Quality (IPQ), however, at the link provided in the citation. 
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Living and ad hoc risk assessments serves as inputs into the risk register, which 
compiles selected information from each risk assessment into a single list, serving as a 
quality risk “executive summary” of sorts.  Information is usually filtered prior to 
transcription into the risk register; for example, some firms may choose to log only 
those risks that exceed a given risk tolerance, while others may log all risks that are 
being mitigated, regardless of level.  Typical information included in the risk register 
is: 
• Hazard/Risk 
• Risk level (e.g. RPN) 
• Source (e.g. risk assessment number and title) 
• Risk owner (e.g. applicable System/Process Owner) 
• Mitigation activities, responsible parties, and target implementation dates 
• Risk closure date (e.g. mitigation plan completion date) 
• Residual risk level 
Some of the experts interviewed for the Phase 3 research indicated that companies 
mature in QRM would also track those risks that were accepted, including the 
acceptance rationale, date, and applicable decision maker, to ensure full transparency 
and accountability. (130) (129)  The risk register should be made available to all 
employees, to increase awareness of critical quality risks throughout the organization. 
(132)  A risk register template, designed to enable enhanced risk maturity, is offered in 
Appendix II. 
Proper QRM governance would include periodic reviews of the risk register by senior 
management.  Figure 9-B illustrates a general process, proposed by the researcher, for 
maintenance of the risk register. 
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Living and ad hoc risk 
assessments
Do any risks exceed 
the risk tolerance of 
the organization?
Include applicable risks 
and associated data in 
risk register
Risk Register governance 
forum: review register 
and update status
Do any risks 
require 
escalation?
Escalate to Quality 
Management 
Review forum
No
Yes
Yes
Communicate risks to 
applicable stakeholders No
“Close” risk 
(remove from risk 
register)
Accepted
risks
 
Figure 9-B: Risk register process flow 
The Head of QRM (or QRM staff) should be responsible for the construction of the risk 
register and will serve as the meeting lead for the risk register governance forum—a 
meeting dedicated to the review of the register contents.  The meetings should be 
conducted frequently, based on the rate at which risks are added to the register and 
status updates are expected.  A typical meeting agenda may include a review of newly 
populated risks, risks targeted for acceptance (and subsequent removal from the risk 
register), status updates on the progression of mitigation activities, and a general 
 298 
 
discussion on which risks, if any, require escalation to Quality Management Review.  
In a mature QRM program, escalated risks should meet one or more of the following 
criteria: 
• Risks that place the patient in jeopardy (urgent escalation required) 
• Risk control strategy has not been defined 
• Risk control strategy is delayed in its implementation 
• Interim controls for unacceptable risks have not been defined 
• Resources not at the disposable of the risk assessment team are needed (for 
example, capital for large design projects or resources from outside the site) 
Directing these types of risks to broader forums ensures that senior leadership has the 
information and ability to hold System/Process Owners accountable for reducing risks 
in their area of responsibility, and can facilitate the removal of obstacles that might 
prevent risks from being reduced to an acceptable level. 
While the risk register ensures that senior leadership is aware of tactical quality risks, 
strategic risks require a different governance process.  In many cases, systemic risks are 
often not captured through individual living or ad hoc risk assessments, which are based 
on a specific scope and risk question as discussed in Chapter Eight.  Two experts 
interviewed for the Phase 3 research suggested that these types of risks are captured in 
a quality risk profile.  While these two experts could only cite one instance each of the 
quality risk profile in use, both proclaimed it a best practice that could help industry 
advance in risk maturity and fill a potentially significant gap in perspective between 
“traditional” QRM and the patient. (127) (125)  A proposed template, prepared by the 
researcher, for the quality risk profile is offered in Appendix III. 
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The primary objective of the quality risk profile is to assess the quality and compliance 
status of the site or organization through the review of trends and prospective indicators 
that may represent quality or compliance risks.  The quality risk profile builds 
awareness of site vulnerabilities and their gravity, in an effort to continually improve 
the quality system and pinpoint those risks that require strategic intervention to reduce 
to within the organization’s risk tolerance. (125) (127)  Unlike the risk register, whose 
data is created by others and reviewed during the governance forum, the quality risk 
profile is created by the governing body itself—it should capture all of the things that 
keep leadership awake at night, or perhaps more appropriately, the things that should 
keep them awake. 
Issues that represent, or have the potential to represent, quality or compliance risks may 
arise from various sources and contain both reactively and proactively identified risks 
as illustrated in Figure 9-C.66   
 
Figure 9-C: Proactive vs. reactive risks 
                                                 
66 A modified version of Figure 9-C was created by the researcher for the PDA QRM Task Force and 
was published in PDA Technical Report No. 54-5, Quality Risk Management for the Design, 
Qualification, and Operation of Manufacturing Systems. (256) 
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Quality and compliance risks are identified using data trends of systems and processes 
or through subjective assessments of changing conditions.  Examples of data feeder 
streams for the quality risk profile include: 
• Site review forums such as metric reviews or Quality Management Review 
(reactive) 
• Deviation/investigation trends that represent a systemic issue within the 
quality system (reactive) 
• Internal audit and external inspection observations and/or comments, either 
specific to the site (reactive), communicated from other sites in the 
organization (proactive), or identified through benchmarking exercises with 
other organizations (proactive) 
• Intelligence information regarding potential changes to organizational 
capability, processes, and regulatory or business requirements (proactive) 
• Regulatory and business intelligence information regarding evolving 
expectations of health authorities and industry best practices (reactive or 
proactive, depending on the nature of the information) 
• Gaps between current processes, technology, and/or infrastructure and 
industry standards (proactive) 
From these data, risks can be identified and populated on the quality risk profile, along 
with supporting details such the risk owner, type of risk identification 
(proactive/reactive), type of risk (patient safety/product quality/compliance/other), and 
applicable quality system element (aligned to ICH Q10).  These data can facilitate 
trending and metrics calculation, as discussed later in this chapter.  Each risk is then 
ranked for likelihood or frequency and severity, and a risk level is calculated.  Example 
ranking criteria for the quality risk profile is offered in Table 9-1: Example severity 
ranking criteria for the quality risk profile are offered in Table 9-1and Table 9-2.  The 
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associated risk level is determined by locating the intersection of these two rankings in 
a simple “9-box” matrix, as shown in Figure 9-D. 
Table 9-1: Example severity ranking criteria for the quality risk profile 
Ranking Definition 
Critical 
Extremely significant impact.  Indicative of a systemic issue that permeates 
multiple aspects of the Quality System.  Risk could result in a critical product 
quality or safety impact to patient/user.  Could result in a shortage of a life-
saving drug. 
Moderate 
Moderately significant impact.  May extend to another aspect of the Quality 
System, but the impact can be contained.  Risk could result in a moderate 
product quality impact that is unlikely to affect patients.  Not likely to result in a 
shortage of a life-saving drug, or likely to result in a shortage of a non-life-
saving drug. 
Minor Risk has no impact to product quality or patient safety. 
Table 9-2: Example likelihood/frequency ranking criteria for the quality risk profile 
Ranking Criteria 
Proactively-identified risks Reactively-identified risks 
Frequent/ 
Likely 
Realization (occurrence) of risk is 
inevitable unless immediate, 
sweeping reform/mitigation is 
implemented.   
Trend occurred in the past, either in 
consecutive intervals or with a clear 
pattern (e.g., seasonal) and/or risk is 
likely to recur without mitigation. 
Intermittent/ 
Average 
Realization (occurrence) of risk is 
likely but may be avoided with the 
implementation of targeted mitigation 
activities within the site. 
Risk may have occurred in the past 
but in a non-consecutive/sporadic 
interval and/or risk may recur without 
mitigation. 
Rare/ 
Remote 
Realization (occurrence) of risk is 
moderately likely to unlikely; existing 
Quality System controls expected to 
restore steady state. 
Risk isolated in time and/or highly 
unlikely to recur. 
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Figure 9-D: Risk matrix for the quality risk profile 
 
The risk level is used to determine the need for risk reduction, and the QRM process 
continues, as discussed in Chapter Eight.  Vesper applauded the visualization of the 
quality risk profile in a “heat map” plotted by quality system element. (127)  This can 
show the relative distribution of strategic quality risks by risk level, as well as enable 
the onlooker to understand which aspects of the quality system are most vulnerable for 
the organization.  An example heat map is provided in Figure 9-E. 
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Figure 9-E: Example of a quality risk profile heat map 
. 
 Through the application of governance processes covering both strategic and tactical 
quality risks, the oversight of key risks for the organization and the patients it served 
can be achieved. 
9.4 Setting strategic direction and planning activities to achieve it 
The third purpose of QRM governance is to identify a strategy for QRM and develop 
plans to achieve it.  In a company with a mature QRM program the strategy will, of 
course, be linked to managing risk to the patient, and may also include elements that 
describe how this will be achieved.  The development of a vision and mission for the 
• Process 
Validation 
• Personnel 
and 
Training 
• Risk 
Management 
• Change 
Management 
• Equipment 
Qualification 
• Supplier 
Management 
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QRM program may best articulate the strategy in a form that can energize the 
organization.  For example, a mature QRM program might have the following vision 
and mission: 
Vision: To protect the patient through the management of quality risks 
Mission: To fully understand and manage critical risks to product quality, to integrate 
risk-based thinking throughout the organization, and to foster a proactive, anticipatory 
culture in which quality risks are anticipated and avoided. 
As discussed in the context of medical device risk management in Chapter Six, the 
planning of QRM objectives and activities is critical to the realization of a QRM 
strategy.  In addition, a QRM plan can be a valuable communication vehicle to inform 
the organization of management’s commitment to and intentions for QRM, and how 
each QRM practitioner’s work relates to these strategic goals.  A QRM plan, therefore, 
must explicitly address strategies, objectives, tactics, and associated activities over a 
defined timeframe to serve as a guiding light for all things risk.  Figure 9-F illustrates 
the relationship between these critical components of a QRM plan. 
 305 
 
 
Figure 9-F: Components of a QRM Plan 
 
The remainder of this section describes the content of a QRM plan as proposed by the 
researcher that can be used by the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries to 
enhance risk maturity and better manage risk to the patient.   
Purpose section 
The purpose section of the QRM Plan should describe the goal and intent of the plan.  
Depending on the individual firm’s current level of risk maturity, the goals might differ.  
For example, less mature firms may elect to focus on the development of a QRM 
process, governance structure, and training, while more mature firms may wish to focus 
on expanding an existing QRM program to additional aspects of the quality system.  
This section serves to ground the reader in the primary objectives of QRM over a 
defined time period. 
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Scope  
The scope section should describe the boundaries of the QRM Plan, and should use 
exclusionary language where necessary to describe elements or areas that are out of 
scope.  This section may include, for example: 
• The site or sites to which the QRM Plan applies, 
• Products, product lines, and/or systems to which the plan applies,  
• Product lifecycle phases to which the plan applies (e.g. development through 
Phase I, commercial only, etc.), 
• Quality system elements included in the plan (e.g. change control, deviation 
management, etc.) 
• Timeframe covered in the plan 
It is recommended that the QRM Plan cover a timeframe spanning one to three years, 
enabling both short-term “quick wins” as well as longer-term strategic objectives to be 
outlined. 
Roles and responsibilities section 
This section of the QRM plan should outline the roles and responsibilities for those 
working or interacting with the QRM program.  It is recommended that the following 
roles be addressed in order to align with the ideal QRM program model proposed in 
this thesis: 
• Senior leadership 
• Head of QRM 
• Facilitators 
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• System/Process Owners 
• Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) 
• Quality Unit (QU) 
Many firms have experienced success with the use of a Responsibility Assignment 
(RACI) matrix which maps each role to a given activity according to whether they are 
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and/or Informed. (130) (129)  The 
responsibilities and tactics or activities outlined in this section should directly correlate 
to the content of the plan; that is, all activities within the plan should be assigned to a 
specific role, and each responsibility listed should likewise have specific actions 
associated with it.  This practice ensures clarity is provided to both the readers and users 
of the plan.  For example: 
Table 9-3: Example RACI Matrix for QRM Plan 
Tactic Leadership Head of QRM Facilitators 
System/ 
Process 
Owners 
SMEs QU 
Complete defined 
living risk 
assessments 
I C R A R C 
Integrate QRM 
principles into 
quality system 
C A/R N/A R C C 
Establish risk register I A/R N/A R C I 
Establish quality risk 
profile I A/R N/A R C C 
 
Strategy mapping and activity list 
The bulk of the QRM plan should include a discussion of strategies, objectives, tactics, 
and activities for the QRM program, as described in the purpose and scope sections.  
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The objectives and activities defined in the plan will vary according to the level of 
maturity of the firm’s QRM program, as well as the length of time the QRM program 
has been in use.  The researcher suggests that mature QRM programs might employ a 
strategy of “implement a robust quality risk management program to better protect the 
patient.”  A resultant QRM plan may be structured as shown in Table 9-4. 
Table 9-4: Example strategy mapping for QRM plan as proposed by the researcher 
Objectives Tactics Activities 
Evaluate risks 
associated with 
all critical 
operations on 
site 
Design ideal living 
risk assessment 
library 
Define critical operations 
Development and document critical 
operations 
Perform gap analysis 
between ideal living 
risk assessment 
library and risk 
assessments currently 
in place 
Perform and document gap analysis 
Complete defined 
living risk assessments 
Complete HACCP for warehouse 
Complete process FMEA for fill/finish 
operations 
Complete HACCP for fill/finish facility and 
equipment 
Complete process FMEA for solution 
preparation 
Integrate QRM 
in the quality 
system 
Integrate QRM into 
third party 
management 
Develop QRM approach to supplier 
management 
Develop QRM approach for contract 
manufacturers 
Understand 
portfolio of 
quality risks for 
the site 
Establish quality risk 
profile 
Develop baseline quality risk profile 
Develop process to maintain the quality 
risk profile 
Establish risk register 
Develop baseline risk register 
Develop process to maintain the risk 
register 
 The activities in the QRM Plan should be prioritized using a risk-based framework, 
such that all stakeholders will understand the rationale for the cadence of tasks.  Such 
a risk-based prioritization tool might involve the ranking of each activity for the 
criticality of the topic and the complexity of the effort, as follows: 
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Table 9-5: Topic criticality ranking criteria, for QRM activity prioritization 
Ranking Criteria 
Critical Topic directly impacts product quality and the health and safety of the 
patient.   
Moderate Topic indirectly impacts product quality and the health and safety of the 
patient. 
Minor Topic does not impact product quality or the health and safety of the 
patient. 
 
Table 9-6: Effort complexity ranking criteria, for QRM activity prioritization 
Ranking Criteria 
Complex Significant resources and expertise required. 
Average A moderate amount of resources and expertise required. 
Simple Minimal resources and expertise required. 
 
The intersection of the individual rankings for topic criticality and effort complexity is 
then located in the prioritization matrix to determine the relative priority of the activity. 
  Topic Criticality 
  Minor Moderate Critical 
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Figure 9-G: QRM activity prioritization matrix 
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The relative priority of each QRM activity can be used, in addition to an analysis of 
activity interdependencies, critical path identification, and other considerations, to 
determine an appropriate timeframe for completion.  This enables the firm to allocate 
resources towards the most appropriate activities to enhance QRM maturity and deliver 
a direct benefit to the patient.  An example activity list using the above principles is 
shown in Table 9-7. 
Table 9-7: Example activity list for QRM Plan 
Activity Resources 
required 
Criticality Complexity Priority Target 
completion date 
Complete process 
FMEA for fill/finish 
operations 
As 
appropriate 
Critical Average 2 Q1, Year 1 
Complete HACCP for 
fill/finish facility and 
equipment 
As 
appropriate 
Critical Complex 3 Q2, Year 1 
Develop QRM 
approach to supplier 
management 
As 
appropriate 
Moderate Simple 4 Q3, Year 1 
Complete process 
FMEA for solution 
preparation 
As 
appropriate 
Critical Simple 1 Q1, Year 1 
Complete HACCP for 
warehouse 
As 
appropriate 
Moderate Average 5 Q2, Year 2 
Develop baseline 
quality risk profile 
As 
appropriate 
Minor Average 8 Q4, Year 1 
A thoughtfully constructed QRM plan translates the strategy established by leadership 
into actionable tasks, thereby ensuring the organization remains centered upon the 
things that matter most—protection of the patient. 
9.5 Measuring QRM performance 
The final function of governance—to measure performance of the QRM program—is 
one that has confounded risk management experts for some time.  Organizations often 
calculate metrics, a subset of which are christened “key performance indicators” or 
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KPIs, to evaluate the performance (and changes in performance) of various business 
and operational measures.  Risk management experts at Protiviti note: 
“Improved risk measures, metrics, and monitoring integrated with key 
performance indicator (KPI) reporting facilitates the shift from ‘guessing’ to 
‘knowing’ or ‘understanding’ as well as from ‘reacting’ to ‘being prepared’ or 
‘proactive’ or ‘forward looking’.  These shifts provide evidence of improved 
risk management over time.” (169) 
There are two questions to be answered through the calculation and review of metrics 
and KPIs: (a) is QRM being performed effectively? and (b) is QRM effective at 
managing risk to the patient?  The first of these questions focuses on whether QRM 
principles and practices are being implemented in an effective manner; that is, whether 
the QRM process is being followed in a manner conducive to risk maturity.  The second 
question focuses on measuring whether QRM is achieving its objective—protecting the 
patient.  This second question is notoriously difficult to answer, primarily because truly 
effective QRM, integrated throughout the quality system, would be seamless.  When 
QRM is properly designed and deployed, there are fewer problems in the organization.  
Processes are better controlled.  There are fewer deviations and associated 
investigations.  Changes are more effective.  Reactive CAPA is replaced with proactive 
risk control.  Right-first time efforts abound.  While there are obvious challenges with 
measuring an absence of data; as would be the case when QRM is applied from the start 
of the product lifecycle, measuring changes in these parameters following the 
application of QRM can be misleading.  Attributing improvement in quality and 
reliability solely to QRM is riddled with assumption—in many cases, other quality 
improvement efforts, such as deeper investigations and root cause analyses, more 
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effective CAPA, human error prevention programs, or technology enhancements may 
also contribute to improvements.  While the establishment of precise metrics to measure 
the direct impact of QRM on enhancing product quality and patient protection can be a 
futile endeavor due to the number of variables involved, measuring product quality 
improvements over time can provide valuable information on the relative influence of 
QRM in managing risk to the patient.  A measure of this kind is therefore critical to any 
set of metrics for QRM. (170) 
The second question to be answered through metrics and KPIs, “is QRM being 
performed effectively?,” is perhaps less noble than measuring patient protection.  
However, in a well-designed QRM program, it is equally important to evaluate 
performance related to program implementation as program impact.  Many 
organizations, unfortunately, fail to establish meaningful metrics—those that provide a 
perspective on performance that highlights vulnerabilities, opportunities, and success.  
A majority of industry conference delegates involved in philosophical dialogues with 
the researcher mentioned only one metric for QRM at their companies—the number of 
risk assessments performed.  This metric is weak for a number of reasons.  First, it fails 
to measure QRM performance, focused only on the volume of activity.  Second, as 
discussed in Chapter Eight, the number of risk assessments should reflect the strategic 
design of the living risk assessment library and therefore should be largely predictable.  
Finally, conclusions based solely upon a single metric are likely to be myopic, failing 
to provide decision makers and other stakeholders with the information needed to make 
strategic decisions regarding the QRM program. 
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Instead, the researcher recommends that a small portfolio of metrics be established and 
measured on a periodic (monthly) basis.  In order to ensure a balanced approach, QRM 
metrics should: 
1. Measure activities in each key phase of the QRM lifecycle (risk assessment, 
risk control, risk review, and risk communication) as well as programmatic 
elements (infrastructure and risk maturity) 
2. Include a mix of leading (predictive of future success) and lagging (reflective 
on past performance) indicators 
3. Include a mix of trend (measurement over time to understand organizational 
progress) and target (measurement over time with a defined goal) models 
4. Provide meaningful information that can enable decision making by multiple 
stakeholder groups (e.g. leadership, middle management, QRM practitioners) 
5. Be easily calculated; data required to complete the metrics should be readily 
available and should not pose an undue burden on those who report data nor 
those who compile the metrics (171) (172) (173) (174) 
The first objective of the development of a meaningful set of metrics is to ensure that 
all QRM lifecycle phases—risk assessment, risk control, risk review, and risk 
communication—are represented.  The need for this is clear—the organization must 
ensure that QRM as a whole is functioning effectively.  The inclusion of metrics around 
QRM infrastructure is critical to ensure that the program is appropriately resourced and 
that expertise within the organization is proliferating.  In addition, a measure of risk 
maturity is beneficial to evaluate not only what is being done, but how it is being done.  
Chapter Ten presents a measurement tool for risk maturity developed by the researcher 
that can be used to calculate associated metrics. 
Including both lagging and leading indicators in the metrics set is listed as the second 
objective.  Lagging indicators are the most common form of metrics used in the 
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pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, and measure past performance using 
data gathered from the quality system. (128) (175)  While lagging indicators are 
informative, they are not always predictive of future performance; leading indicators 
perform that function.  Deloitte defines leading indicators as “information that has a 
predictive quality in that it measures current events highly correlated to the future 
results or that directly drive future results through cause-and-effect relationships.” 
(172)  Knowledge gained through an analysis of leading metrics can enable course-
corrections in real time, to influence future outcomes.  Leading indicators are therefore 
proactive in nature—a fitting perspective for QRM. 
The third objective centers upon whether the metric is more conducive to trending or 
goal setting.  Metrics used to set targets, such as a specific percent reduction in quality 
defects, can mobilize the organization towards a shared objective and influence 
behaviors accordingly.  Where targets are established for the wrong metrics, however, 
these same attributes can have negative effects; for example, setting a target for a 
percent reduction in manufacturing deviations may result in under-reporting from 
personnel who are incentivized more strongly to meet the target than to follow the rules.  
In these instances, it is wiser to trend the metric over time to see patterns, and working 
on activities associated with leading metrics to improve future performance. 
A common pitfall in metrics creation, as reported in the philosophical dialogues, is the 
failure to fully understand what the data means; that is, what conclusions can be drawn 
from the information and whether these conclusions offer insight needed by the 
organization.  As described above, for example, the number of risk assessments 
performed over time is merely indicative of the amount of work being done.  It does 
not reflect the quality of the work, or whether there are redundancies or inefficiencies 
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between risk assessments.  Nor is it representative of the number of risks identified, 
which would require a complete understanding of each risk assessment’s scope to fully 
characterize.  Other metrics measure compliance with regulatory standards or company-
specific requirements; as discussed in Chapter Five, while compliance is essential, it is 
only a portion of overall quality.  Rather, organizations should focus on measuring and 
understanding the effectiveness of the work done, regardless of the volume, and 
whether the patient is better protected as a result. 
The fifth and last objective of metrics creation is that the data must be easy to retrieve 
and the metrics easy to compile.  It is far better to spend resources and intellectual 
energy to manage risk to the patient than to labor over metrics. 
A subset of metrics should be selected as KPIs, to be reviewed at the appropriate 
governance forums.  The researcher recommends a maximum of three KPIs for 
companies of any size, to keep attention focused on the most meaningful performance 
measures and prevent “paralysis by analysis.”  In addition, KPIs should measure the 
effectiveness of the QRM program and its use, rather than compliance with the 
program.  This will allow stakeholders to make the appropriate linkages with other 
business and quality objectives, and will reinforce the role of QRM as an enabler of 
quality systems as per ICH Q10.  Finally, the selected KPIs should be those metrics 
most indicative of the strategic role of QRM—to protect the patient.  Table 9-8 offers 
an example of QRM metrics and KPIs that may be useful in providing insight into the 
QRM performance of an organization. 
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This chapter sought to characterize maturity with regard to QRM governance, including 
the supporting infrastructure, governance mechanisms, QRM plan, and metrics and 
KPIs.  Chapter Ten will synthesize the learnings from the complete research effort 
through the development of a QRM maturity measurement tool and associated 
assessment program. 
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Table 9-8: Example QRM Metrics and KPIs 
Metric67 Provides information on… Measures… Type Trend / Target QRM lifecycle phase 
Number of full-time equivalent dedicated QRM 
staff 
Organizational progress, leadership 
commitment Effectiveness Leading Trend Infrastructure 
Number of qualified facilitators Organizational progress, leadership commitment Effectiveness Leading Trend Infrastructure 
Percent of risks identified proactively vs. 
reactively (from Quality Risk Profile)  Organizational and cultural progress Effectiveness Leading Trend Risk Identification 
Number of unacceptable risks (from Quality Risk 
Profile) categorized by quality system elements 
Common pain points, opportunities for 
improvement Effectiveness Lagging Trend Risk Identification 
Number of external inspection observations of any 
type not previously identified on SRP 
Level of self-awareness achieved through 
QRM Effectiveness Lagging Target Risk Identification 
Percent of risk assessments from QRM Plan 
completed on time, completed late, or incomplete Vulnerability of site during inspections Compliance Lagging Target Risk Assessment 
Number of unacceptable risks with no risk control 
plan 
Passive acceptance of risk through 
inaction Compliance Lagging Target Risk Reduction 
Percent of risk control measures/mitigation 
activities proven effective 
Progress in risk control option analysis and 
implementation  Effectiveness Lagging Trend Risk Reduction 
Percent of periodic risk reviews completed on 
time 
Whether risk assessments reflect current 
state Compliance Lagging Target Risk Review 
Number of external inspection or internal self-
inspection observations related to QRM program 
Whether QRM program and/or use of the 
program meets regulatory expectations Compliance Lagging Target All 
Risk register tracking by month – number of high 
risks, number of medium risks, number of new 
(opened) risks, number of closed 
(accepted/mitigated) risks, total number of risks 
Effectiveness of risk identification and 
risk control, organizational progress with 
regard to the amount of attention paid 
towards QRM program 
Effectiveness Lagging Trend All 
QRM maturity assessment results, over time68 Organizational and cultural progress Effectiveness Leading Trend All 
Number of quality defects over time Influence of QRM in improving product quality and patient protection Effectiveness Lagging Target All 
 
                                                 
67 KPIs are shown in yellow. 
68 The QRM measurement tool and associated assessment is discussed further in Chapter Ten. 
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10 Chapter Ten: Measuring QRM Maturity 
 
With the current state of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries 
defined, and the future, mature state envisioned, the research effort sought to outline 
the path towards excellence through the construction of a QRM maturity measurement 
tool to be used to evaluate the effectiveness of QRM as applied by a drug manufacturing 
site.  As mentioned in Chapter Nine, measuring risk maturity, and the progress towards 
the ideal state, is a useful means to evaluate efforts towards patient protection and 
ensure the appropriate oversight of the effectiveness of the QRM program as a whole.  
This chapter discusses the QRM maturity measurement tool that has been developed by 
the researcher based on the learning from all phases of the research, which was piloted 
with several candidate sites from the biopharmaceutical industry to confirm validity 
and utility.  The tool design, usage, benefits, and outcomes of the pilots are discussed.  
Appendix IV offers the complete measurement tool described in this chapter. 
10.1 QRM maturity measurement tool overview 
The QRM maturity measurement tool is structured in a similar way to the chapters in 
Section Three, beginning with an evaluation of the people pillar of QRM, followed by 
each step in the QRM process, and ending with QRM governance.  The tool is therefore 
organized around headings representative of the three pillars of QRM, with associated 
sub-headings as delineated in Table 10-1.   
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Table 10-1: Headings and sub-headings of the QRM maturity measurement tool 
Heading Sub-heading 
People Organizational awareness QRM expertise 
Risk culture 
Application of QRM 
Cultural motivation 
Personnel engagement 
Reward and recognition 
QRM Initiation 
Risk question 
Tool selection 
Expert representation 
Risk Assessment 
Living risk library 
Risk identification 
Risk analysis 
Risk evaluation 
Risk control 
Risk control option analysis 
Risk reduction 
Residual risk appraisal 
Risk review Risk review structure Risk review execution 
Risk communication Risk communication plan Communication of risks 
QRM Infrastructure 
Roles and responsibilities 
Dedicated QRM staff 
Qualified facilitators 
Governance 
Risk register 
Quality risk profile 
QRM plan 
Metrics and KPIs 
Each sub-heading has four levels of criteria that define the level of maturity for that 
aspect of QRM.  Each level has an associated score, ranging from 1 – 4, as shown in 
Table 10-2.   
Learnings from Phase 2 of the research, as discussed in Chapter Five, led the researcher 
to re-envision the structure of the maturity model for the Phase 3 research to facilitate 
a more meaningful evaluation of maturity.  The first pillar of QRM, “people,” has been 
separated into two distinct headings—one to capture organizational knowledge of QRM 
and the other to evaluate risk culture.  The second pillar of QRM, “process,” has been 
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broken out in the QRM maturity measurement tool to capture each stage of the QRM 
lifecycle independently.  The third “governance” pillar of QRM was also separated into 
QRM infrastructure and overall governance.  This separation enables decision makers 
to better distinguish strengths and vulnerabilities in the implementation of QRM 
program than the Phase 2 maturity model and represents an evolution in the researcher’s 
thinking as the research effort progressed.  
Table 10-2: QRM maturity levels and associated scores 
Score Maturity Level Interpretation 
1 Absent QRM program element not acknowledged or performed. 
2 Novice Application of QRM program element is immature. 
3 Intermediate Application of QRM program element is moderately mature, with room for improvement. 
4 Expert 
Application of QRM program element is very mature.  
Tangible benefits to both the site and patients are 
realized. 
 
In addition, a level 0 is available for situations in which the site is unaware that such a 
practice should be acknowledged—that is, the program element represents a blind spot 
for the organization. 
The QRM maturity measurement tool is used through a detailed assessment of the QRM 
program on site, including both the design of the program, as evidenced by policies and 
procedures, and application of the program, as evidenced by completed QRM 
documentation and interviews of site personnel.  The mean of the scores for each sub-
heading represent the overall maturity score for the related heading, which is then 
plotted in a chart or “dashboard” to allow for further analysis. 
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10.2 Recommended use of the QRM maturity measurement tool 
10.2.1 Assessment process 
The QRM maturity assessment is performed using an evidence-based approach in 
which randomly-selected samples of QRM documentation are reviewed, and individual 
QRM practitioners interviewed, to enable the selection of the best-fit maturity score for 
each sub-heading in the measurement tool.  As it not practical (nor valuable) to review 
every piece of evidence related to the QRM program, the random sampling is presumed 
to be representative of the population, and therefore allow for characterization of QRM 
practices as a whole.   
The QRM maturity assessment is intended to be performed for a single site within a 
given pharmaceutical or biopharmaceutical company, rather than the organization as a 
whole.  Because, as seen in Chapter Five, QRM practices can vary within an 
organization based on factors such as geographical location, assessing risk maturity at 
the site level provides the most accurate, and actionable, results.   
In order to ensure an un-biased evaluation, the QRM maturity assessment should be 
performed by a party independent of the QRM program and ideally, the site.  This may 
include an independent functional group within the site, as is often the practice for 
quality self-inspections or internal audits, or an external party such as a consultant may 
be used.  Over time, the site may elect to integrate the maturity assessment into the self-
inspection program as an additional means to measure the effectiveness of the quality 
system through the lens of QRM. 
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Once identified, the assessor (or assessment team) should begin with a review of the 
QRM policy, to familiarize themselves with the landscape in which the site has elected 
to apply QRM.  From there, the assessor may request specific documents to review, 
such as individual procedures, risk assessments, risk reviews, training materials and 
records, and job descriptions.  The assessor may also wish to interview specific 
individuals regarding their opinions of QRM and how they practice of QRM on site.  
Table 10-3 suggests various forms of evidence for each sub-heading that may prove 
useful in the maturity assessment. 
With the evidence reviewed, the assessor moves on the selecting the most appropriate 
maturity score for each sub-heading based on the criteria defined in the measurement 
tool.  Once all scoring is complete, the results are averaged for all sub-headings within 
a given heading, providing a total of eight individual scores—one each for People, 
QRM Initiation, Risk Assessment, Risk Control, Risk Review, Risk Communication, 
QRM Infrastructure, and Governance.  These scores are then plotted on a QRM 
maturity dashboard for further analysis. 
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Table 10-3: Evidence to review during QRM maturity assessment 
Heading  Sub-heading  Evidence to review 
People 
Organization awareness Training materials, training 
records, personnel interviews 
QRM expertise Training materials, training 
records, personnel interviews 
Risk Culture All elements Personnel interviews, QRM plan, risk assessment reports 
QRM Initiation 
Risk question QRM initiation form, risk 
assessment reports 
Tool selection SOPs, QRM initiation form, risk 
assessment reports 
Expert representation QRM initiation form, risk 
assessment reports 
Risk Assessment 
Living risk library SOPs, QRM plan 
Risk identification SOPs, risk assessment reports 
Risk analysis SOPs, risk assessment reports 
Risk evaluation SOPs, risk assessment reports 
Risk Control 
Risk control option 
analysis 
SOPs, risk assessment reports 
Risk reduction CAPA lists, risk assessment 
reports 
Residual risk appraisal Risk assessment reports 
Risk Review 
Risk review structure SOPs, risk review reports 
Risk review execution Risk review reports, updated risk 
assessment reports, meeting 
minutes 
Risk 
Communication 
Risk communication plan SOPs, QRM plan, risk 
communication plan 
Communication of risks Meeting minutes, email, 
memorandums, correspondence 
with external stakeholders 
QRM Infrastructure 
Roles and responsibilities Organizational charts, job 
descriptions 
Dedicated QRM staff Organizational charts, job 
descriptions 
Qualified facilitators Organizational charts, job 
descriptions, training plans 
Governance 
Risk register SOPs, risk register 
Quality risk profile SOPs, quality risk profile 
QRM plan SOPs, QRM plan 
Metrics and KPIs Meeting minutes, dashboards 
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10.2.2 QRM maturity dashboard 
The researcher chose a dashboard, rather than a single “rolled-up” maturity score, as 
the mechanism for analysis.  The dashboard takes the form of a radar or “spider” 
diagram, with each heading plotted as a “spoke” in the diagram and the results of the 
maturity assessment as points on the chart, as illustrated in Figure 10-A. 
 
Figure 10-A: Example QRM maturity dashboard 
The spider diagram used for the QRM maturity dashboard enables the viewer to see the 
overall level of QRM maturity, the individual levels of maturity for each pillar of the 
QRM program, and to explore the balance of maturity to determine where to focus 
efforts or expand best practices.  For example, “risk communication” is shown as an 
area of relative weakness in the example dashboard from Figure 10-A.  However, 
because the “people” and “QRM infrastructure” headings are more mature, there are 
opportunities to mobilize the people at the site and leverage the associated infrastructure 
to improve risk communication within the site.  The dashboard therefore serves as a 
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visual aid to help identify where more mature elements of the QRM can be repurposed 
to improve maturity in areas that are struggling. 
The use of the spider diagram for the QRM maturity dashboard also allows easily 
comparison of results of the maturity assessment.  Figure 10-B, for example, shows 
how two years of data for the same site can be overlaid to enable the identification of 
improvements and backslides over time.  A similar approach may be used to compare 
results between sites to evaluate where knowledge and best practices may be transferred 
from a more mature site to a less mature one. 
 
Figure 10-B: QRM maturity dashboard illustrating a year-over-year comparison 
In this way, the QRM maturity dashboard can provide far more insight into the true 
level of QRM effectiveness than a simple, overall risk maturity “score.” 
10.3 Results of the pilots for the QRM maturity measurement tool 
As the final inquiry in the research effort, the researcher had the opportunity to pilot the 
QRM maturity measurement tool and process with two separate biopharmaceutical 
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companies, for a total of eight sites (seven sites from one company and one site from 
the second company).  Access to each site was granted by senior leadership 
(specifically, the network Vice President of Quality for one company and the site head 
of quality for the other).  Following the QRM maturity assessment using the 
measurement tool, each site’s head of quality was queried regarding his or her opinions 
on the structure of the measurement tool and QRM maturity assessment process.  
Specifically, they were asked: 
• Did you find the QRM maturity assessment valuable? 
• Do the results of the QRM maturity assessment accurately reflect your 
opinions of the maturity of your site’s QRM program? 
• Do you plan to take action based on the results of the QRM maturity 
assessment? 
Both companies requested anonymity with regard to this research, and will therefore be 
referred to as Company A and Company B.  All company and site details were relayed 
to the researcher during the QRM maturity assessments by each site’s Head of Quality. 
Company A is a global pharmaceutical firm with a 2016 annual revenue in excess of 
US $39.2B (33.8B euro) and over 110,000 employees worldwide.  The company has 
divided its business based on product type, with separate business units covering the 
production of API, small molecule pharmaceuticals, biopharmaceuticals, medical 
devices, veterinary products, and consumer health products.  All seven sites included 
in the Phase 3 research pilot were operating under the biopharmaceutical arm of the 
business; however, some of the sites also manufacture medical devices.  Company A 
has a centralized QRM program run by corporate quality that has been tailored by each 
site to meet their specific needs. 
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Site 1 within Company A is staffed by an estimated 1200 employees, focused solely on 
the manufacture and related support of one sterile biological drug substance.  At the 
time of the pilot (September 2016), the site had been performing QRM for 
approximately five years.  Prior to the assessment, the head of quality cited the site’s 
primary struggle with QRM as the shift in site culture away from seeing QRM as a box-
ticking exercise necessary for compliance towards one in which the value is fully and 
broadly understood. The QRM maturity dashboard for Company A, Site 1 is provided 
in Figure 10-C. 
 
Figure 10-C: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 1 
Site 2 within Company A has fewer employees than Site 1, totaling an estimated 350 
employees within manufacturing and related support functions.  Site 2 has an extensive 
history of medical device design and manufacturing, and had been performing risk 
management in accordance with ISO 14971 for over fifteen years at the time of the 
assessment (May 2016).  The site’s inclusion of quality risk management principles and 
practices in the spirit of ICH Q9 into their overarching risk management program was 
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more recent, introduced four years prior to the pilot.  During the opening meeting for 
the assessment, the site’s head of quality reported no challenges with his QRM program 
and anticipated it to be best-in-class.  Figure 10-D illustrates the QRM maturity 
dashboard for Company A, Site 2. 
 
Figure 10-D: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 2 
The third pilot site from Company A (referred to as Site 3) employs an estimated 75 
people and focuses solely on raw material receipt, testing, and release for other sites in 
the biopharmaceutical network as well as finished product packaging and distribution.  
The site had been performing QRM for only one year at the time of the pilot (May 
2016) but had established QRM program deployment as the site’s primary quality 
objective for the prior year.  At the start of the assessment, the site’s head of quality 
acknowledged that the program was young, and was primarily interested in learning the 
site’s vulnerabilities to enable goal setting for the following calendar year.  The QRM 
maturity dashboard for Company A, Site 3 is shown in Figure 10-E. 
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Figure 10-E: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 3 
Site 4 within Company A employs an estimated 2500 employees and focuses on the 
production and associated support of four sterile biopharmaceutical drug substances.  
The QRM program at Site 4 had been in effect for four years at the time of the QRM 
maturity assessment in February 2016.  The site’s head of quality expressed concern in 
the opening meeting with the number of unacceptable risks reported by the site and the 
lack of “movement” on those risks—described as either risk reduction or risk 
acceptance.  The QRM maturity dashboard for Site 4 is provided in Figure 10-F. 
People
Risk culture
QRM Initiation
Risk Assessment
Risk ControlRisk Review
Risk Communication
QRM Infrastructure
Governance
1
4
3
2
 330 
 
 
Figure 10-F: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 4 
 
The fifth pilot site from Company A was new to the company, having been acquired by 
the large pharmaceutical firm two years prior to the QRM maturity assessment (March 
2016).  Formerly a small start-up firm, the site had only been applying QRM over the 
prior six months, largely as a result of the integration efforts into its parent company.  
The site employs a mere 50 people, and manufactures one aseptically-produced sterile 
drug substance.  The site’s head of quality had no prior experience with QRM himself, 
and was interested in understanding where the site ranked in QRM maturity in 
comparison to its peers in the company network.  The QRM maturity dashboard for Site 
5 is provided in Figure 10-G. 
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Figure 10-G: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 5 
 
Site 6 of Company A is a rather interesting case, being under consent decree in the US 
at the time of QRM maturity assessment in October 2016.69  The site employed 
approximately 700 employees, an additional 500 external quality consultants, and 30 
external consent decree verifiers, to support the production of one sterile 
biopharmaceutical drug substance at 100% capacity.  The site had been performing 
QRM since the finalization of the consent decree terms six years prior to the pilot.  
Because the site’s QRM program had been developed by external quality consultants 
and was cited by the consent decree verifiers as an example of excellence for the rest 
of the site, the site’s head of quality was exceedingly confident in the opening meeting 
that the level of risk maturity would be the highest in the company’s network, although 
                                                 
69 Consent decree is one of the more severe regulatory sanctions available to the FDA, exceeded only by 
revocation of a drug manufacturing license and physical seizure of drug manufacturing assets.  Consent 
decree entails, among other requirements, the hiring of full time quality consultants to guide 
reconstruction of the site’s quality system, continuous verification of quality system improvement by a 
separate consulting body, and disgorgement of profits to FDA from the sale of products manufactured in 
violation of regulatory requirements. 
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admitted that the site culture is one of urgent reaction rather than anticipation.  Figure 
10-I shows the QRM maturity dashboard for Site 6 of Company A. 
 
Figure 10-H: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 6 
Site 7 of Company A employs an estimated 120 people to manufacture and support a 
medical device.  Having performed risk management in accordance with ISO 14971 
since 2003, the site had incorporated QRM principles four years prior to the QRM 
maturity assessment date (July 2016).  The head of quality at the site appeared mildly 
disinterested when the assessment commenced, and did not express any concerns with 
his site’s QRM program.  The QRM maturity dashboard for Site 7 of Company A is 
provided in Figure 10-J. 
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Figure 10-I: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company A, Site 7 
 
The final site used in the QRM maturity measurement tool pilot was a single site from 
Company B.  Company B is also a global pharmaceutical firm headquartered in the EU, 
although the site included in the pilot is located in the US.  Company B’s 2016 annual 
revenue exceeded US $54.2B (46.7B euro) with over 115,000 employees 
internationally.  Similar to Company A, Company B has organized its diversified 
product portfolio into business units based on product type, including crop science, 
pharmaceuticals, consumer health, and animal health.  The pharmaceutical division in 
sub-divided into small molecule products and biopharmaceuticals.  The site included in 
this pilot is organized with the biopharmaceutical subdivision. 
Site 1 of Company B employs an estimated 2,500 employees to manufacture and 
support three sterile drugs, including both drug substance and drug product.  The site 
had become interested in QRM following the hiring of a new site head of quality who 
was particularly interested in the topic.  The site had been performing QRM for ten 
years leading up to the pilot, performed in May 2017.  At the start of the maturity 
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assessment, the new head of quality was distressed by the site’s QRM program when 
compared with her prior experience, though no specific areas of concern were voiced.  
Figure 10-K shows the QRM maturity dashboard for Site 1 of Company B. 
 
Figure 10-J: Results of QRM maturity measurement tool pilot – Company B, Site 1 
 
The results of QRM maturity assessment pilots validated the measurement tool as an 
accurate and constructive means to measure, understand, and improve QRM maturity 
and effectiveness.  All eight heads of quality involved in the pilots agreed that the 
assessment was valuable, with seven expressing interest in repeating the assessment in 
one year’s time to gauge improvement.  All heads of quality noted that they intend to 
share the results of the QRM maturity assessment with their staff, some noting that they 
would include the topic in upcoming town hall-type meetings with all site employees.  
Seven of eight heads of quality agreed that the QRM maturity measurement tool 
0
1
2
3
4
People
Risk Culture
QRM Initiation
Risk Assessment
Risk ControlRisk Review
Risk Communication
QRM Infrastructure
Governance
 335 
 
accurately reflected their opinions of their site’s QRM effectiveness, 70 with one head 
of quality (for Company A, Site 6, involved in consent decree activities) acknowledging 
that he may have been overconfident in the program currently in place at this site.  All 
eight heads of quality noted that they plan to take action to improve the level of QRM 
maturity within their site based on the outcomes of the measurement tool.  The QRM 
maturity assessment and associated measurement tool are therefore considered to 
provide an adequate measure of QRM maturity that can help ensure an organization can 
effectively use QRM to protect the patient. 
 
The QRM maturity measurement tool development and pilots marks the end of the 
Phase 3 research, and closure of the overarching research effort.  The implications of 
the research, including conclusions, recommendations, and suggested areas for 
additional research are discussed in the fourth and final section of this thesis. 
  
                                                 
70 One quality head (for Company A, Site 2) did not feel that the random sampling of evidence was 
representative of the population, as it was his opinion that the site was very mature in QRM application.  
The researcher would like to draw the reader’s attention to the low “governance” score associated with 
this site (Figure 10-D), as there appears to be a lack of knowledge and oversight of the QRM program at 
the leadership level.  While the researcher cannot definitively state that the head of quality was 
misinformed regarding the true state of QRM at his site, the results of the QRM maturity assessment 
indicate that this may be a factor influencing his opinion. 
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Section Four: Implications of the 
Research 
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“When you find yourself in a hole, stop digging.” 
- Will Rogers 
  
 
“Don`t be afraid to take a big step when one is indicated. You 
can`t cross a chasm in two small steps.” 
- David Lloyd George 
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11 Chapter Eleven: Focus Areas for Future Research 
 
Perhaps one of the most difficult challenges for any researcher is to stay within the 
boundaries of the chosen research topic.  As the research progresses, ideas abound.  The 
researcher may be left with an unsettling sort of intellectual restlessness when faced 
with the prospect that those ideas must, in many cases, be left unexplored, if a final 
body of knowledge were to ever be shared.  This researcher, in particular, suffers 
gravely from this affliction.  This chapter aims summarizes the most critical and 
potentially valuable of these ideas to inspire future researchers.  
Future research topic #1 
Skeptics within industry require proof, in the form of both statistical correlation and 
case studies, that QRM will improve product quality and profitability.  Future work in 
QRM should focus on determining whether there is a direct correlation between those 
companies with mature QRM programs (per the QRM maturity measurement tool) and 
those with higher quality products, as evidenced by defect rates, recall rates, and other 
quality metrics.  In addition, profitability and cost of goods sold (COGS) should be 
measured and compared with each firm’s QRM maturity levels.  Such an analysis will 
enable an understanding of the benefits of QRM using tangible outcomes by answer the 
following questions: 
• Do companies with robust, consistent product quality tend to have more 
mature QRM programs? 
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• Do companies with more mature QRM programs tend to have more robust 
product quality? 
This will further solidify whether QRM maturity levels are an appropriate leading 
indicator of patient protection in the form of high quality, more readily available 
medicinal therapies. 
Future research topic #2 
Additional research is needed to develop a framework to characterize and improve 
individual QRM maturity.  While the research effort described in this thesis focused on 
organizational QRM maturity, it did not explore in detail how individuals can 
contribute to QRM effectiveness.  Such a research effort should seek to identify whether 
there are specific personality types that are more conducive to excellence in QRM, such 
as introverts or extroverts, or those inclined to be detail-oriented or “big picture” 
thinkers.  Such a research study should also expand upon, and pilot, the education 
required to cultivate QRM expertise, building upon the model suggested in Chapter 
Seven of this thesis.  
Future research topic #3 
While this thesis focused primarily on preventive risk management in the context of 
accident avoidance, additional research is needed regarding business continuity 
programs that can accelerate a pharmaceutical manufacturing plant’s return-to-service 
(or more appropriately, return-to-cGMP) in the event a catastrophe occurs.  This is 
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particularly pressing in light of recent natural disasters that have devastated countries 
like Puerto Rico, which has a high concentration of drug manufacturing plants. 
Future research topic #4 
It is this researcher’s opinion that additional research into the application of defense in 
depth principles and practices, such as those described in Chapter Six in the context of 
the nuclear power industry, to QRM and cGMP.  It would be of particular interest to 
explore the relationship between defense in depth and Lean, which seeks to eliminate 
redundancy and idle capacity where defense in depth may seek to add it as a risk control 
measure. 
Future research topic #5 
Future research into QRM should aim to expand the existing QRM toolkit with other, 
proven risk tools, such as the Probabilistic Risk Assessment techniques mentioned in 
Chapter Six. 
 
The exploration of the above-listed topic through a rigorous academic framework will 
further enhance knowledge of pharmaceutical quality and enable the patient to be better 
served.  
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12 Chapter Twelve: Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
This thesis has explored the application of quality risk management principles and 
practices within the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, in an effort gauge 
its effectiveness in managing risk to the patient.  Through the use of multiple research 
methods, the research effort examined the current implementation of quality risk 
management in these industries and characterized a mature state of QRM 
implementation, all the while seeking to answer the fundamental question of: 
“How can industry recode QRM to better manage risks to the patient?” 
12.1 Conclusion 
Chapter One of this thesis introduced the reader to the research effort, beginning with 
an exploration of the context in which patients live—relying on medicines to sustain 
their life and health, supported by the companies that make these medicines, and hoping 
that those organizations are working hard to protect them.  Protecting patients is 
simultaneously a privilege and a grave responsibility—a core function of the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  After a brief review of the general 
principles of risk management, Chapter One described how the practice can be applied 
to medicinal products to ensure patient protection.  Different types of risks, intrinsic 
and extrinsic to the medicinal product, were discussed.  While intrinsic risks are 
relatively well understood and well controlled for the patient, the management of 
extrinsic risks, particularly quality risks, has been historically neglected by comparison.  
Recent regulatory modernization efforts have opened the door for the use of risk 
management in assuring and improving medicinal product quality, thereby better 
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managing the risk to the patient.  The research effort is centered upon exploring 
whether, and how, this may come to fruition. 
Chapter Two of this thesis summarized the initial literature review performed in support 
of the research effort.  The history of risk management in the pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical industries was reviewed, and the emergent regulatory climate 
towards one of risk-based, rather than rule-based, quality and compliance was 
described.  The reader was then familiarized with ICH regulation, specifically the four 
most recent guidelines, ICH Q8(R2), ICH Q9, ICH Q10, and ICH Q11 which grounded 
the research effort.  Finally, a critical review of authoritative industry reports and books 
on the field of QRM was performed.  The literature review described in Chapter Two 
was just a portion of the overall literature review performed in support of the research. 
Chapter Three of this thesis described the researcher’s worldview, the research 
question, the structure of the research effort, and the research methods to be employed.  
The researcher discussed her pragmatic worldview and described its fit with the 
research effort, given the focus on utility rather than ontology.  The researcher disclosed 
her insider perspective as a member of industry, and acknowledged the potential bias 
that may result as well as the advantages that may be offered.  A review of the controls 
used to conduct the research in alignment with ethical principles and protect research 
subjects’ privacy was then discussed.  The chapter then transitioned to describe the 
history of the risk question, as the researcher evolved her thinking from the initial 
research proposal, through the confirmation examination, and ultimately to the writing 
of the thesis.  Finally, the research phases and methods were discussed.  The research 
effort was divided into three phases: the first phase sought to determine whether there 
is sufficient evidence to confirm that the patient is better protected since the inception 
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of quality risk management in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries; the 
second phase aimed to characterize the extent to which current QRM practices in 
industry effectively manage risk to the patient; and the third and final phase sought to 
frame what effectiveness and maturity in QRM looks like to improve patient protection.  
A mixed methods approach was used throughout the research, consisting of both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods including literature review, philosophical 
dialogues, benchmarking surveys, data analysis, semi-structured expert interviews, and 
pilot case studies. 
Chapter Four documented the results of the Phase 1 research, focused on determining 
whether the patient has reaped the benefit of better quality products since the advent of 
QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries, marked by the 
publication of ICH Q9.  The research used literature review of quality-related medicinal 
product recalls in Ireland and the US, which were then analyzed to determine the 
presence of any trends that may cast insight into the state of patient protection.  In both 
represented countries, there was an increasing trend in quality-related recalls over the 
time period included in the research.  While there may be other variables involved, such 
as increased reporting of quality defects or increasing volume of product on the market, 
the data did not support a claim that the patient is better protected following the 
publication of ICH Q9. 
 Chapter Five described the results of the Phase 2 research, which explored the ways in 
which industry is currently applying QRM and the extent to which these practices 
effectively manage risk to the patient.  The first research inquiry in Phase 2 explored 
whether QRM has improved industry compliance with cGMP, and whether QRM itself 
is applied in a compliant manner.  This inquiry employed literature review of cGMP-
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related warning letters issued by the US FDA and an analysis of the results, which 
revealed an increasing trend in warning letters over the examined time period.  Warning 
letter citations against QRM practices likewise increased over the same time period, 
revealing that industry’s compliance with cGMP has not improved since the 
introduction of quality risk management.  In addition, regulators do not seem to have a 
high level of confidence in the way violative firms have employed QRM, as evidenced 
by the trend and nature of QRM-related citations seen in the data. 
The second research inquiry in Phase 2 sought to identify industry’s current level of 
risk maturity—envisioned by the researcher as the effectiveness of QRM, the behaviors 
and motivations of QRM practitioners, and the oversight and accountability of QRM 
implementation.  A benchmarking survey was conducted to reveal these insights.  The 
survey results were flush with learnings, most of which were rather disappointing given 
the tenure of QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  For 
example, the overall perspective of the people working with and within QRM is rather 
apathetic, with pockets of people engaged in QRM but few “true believers” who 
actively advocate for its use.  QRM has not permeated the product lifecycle and quality 
system to the extent one might expect, and is applied most often in ways that fail to 
proactively protect the patient.  A large proportion of respondents indicated that QRM 
is often misused, such as to justify current practices or decisions that had already been 
taken.  In addition, ownership and accountability for QRM and the promise it holds for 
patients is lacking.  Philosophical dialogues held during the Phase 2 research indicated 
a culture of fear, blame, confusion, and excuses.  The results of this research inquiry 
exposed the burning platform that should incite action.  The need for the development 
of a mature model for QRM that can be implemented by pharmaceutical and 
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biopharmaceutical firms was clear.  The researcher forged ahead to address this solution 
in the Phase 3 research. 
Chapter Six described the interim research inquiry that would bridge the Phase 2 and 
Phase 3.  This chapter explored other industries with a history of strong and effective 
risk management: medical devices, aerospace, and nuclear power.  This research 
inquiry was performed via literature review; the researcher extracted key learnings from 
the literature that would inform the construction of the mature QRM program 
desperately needed by industry.  These key learnings included: 
1. Acknowledge uncertainty associated with the risks being explored and the 
operating climate in which they manifest themselves.  Seek to minimize 
uncertainty by gaining knowledge and understanding. 
2. Define the context in which the risks are identified, analyzed, and controlled.  
Acknowledge that the context may change and that decisions should be 
reassessed accordingly. 
3. Focus QRM efforts on the product—the most direct link to the patient. 
4. Control risks like someone’s life depends on it.  Because the patient’s life 
does. 
5. Plan for QRM.  Identify gaps impeding a mature state from being realized, and 
bridge them. 
6. Acknowledge the two forms of QRM—continuous QRM and risk-informed 
decision making.  Master both. 
7. Culture is key.  Learn from mistakes.  Avoid making the same mistake twice. 
8. Communicate with purpose.  Plan for what to communicate, to whom, when.  
Make sure everyone who needs to know, knows. 
Chapter Seven marked the first chapter addressing the Phase 3 research, and defined a 
mature state of QRM with respect the people working within it.  A combination of 
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literature review, semi-structured expert interviews, and philosophical dialogues were 
used to define how people can be more effective in applying QRM to protect the patient.  
The use of role-based QRM was deemed critical, as it ensures that all QRM 
practitioners, and the organization as a whole, possess a working knowledge of QRM 
commensurate with their interaction with the program.  A high-level framework for 
developing QRM expertise was proposed by the researcher, seeking to fill a commonly 
cited gap in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries.  Finally, the role of 
risk culture in enabling QRM effectiveness was discussed, and recommendations from 
the researcher to improve risk culture were offered. 
Chapter Eight explored maturity and effectiveness with respect to the QRM process, 
beginning with a discussion of the strategic creation of a living risk assessment library 
to ensure that all elements critical to the patient would be included in the QRM program.  
The chapter went on to discuss best practices for QRM initiation, followed by an 
introduction to a risk assessment model developed by the researcher to provide a direct 
line of sight to the patient.  The topic of risk control came next, including an 
examination of best practices to ensure robust risk reduction, residual risk appraisal, 
and risk acceptance.  The chapter then turned to an inquiry into a mature state of risk 
review, in which knowledge gained is fed back into the QRM process to ensure 
continued effectiveness of managing risk to the patient.  Risk communication was then 
explored, including an inquiry into stakeholder perception and the creation of a plan to 
guide risk communication.  The chapter closed with a proposed, modified QRM 
lifecycle to better enable risk maturity and effective patient protection. 
Chapter Nine sought to characterize maturity with respect to QRM governance, 
discussing the importance of leadership commitment and their role in effectively 
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managing risk to the patient.  An effective QRM infrastructure was then proposed, 
including policies, procedures, and human resources necessary to mobilize the 
organization to the management of quality risks.  Two governance mechanisms were 
described—the risk register and the quality risk profile—along with process flows and 
templates created by the researcher.  The construction and use of a QRM plan to set and 
communicate QRM strategy, objectives, tactics, and activities was then described.  
Finally, a set of proposed metrics and key performance indicators was offered to enable 
the governing body to measure the conduct and effectiveness of the QRM program. 
Chapter Ten finalized the Phase 3 research with a discussion around a QRM maturity 
measurement tool and assessment process developed by the researcher.  The 
development of the measurement tool synthesized learnings from prior phases of the 
research into a simple approach to gauge the current level of QRM maturity of a site 
and define a path towards improvement.  The QRM maturity measurement tool and 
assessment process was piloted at eight separate biopharmaceutical manufacturing 
sites, validated the tool as an appropriate means to measure QRM effectiveness. 
Finally, Chapter Eleven outlined areas where additional research is warranted to more 
fully characterize and improve QRM in the pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical 
industries. 
According to Harvard Business Review Analytic Services, risk management programs 
cannot be successful without six organizational capabilities: 
1. “Linking risk information to strategic decision making 
2. Establishing a risk aware culture at all levels 
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3. Embedding risk management practices and responsibilities within strategy and 
operations 
4. Ensuring that all decisions remain within the organization’s risk tolerance 
5. Driving risk mitigation activities 
6. Proactively identifying current and emerging risks” (164) 
This thesis, and the research effort it described, sought to address each of these 
capabilities in turn, recoding QRM principles and practices to better manage risk to the 
patient.   
In her learnings over the course of the research, the researcher has identified several 
recommendations for both regulators and industry to better support the common goal 
of applying QRM to manage risk to the patient.  It is at this stage that the researcher 
chooses to exercise the advantages of her insider status, as summarized above and 
discussed at length in Chapter Three, and issue both parties an untitled letter.71  As the 
FDA as found untitled letter an effective means to incite action, so too hopes the 
researcher. 
12.2 An untitled letter to regulators 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
Thank you for your service in protecting the public health.  Patients the world 
over rely on you as the gatekeepers for the drug manufacturing industries, 
trusting they are safe under your watchful eyes.  Your regulatory strategy is 
                                                 
71 An untitled letter is a regulatory communication vehicle used by the US FDA to warn manufacturers 
of violative conditions that may, if left unresolved, trigger future regulation action. 
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evolving in ways that acknowledge emergent concepts, demonstrating your 
commitment to modernizing your way of thinking.  Kudos to you and best of 
luck in this endeavor.  I know it is difficult to change. 
It has come to my attention that the use of quality risk management in the 
pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical industries has not been successful in 
managing the risk to patients.  This is alarming, particularly in light of your 
evolving regulatory strategy which relies on this very topic to supplement 
traditional regulation.  If QRM fails to manage risk to patient, what good will it 
do?  What will become of modern regulation if it so heavily relies on ineffective 
programs?  What will happen to the patients? 
There are actions that you, as regulators, can take to help make QRM successful 
and ensure its goal is met.  Please consider the following as you continue along 
your mission: 
• Several QRM experts have suggested that regulators may be confusing 
industry with regard to appropriate QRM application. (134) (132) (127) 
(125)  One expert even went so far as to say that “regulators are part of 
the problem” with the immature state of QRM in industry. (134)  For 
example, you often issue warning letters for cGMP violations, requiring 
a risk assessment to be performed in response.  This implies to industry 
that it is your desire that QRM be performed retrospectively, perhaps, 
even, to justify the quality of a product already on market.  Of course, 
this is the wrong impression.  As a first step, please seek out better and 
more complete education on QRM principles and practices.  This will 
enable you to ensure that your requests do not encourage improper 
practices within industry. 
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• Please review QRM in all inspections you perform.  Industry has heard 
your message that QRM is an enabler of the quality system, and yet, 
many firms never get feedback on how their enabler is working.  Please 
make a distinction between risk assessments and QRM in these 
inspections.  Risk assessments are not representative of risk 
management.  Training, governance, risk control, risk review, and risk 
communication must also be reviewed.  After all, what can one make of 
a quality system that is not adequately enabled? 
• Please be cautious of the language you select when issuing new 
regulation or guidance.  For example, rather than requiring a risk 
assessment to be created for a given topic, consider requiring the risk to 
be assessed.  This will allow industry to use their living risk assessment 
libraries to evaluate risks in the context of other risks to the patient, 
minimizing the number of individual, narrowly-scoped risk assessments 
that confound patient protection. 
• Please take the time to review all regulations and guidance that you have 
issued to ensure they accurately reflect your intended message.  Where 
discrepant points or inconsistencies are found, make industry aware of 
what you have learned and how you intended to resolve it.  Risk 
communication can also flow from regulators to industry, you know. 
• Please try to avoid suggesting a particular risk tool be used to assess 
certain types of risks.  Frankly, you don’t have a great track record in 
getting this right (refer to sections 2.2.3 and 5.3.2), and it absolves 
industry from the responsibility to understand QRM well enough to 
select a tool on their own. 
I know these recommendations and the concerns that inspire them may be hard 
to hear.  They come from a good place—a place of devotion to well-done QRM 
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and a place of concern for the patient.  Please, take these recommendations to 
heart.  The patient depends on it. 
Sincerely, 
The Researcher 
 
 
12.3 An untitled letter to industry 
 
To Whom It May Concern (which, of course, means all of us): 
I am sorry to inform you that QRM isn’t working.  I don’t mean to say that 
QRM doesn’t work—indeed, it does—but rather the way we have tried to 
implement it has been unsuccessful.   
I’m sure many of you have sensed this.  We have been working so hard, doing 
the best QRM we know how to do.  But it is like we are on an exercise wheel in 
a hamster cage—running, running, running, yet getting nowhere.  We are 
creating a lot of risk assessments, a lot of deliverables, and yet our patients are 
no better protected.  Things have got to change. 
Please, stop doing what you’re doing.  Review this thesis, dissolve your current 
QRM programs, and replace it with this one.  I know some of us are doing good 
things with QRM, that there are pockets of best practices out there.  I do not ask 
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those companies to take a step backward.  What I ask is that we look critically 
at our QRM programs, that we gauge our maturity using the QRM maturity 
measurement tool provided in Appendix IV, and that, if we’re not where we 
need to be, we take a drastic leap forward. 
This will require a lot from you.  It will require some of us to stop managing 
and start leading.  It will require us to invest in prevention, to invest in 
education, and to let some fires burn while we seek to prevent others.  But ours 
is an industry of intelligent, resourceful, and resilient people.  We are far more 
capable of managing quality risks than our patients.   
Remember, people, processes, and governance need to work together to make 
QRM effective, and QRM is needed to support the patient.  We can do this, and 
we shall. 
 
Kind regards, 
The Researcher 
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14 Appendix I: Template for QRM Initiation 
This appendix offers a template that may be used by pharmaceutical and 
biopharmaceutical firms to enhance their maturity in QRM Initiation.  The use of this 
template will ensure that all aspects of the QRM Initiation process are performed in a 
concise and organized manner. 
 
Section 1: General Information 
 
Risk Assessment Topic:  ____________________________________________ 
 
Product/Process/System under assessment:  _____________________________ 
 
Risk Assessment Type:    Living       Ad hoc 
 
Applicable Product(s):  _____________________________________________ 
 
In scope:  ________________________________________________________ 
 
Out of scope:  ____________________________________________________ 
 
Objective/Risk Question:  __________________________________________ 
                                          
_____________________________________________________________ 
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Section 2: Team Identification 
 
Expertise Needed Subject Matter Expert Name(s) 
  Manufacturing Process  
  Quality  
  Microbiology  
  Chemistry  
  Manufacturing Science  
  Validation  
  Engineering  
  Facilities  
  Maintenance  
  Calibration  
  Computerized Systems  
  Automation  
  Medical / Clinical  
  Toxicology  
  Other (specify)  
 
System/Process Owner:  ____________________________________________ 
                                               Print / Sign                                                  Date 
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Section 3: Risk Assessment Decision Tree 
Scope and Objective/
Risk Question
Is there a 
procedural 
requirement to use 
a specific risk 
tool?
Use tool 
defined in the 
applicable 
procedure
  Yes
Is this a
 living risk 
assessment?
  No
Is the objective of this 
risk assessment to 
determine patient impact 
following an event?
Use Risk-based Impact 
Assessment (RBIA)
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Formal
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Formal
Use Hazard 
Analysis and 
Critical Control 
Points (HACCP)
Use Failure 
Modes and 
Effects 
Analysis  
(FMEA)
Is the 
development of a 
sampling plan a 
primary 
objective?
  Yes
  No
  Yes
  No
  Yes
Is this risk assessment 
related to a process or 
system that is critical to 
product quality or patient 
safety?
Use Failure 
Modes and 
Effects Analysis  
(FMEA) tool
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Formal
  Yes
  No
Risk 
Assessment 
Formality = 
Less Formal
  No
Use Risk Estimation Matrix (REM), Risk 
Ranking and Filtering (RRF), decision tree, 
Ishikawa diagram, or other risk-based 
approach
Is the objective of this 
risk assessment to 
determine root (or 
potential) cause?
Use Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA) or 
other formal root 
cause analysis tool
Is the issue simple and 
loosely coupled or 
complex and tightly 
coupled?
  Yes
Use Five Whys or 
other less formal 
root cause analysis 
tool
  Simple
  Complex
  No
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Level of Formality:    Formal             Less Formal                    Customized 
 
Risk Tool:  _______________________________________________________ 
 
 
System/Process Owner:  _____________________________________________ 
                                               Print / Sign                                               Date 
 
Section 4: Request Disposition 
 
  Risk Assessment is approved to proceed based on the details of this template 
and site objectives as defined by the QRM Plan. 
 
  Risk Assessment is NOT approved to proceed.  Information in this template is 
incomplete or inaccurate, or request conflicts with the site objectives as defined by 
the QRM Plan. 
 
Comments: 
 
Approved by:  ____________________________________________________ 
                             Quality Risk Management; Print / Sign                     Date 
 
 
 
 392 
 
15 Appendix II: Template for Risk Register 
 
 
  
Acceptance 
Information
Risk ID Report #
Report 
Title Revision
System/ 
Process 
Owner
Approval 
Date
Failure 
Mode / 
Hazard
Failure 
Cause
Failure 
Effect Likelihood Detectability Severity Risk Level
Rationale for 
Acceptance
Mitigation 
Activity
Responsible 
Party
Target 
Implementation 
Date
Completion 
Date Residual Risk
Acceptance 
Date
Origin Information Risk Information Mitigation Activities Residual Risk
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16 Appendix III: Template for Quality Risk Profile 
 
 
 
Risk ID Risk 
Description
Risk Owner Date 
Identified
Risk 
Identification
Risk Type
Quality 
System 
Element
Likelihood Severity Overall 
Risk
Mitigation 
Plan
Responsible 
Parties
Target 
Date
Interim 
Controls
Mitigation 
Plan 
Status
Actions 
Taken
Likelihood Severity Residual 
Risk
Rationale for 
Risk 
Acceptance
Risk 
Acceptance 
Date
Risk Identification Risk Classification Risk Analysis Risk AcceptanceResidual RiskRisk Control
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17 Appendix IV: Quality Risk Management Maturity Measurement Tool 
 
People 
Sub-heading 
Maturity 
Level 1: 
Absent 
Maturity Level 2: 
Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Organizational 
awareness 
There is no 
QRM training 
provided for 
most 
employees on 
site. 
QRM training is 
provided at the site 
at an undefined 
frequency to those 
who request the 
training. 
All employees are provided with 
training commensurate with their 
level interaction with risk 
management, including those with 
no direct responsibility for 
performing or participating in risk 
assessments (e.g. those who only 
require training on the role of QRM 
in GMP). 
All employees are provided with training commensurate with 
their level interaction with risk management, including those 
with no direct responsibility for performing or participating in 
risk assessments (e.g. those who only require training on the 
role of QRM in GMP).  Training is updated and refreshers are 
provided periodically; retraining frequency is predefined and 
documented. 
QRM expertise 
(facilitators) 
There is no 
training 
available to 
develop QRM 
experts. 
QRM facilitator 
training focuses on 
the basic principles 
of QRM and the use 
of QRM tools. 
QRM facilitator training includes 
QRM principles, QRM tools, best 
practices over the QRM lifecycle, 
and facilitation skills. 
QRM facilitator training is considered an ongoing education.  
Facilitators undergo a rigorous qualification process 
consisting of the maturity level 3 coursework, and are required 
to apprentice under a seasoned QRM expert.  QRM experts 
are expected to mentor apprentices and continue growing in 
their role. 
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Risk Culture 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Application of 
QRM Reactive only 
Primarily reactive (80% 
reactive / 20% proactive) 
Primarily proactive (80% proactive 
/ 20% reactive) 
QRM fully integrated throughout the 
quality system and is applied proactively 
to design systems and assess risks 
Cultural 
motivation 
achieve compliance; "the 
regulations require it" 
foster more consistent 
decision-making 
learning organization; continuous 
improvement of operations and 
business processes through risk 
protecting the patient 
Personnel 
engagement individual heroics and silos 
organization acknowledges 
QRM value proposition; 
pockets of personnel are 
engaged in QRM 
organization is engaged in QRM; 
pockets of personnel advocate for 
QRM 
organization advocates for QRM 
Recognition and 
reward system 
Heroic efforts for solving 
existing problems are 
rewarded exclusively; 
proactive QRM 
consciously deprioritized 
Efforts for proactive QRM go 
unnoticed by the organization 
Informal acknowledgement / 
rewards for proactive QRM, or 
rewards exist in pockets only 
Formal recognition / reward system in 
place for proactive QRM   
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QRM Initiation 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Risk question 
Individual risk 
assessments do not 
have clearly defined 
risk question or 
objective and scope. 
Some risk assessments have 
a defined risk question and 
scope, however the risk 
question may imply a 
forgone conclusion. 
Some risk assessments have a 
clearly defined risk question and 
scope, phrased in a way to 
encourage an assessment that is 
agnostic to the outcome. 
All risk assessments have a clearly defined risk 
question and scope, phrased in a way to 
encourage an assessment that is agnostic to the 
outcome. 
Tool selection 
There are no QRM 
tools defined, or only a 
single QRM tool is in 
use. 
A QRM toolkit is in place, 
but tool selection is 
inconsistent based on the 
risk question. 
A QRM toolkit is in place. 
Guidance is available to ensure 
the tool selected is appropriate 
for the risk question. 
A QRM toolkit is in place.  There is a clearly 
defined mechanism to select an appropriate tool 
based on the risk question, with an allowance to 
use an alternate tool with appropriate rationale. 
Expert 
representation 
Teams of SMEs are not 
used to conduct a risk 
assessment. 
Team selected for 
individual risk assessments 
do not adequately represent 
the technical expertise 
required.   
Team selected for individual risk 
assessment represents the 
technical expertise required for 
the completion of a robust 
assessment. 
Team selected for individual risk assessment 
represents the technical expertise required for 
the completion of robust assessment, and the 
team members are empowered to make 
judgments representing their area of expertise.  
SME representation is consistent throughout the 
risk assessment.   
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Risk Assessment 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Living risk 
assessment library 
The living risk assessment 
library has not been defined. 
The living risk assessment 
library has been defined.  
Between 0 - 50% of required 
risk assessments are complete. 
The living risk assessment library 
has been defined.  Between 51 - 
80% of required risk assessments 
are complete. 
The living risk assessment library has been 
defined.  Over 80% of required risk 
assessments are complete and the remainder 
are planned. 
Risk identification 
Risks identified without any 
systematic mechanism. Clear 
gaps exist between site 
experience and identified 
risks.  There is no link 
between the identified risks 
and elements critical to the 
patient (i.e. CQAs, CPPs, 
CAs, and CADEs). 
Risks are systematically 
identified and aligned with site 
experience, however there is a 
weak link between the 
identified risks and elements 
critical to the patient. 
Risks are systematically identified 
and aligned with site experience.  
Risk associated with most 
elements critical to the patient 
have been identified. 
Potential risks are identified in a systematic 
way, consistent with the identified scope, 
perspective, and risk question.  Identified risks 
are comprehensive with respect to reasonable 
expectations when compared with site 
experience.  Risks associated with all 
elements critical to the patient have been 
identified. 
Risk analysis  
Individual risk assessments 
are based on undocumented 
or invalid assumptions and 
are largely subjective with no 
references to supporting data. 
Individual risk assessments 
have some undocumented 
assumptions.  Supporting data 
is referenced but there is no 
discussion of the how the data 
relates to the analysis. 
Individual risk assessments 
include a general discussion of 
assumptions.  Supporting data is 
referenced and discussed in the 
context of the analysis. 
Individual risk assessments performed using 
clearly referenced data sources, with 
documented rationale connecting the related 
data to each risk that was analyzed.  All 
assumptions are valid and documented. 
Risk evaluation  
The risk evaluation is not 
connected to the risk 
analysis.  Claims of risk 
acceptability are made 
without consideration of risk 
tolerance. 
The risk evaluation is derived 
from the results of the risk 
analysis but does not 
adequately align with the 
associated risk tolerance. 
The risk evaluation is derived 
from the results of the risk 
analysis and is aligned with the 
applicable risk tolerance. 
Risk evaluation is derived from the results of 
the risk analysis and is aligned with the 
applicable risk tolerance.  Individual risks are 
evaluated and accepted on a case-by-case 
basis rather than through a comparison with a 
risk threshold. 
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Risk Control 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Risk control 
option analysis 
Risks deemed unacceptable 
through risk evaluation do 
not continue to risk control. 
All unacceptable risks 
continue to risk control, 
however there is no 
consistent or documented 
rationale for the selection of 
mitigation activities.   
All unacceptable risks continue 
to risk control, and the selection 
of mitigation activities is 
appropriate and includes a 
documented rationale.   
All unacceptable risks continue to risk 
control.  Evidence that the mitigation 
strategy selected is optimal based on the 
anticipated effectiveness of the risk control, 
the individual risk or group of risks that are 
targeted for reduction, the root cause of 
those risks, anticipated residual risk, and 
new risks that may arise as a result of each.  
Rationale for selection of mitigation 
strategy is documented. 
Risk reduction 
Documented risk mitigation 
activities are not 
consistently implemented. 
Documented risk mitigation 
activities are implemented as 
defined, and presumed to be 
effective in reducing the risk. 
Documented risk mitigation 
activities are implemented as 
defined, and evaluated for 
effectiveness in reducing the 
risk.  
Documented risk mitigation activities are 
implemented as defined, and evaluated for 
effectiveness in reducing the risk.  There is 
an analysis and appropriate action taken in 
the event new risks are introduced (or 
existing risks affected) through the 
implementation of the mitigation activities. 
Residual risk 
appraisal 
Residual risk is not 
evaluated following 
mitigation. 
Appraisal (acceptance or 
rejection) of residual risk is 
documented with no 
rationale. 
Appraisal of residual risk, 
including rationale, is 
documented in every 
assessment.  
Comprehensive, documented rationale 
included to describe the acceptability of 
both individual and overall residual risk.   
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Risk Review 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Risk review 
structure 
There is no defined process 
for risk review. 
There is a defined process 
for risk review, but data 
sources and expectations for 
analysis and conclusions are 
weakly defined. 
There is a defined process for 
risk review. Internal data 
sources and expectations for 
analysis and conclusions are 
clearly defined. 
There is a defined process for risk review, 
including both periodic and event-driven 
reviews. Internal and external data sources 
are defined, and expectations for analysis 
and conclusions are clear. 
Risk review 
execution 
Risk review has not been 
performed. 
There is limited evidence of 
data being analyzed during 
risk review. 
There is evidence of internal 
data sources (e.g. deviations, 
change control, related ad hoc 
risk assessments) analyzed 
during risk review.  The 
rationale behind conclusions 
drawn is documented and is 
aligned with the data reviewed. 
There is evidence of both internal (e.g. 
deviations, change control, related ad hoc 
risk assessments) and external data sources 
(e.g. regulatory intelligence, industry 
benchmarking, etc.) analyzed during risk 
review.  The rationale behind conclusions 
drawn is documented and is robust, 
identifying specific connections between 
sources of information and related updates 
to the living risk assessment. 
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Risk Communication 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Risk 
communication 
plan 
No formal or defined 
requirements associated with 
communication relative to the 
person performing the 
communication, the parties 
receiving the communication, 
or the content, format, intent, 
or frequency of 
communication. 
Mechanism for 
communication is defined, 
however is uniform with 
respect to the form and 
audience of 
communication vs. what is 
being communicated. 
Several different mechanisms 
for communication are defined.  
Mechanism outlines 
communication pathways 
throughout the organization as 
well as with external 
stakeholders. 
A formalized risk communication plan 
exists, which defines several 
communication pathways based on nature 
of the communication, the intent of the 
communication, the format of 
communication, and the communicator and 
recipient. 
Communication 
of risks Risks are not communicated. 
Risk communication is 
infrequent, passive, 
unclear, or sporadic. 
Risk communication is 
performed frequently between 
necessary parties. 
Continuous risk communication occurs.  
Format of communication is tailored to 
what is being communicated (e.g. email, 
phone call, meeting discussion, formal 
documentation).   Communication is clear 
in terms of what the expected result will be 
(e.g. to inform or to initiate action).  All 
communication forms a closed loop so there 
is no ambiguity regarding whether the 
message has been understood. 
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QRM Infrastructure 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent Maturity Level 2: Novice 
Maturity Level 3: 
Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Roles and 
responsibilities 
Roles and 
responsibilities within 
the QRM program are 
not defined. 
Roles and responsibilities are defined 
but are isolated to a single functional 
group. 
Roles and responsibilities are 
defined, including the Head 
of QRM, System and Process 
Owners, Subject Matter 
Experts, Quality Unit, and 
senior management. 
Roles and responsibilities are defined, 
including the Head of QRM, System and 
Process Owners, Subject Matter Experts, 
Quality Unit, and senior management.  
All personnel fulfill their responsibilities 
under the QRM program. 
Dedicated QRM 
staff 
There are no staff 
responsible for the 
QRM program. 
One or more staff is responsible for the 
QRM program as a portion of their job 
description. 
There is a defined Head of 
QRM. 
There is a functional group dedicated to 
the QRM program, of an appropriate 
number based on site need.  The Head of 
QRM has direct access to senior 
management through his or her reporting 
structure.  
Qualified 
facilitators 
There are no qualified 
facilitators on site. 
Site has a defined group of qualified 
facilitators, however either: 
• there are insufficient numbers of 
facilitators to meet site needs, or 
• facilitators have not actively led a 
risk assessment for an extended 
period of time 
Site has an optimal number 
of qualified facilitators that 
is sufficient to meet site 
needs and ensure the 
facilitator's knowledge and 
experience remains current. 
Site has an optimal number of qualified 
facilitators that is sufficient to meet site 
needs and ensure the facilitator's 
knowledge and experience remains 
current.  Several of the facilitators are 
experts in QRM and can be relied upon 
to improve the effectiveness of the QRM 
program. 
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Governance 
Sub-heading Maturity Level 1: Absent 
Maturity Level 2: 
Novice Maturity Level 3: Intermediate Maturity Level 4: Expert 
Risk Register 
There is no 
risk register 
for the site. 
There is a risk register at 
the site that is updated 
sporadically or contains 
minimal information. 
There is a risk register in place that 
is updated consistently.  The register 
contains adequate information to 
enable the tracking of the site's most 
critical risks. 
There is a risk register in place that is updated consistently.  The 
register contains adequate information to enable the tracking of 
the site's most critical risks and to facilitate metrics.  The risk 
register is reviewed at the appropriate governance forum.  There 
is a defined escalation pathway to ensure the register is visible 
to senior management. 
Quality risk 
profile 
There is no 
quality risk 
profile for the 
site. 
There is a quality risk 
profile at the site that is 
updated sporadically or 
fails to capture key 
strategic quality risks. 
There is a quality risk profile in 
place that is updated consistently.  
All strategic quality risks are 
captured and addressed as 
appropriate.  The quality risk profile 
is created by the appropriate 
governing body. 
There is a quality risk profile in place that is updated 
consistently.  All strategic quality risks are captured and 
addressed as appropriate.  The quality risk profile is created by 
the appropriate governing body.  Decisions regarding strategic 
site objective, such as project planning and budgeting, are made 
in consideration of the quality risk profile. 
QRM Plan 
The site does 
not have a 
defined QRM 
plan. 
The site has a QRM Plan 
that focuses primarily at 
the activity level. 
The site has a QRM Plan that fully 
maps strategy to individual QRM 
activities over a defined timeframe.   
The site has a QRM Plan that fully maps strategy to individual 
QRM activities over a defined timeframe.  All personnel have 
visibility to the QRM Plan and the way in which their work 
influences the achievement of objectives is both clear and well 
understood. 
Metrics and KPIs 
The site has 
not defined 
metrics for the 
QRM 
program. 
QRM metrics focus on 
compliance and lagging 
indicators rather than 
effectiveness and leading 
indicators. 
QRM metrics include a mix of 
compliance and effectiveness 
measurements as well as lagging 
and leading indicators. 
The site has defined metrics and KPIs representative of all 
stages of QRM, compliance and effectiveness, and lagging and 
leading indicators.  Metrics and KPIs are tracked on a defined 
frequency and reviewed by applicable governing body.  KPIs 
indicate that QRM effectiveness is stable or improving. 
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